Gonzalez-Lopez v. State Indus. Prods. Corp.

MIGUEL GONZALEZ-LOPEZ, Plaintiff, v. STATE INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS CORP.; STATE CHEMICAL SALES COMPANY INTERNATIONAL, INC.;JOHN DOE; JANE ROE; INSURANCE COMPANIES A, B, AND C, Defendants.

CASE NO. 16-2710 (GAG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

March 20, 2019

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Miguel Gonzalez-Lopez ("Gonzalez-Lopez" or "Plaintiff") sued State Industrial Products Corp. and State Chemical Sales Company alleging unlawful discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §621 (Docket No. 1). Gonzalez-Lopez also invokes the Court's supplemental jurisdiction, for claims arising under Puerto Rico's Act No. 100 of June 30, 1959, P.R. LAWS ANN. Tit. 29, §146 et seq. ("Act 100"), Act No. 115 of December 20, 1991, P.R. LAWS ANN. Tit. 29, §194 et seq. ("Act 115"), Act No. 80 of May 30, 1976, P.R. LAWS ANN. Tit. 29, §185a et seq. ("Act 80"), and for alleged violations of Sections 1, 8 and 16 of the Bill of Rights of the Puerto Rico Constitution.¹ Pending before the Court are State Chemical and State Industrials motions for summary judgment. (Docket Nos. 171; 173). After disposing of preliminary matters involving Local Rule 56, the Court GRANTS aforementioned motions for summary judgment.

I. Local Rule 56²

As a threshold issue the Court must determine whether Plaintiff Opposition to the Uncontested Material Facts (Docket No. 195) complies with Local Rule 56. Gonzalez-Lopez's opposition statement of uncontested material facts included additional facts in his denials and qualifications of the moving party's facts.

At the summary judgment stage, parties must follow Local Rule 56. Section (c) instructs that "[a] party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall submit with its opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts." L. Cv. R. 56(c) (emphasis added). This opposing statement "shall admit, deny or qualify the facts supporting the motion for summary judgment by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts." Id. Each denial and qualification must be supported by a record citation. Id.

In addition to allowing an opposing party to admit, deny, or qualify the moving party's facts, Local Rule 56(c) allows an opposing party to submit additional facts "in a separate section." Id. (emphasis added). As the First Circuit has stated, "[t]he plain language of the rule specifically requires that additional facts be put forward in a 'separate section.'" Carreras v. Sajo, Garcia & Partners, 596 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that district court acted within its discretion when it disregarded additional facts not contained in a separate section). A separate section serves two purposes: "to allow the moving party to reply to those additional facts and to allow the court to easily determine the disputed facts." Malave-Torres v. Cusido, 919 F. Supp. 2d 198, 207 (D.P.R. 2013). For these reasons, "a party may not include numerous additional facts within its opposition to the moving party's statements of uncontested facts." Id.

If a party improperly controverts the facts, Local Rule 56 allows the Court to treat the opposing party's facts as uncontroverted. The First Circuit has consistently held that litigants ignore Local Rule 56 at their peril. See Caban Hernandez v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F. 3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007). Thus, due to the consequences of noncompliance with Rule 56, a better understanding is essential.

The line between a properly supported qualification, a denial, and additional facts may be blurry. Because Local Rule 56 requires each qualification or denial be supported by a record citation, a better understanding of what constitutes a proper qualification or denial is necessary to comply with the rule.

A qualification is "[a] modification or limitation of terms or language; esp., a restriction of terms that would otherwise be interpreted broadly." Qualification, Black's Law Dictionary 1436 (10th ed. 2014). Simply put, a qualification must clarify a statement of fact that, without clarification, could lead the Court to an incorrect inference. Thus, if a fact states that "Plaintiff works as an attorney all day," a proper qualification would be: "Plaintiff works as an attorney from 9-5" and a citation to the record supporting this fact. This would prevent the Court from inferring that Plaintiff works as an attorney from 7 a.m. to 9 p.m., which can be the standard in the legal world. Adding that Plaintiff works from 9-5 would not be considered an "additional fact" in the context of Local Rule 56. On the other hand, a denial, as common sense suggests, is "[a] statement that something is not true." Denial, id. at 527. So if a fact states that "Plaintiff is an attorney," a proper denial would be: "Denied. Plaintiff is a doctor" and a citation to the record supporting this fact.

First Circuit case law sheds some light on when parties cross the line between a proper qualification or denial and additional facts. In Acevedo-Padilla v. Novartis Ex Lax, Inc., the district court held that "a party's denial or qualification of a proposed fact must be strictly limited to the issue therein raised. Any additional information shall be included in a separate section in order to ease the Court's task." 740 F. Supp. 2d 293, 298 (D.P.R. 2010), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 696 F.3d 128 (1st Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). The First Circuit affirmed this ruling, labeling it "an appropriate exercise of [the district court's] discretion." Acevedo-Parrilla, 696 F.3d at 137 ("[D]istrict court, in an appropriate exercise of its discretion, ruled that it would disregard any additional facts provided by [plaintiff] when denying or qualifying [defendant's] statement of uncontested facts"). So, returning to the previous example of the 9-5 attorney, it could be improper to qualify the fact that Plaintiff works "all day" by adding that one day at work, Plaintiff's boss made a discriminatory remark. This fact would not be "strictly limited to the issue therein raised." Acevedo-Padilla, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 298.

The Court notes that the "strictly limited to the issue therein raised" standard for denials and qualifications, as articulated by my esteemed colleague, the late Senior Judge Salvador E. Casellas, is demanding but necessary. Id. The Court wants to impart justice, and lawyers play an essential role in helping it achieve this goal. Honest argumentation and clear presentation of the issues and facts help the Court tremendously. The opposite burdens the Court just as much.

Gonzalez-Lopez's response to State Chemical's statement of uncontested facts has indeed burdened the Court beyond cavil. Many of Gonzalez-Lopez's denials and qualifications contained pages of additional facts. For example, Paragraph 11 of State Chemical's statement of uncontested facts states: "González hand-delivered his resignation on June 12, 2015, effective June 15, 2015". (Docket No. 171-1 ¶ 11). A proper denial should be limited to those facts. Instead, Gonzalez-Lopez goes on to argue the characterization of the word resignation:

Admitted in part, denied in part. It is admitted that the Plaintiff hand delivered his employment resignation letter. However, Plaintiff denies the characterization of "resignation", since it is incorrect that it was a free and voluntary employment termination as it is incorrectly implied, since this is a contested fact as demonstrated by the evidence on record. On May 28, 2015, Plaintiff was wrongfully terminated and/or forced to resign from his job position because of the discriminatory treatment and retaliatory conduct against him became so intolerable and overwhelming that his health was being affected and continues to be affected. After trying numerous times to seek a resolution with the Company and from his direct supervisors, Plaintiff did not obtain any remedy for the discriminatory treatment that he was subjected to. Therefore, with great sadness and after 26 years of outstanding service, Plaintiff was forced to resign from his employment. State Chemical's and State Industrial's conduct forced him to resign. Therefore, Plaintiff was wrongfully terminated from his employment as a result of the Company's illegal practices. Exhibit 5, Plaintiff's Answer to Defendants' Set of Interrogatories, Interrogatory No. 19, pages 32-40. 9 Thus, there are genuine issues for trial on the facts concerning whether or not Plaintiff freely and voluntarily resigned from his employment, or whether he was constructively discharged and forced to resign.

(Docket No. 195-1 ¶ 10)³ (citations omitted).

Furthermore, Gonzalez-Lopez provided 271 additional facts that are mostly repetitive statements and legal arguments, at times contradicting his denials to State Chemical's statement of uncontested facts. (Docket No. 195-1). The Court could ignore them, as shown above, for not complying with Local Rule 56. But the Court firmly believes in access to justice, the lack of which is a serious problem in Puerto Rico, and feels uncomfortable completely disregarding these additional facts. See, e.g., Luis F. Estrella Martínez, Acceso a la Justicia 5 (2017) ("Dworkin visualizes 'integrity' as an ideal that aspires that public powers are not exercised in a capricious or arbitrary way, but coherently.") (translation ours); Deborah L. Rhode & Pablo J. Hernández Rivera, Access to Justice in Puerto Rico, 86 Rev. Jur. UPR 818, 822 (2017) ("The challenges facing Puerto Rico in ensuring access to justice remain substantial."); Federico Hernández Denton, Acceso a la justicia y Estado de Derecho, 81 Rev. Jur. UPR 1129 (2012) (focusing on two issues that "directly affect the manner in which one can measure our Rule of Law's success . . . access to justice and court efficiency") (translation ours); José Trías Monge, Sociedad, Derecho y Justicia 291 (1986) ("[L]awyer[s] must ensure the continued improvement in the progress of our courts.") (translation ours)...