Gonzalez v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., CIVIL NO. 12-1159 (CVR)

YAMIL VALENTIN GONZALEZ, Plaintiff, v. JOHNSON AND JOHNSON SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 12-1159 (CVR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

May 28, 2015

OPINION AND ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Yamil Valentín (hereinafter "Plaintiff" or "Valentín") brings this suit alleging discrimination on the basis of religion, violation of a reasonable accommodation agreement, and retaliation for having made internal complaints under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et. seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §12201, et. seq., and Puerto Rico Act No. 100 of June 30, 1959, and Act No. 115 of December 20, 1991, P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 29 §146-151, and for damages flowing therefrom under Puerto Rico Civil Code Articles 1802 and 1803, P.R. Laws Ann., tit. 31 § 5141 & 5142. The original Defendants were Johnson-Johnson Services, Inc.; Janssen Cilag Mfg., LLC; Janssen Ortho, LLC; Jorge Pantoja, his wife Jane Doe, and their conjugal partnership; Gilberto Pagán, his wife Jane Doe, and their conjugal partnership, and an unknown company.

On October 6, 2014, the Court dismissed all claims against Jorge Pantoja, his wife, the Pantoja-Doe conjugal partnership, Gilberto Pagán, his wife, the Pagán-Doe conjugal partnership, and XYZ Insurance Company, for failure to timely serve with process (DocketNo. 15). The remaining Defendants are Johnson-Johnson Services, Inc., Janssen Cilag Mfg., LLC and Janssen-Ortho, LLC (collectively, "Defendants").

Before the Court now is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 28); Plaintiff's opposition thereto (Docket No. 37); Defendants' reply to Plaintiff's opposition (Docket No. 44); and Plaintiff's sur-reply (Docket No. 51).

In Defendants' motion, they petition the Court to grant summary disposition of all of Plaintiff's claims. Regarding the claims brought under the ADA, Defendants proffer that they cannot lie because, since Plaintiff is not a qualified individual with a disability, he cannot establish a failure to accommodate claim. Defendants further posit that, even if Plaintiff was considered disabled, they were not obliged to provide him the specific accommodation he requested, only a reasonable one to accommodate his needs, which was done. As to the retaliation claim, Defendants aver that no prima facie case can lie, as the temporal nexus between the adverse employment action and the protected activity is too remote, and there is no causal connection between them. Even if a causal connection was established, Defendants have proffered a legitimate reason for their decision to transfer Plaintiff to the first shift of the Packaging Department, to wit, Plaintiff's own request in order to continue his medical treatment. Finally, regarding the religious discrimination claim, Defendant contend that most of the comments relied upon for the claim are too remote from the alleged decision in question to be considered, and further, they were made by persons who were not the decision makers and thus, should not be considered.

As to the state law claims, Defendants argue they should also be dismissed if the Court dismisses the federal claims, as the state law claims mirror their federal counterparts. Finally, Defendants contend that all claims against Johnson and Johnson Business Services (incorrectly named in the Complaint Johnson and Johnson Services, Inc.), and Janssen Cilag Mfg, LLC should be dismissed, as Plaintiff did not have any type of employment relationship with either entity.

Plaintiff counters, saying that his depressive disorder is a disability and that the reasonable accommodation offered to Plaintiff should be evaluated looking at the totality of circumstances. Regarding retaliation, Plaintiff proffers he suffered an adverse action because the transfer to the Packaging Department was a demotion and because temporal proximity exists between his complaints and the transfer. Finally, regarding the religious discrimination claims, Plaintiff alleges the comments uttered in the past can serve as background to support his present claims and the denial of the positions and subsequent transfer to the Packaging Department were because of his religion.

For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 (c). Pursuant to the language of the rule, the movingparty bears the two-fold burden of showing that there is "no genuine issue as to any material facts," and that he is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Vega-Rodríguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 178 (1st Cir. 1997).

After the moving party has satisfied this burden, the onus shifts to the resisting party to show that there still exists "a trial worthy issue as to some material fact." Cortés-Irizarry v. Corporación Insular, 111 F.3d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1997). A fact is deemed "material" if it potentially could affect the outcome of the suit. Id. Moreover, there will only be a "genuine" or "trial worthy" issue as to such a "material fact," "if a reasonable fact-finder, examining the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences helpful to the party resisting summary judgment, could resolve the dispute in that party's favor." Id. At all times during the consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the Court must examine the entire record "in the light most flattering to the non-movant and indulge all reasonable inferences in the party's favor." Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir. 1994).

The First Circuit Court of Appeals has "emphasized the importance of local rules similar to Local Rule 56 [of the District of Puerto Rico]." Hernández v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007); see also, Colón v. Infotech Aerospace Services, Inc., 869 F.Supp.2d 220, 225-226 (D. Puerto Rico 2012). Rules such as Local Rule 56 "are designed to function as a means of 'focusing a district court's attention on what is—and what is not—genuinely controverted.' " Hernández, 869 F.Supp.2d at 7 (quoting Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 427 (1st Cir. 2006)). Local Rule 56 imposes guidelines for both themovant and the party opposing summary judgment. A party moving for summary judgment must submit factual assertions in "a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts, set forth in numbered paragraphs." Loc. Rule 56(b). A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must "admit, deny, or qualify the facts supporting the motion for summary judgment by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of facts." Loc. Rule 56 (c). If they so wish, they may submit a separate statement of facts which they believe are in controversy. Facts which are properly supported "shall be deemed admitted unless properly controverted." Loc. Rule 56(e); P.R. Am. Ins. Co. v. Rivera-Vázquez, 603 F.3d 125, 130 (1st Cir. 2010) and Colón, 869 F.Supp.2d at 226. Due to the importance of this function to the summary judgment process, "litigants ignore [those rules] at their peril." Hernández, 486 F.3d at 7.

FINDINGS OF FACT

At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff's opposing statement of material facts duplicated many of Defendants' proffered facts. Just because the same fact is offered with different wording does not automatically make it different. Therefore, where two (2) versions of the same fact were offered by both parties, the Court only accepted one (1) submission. Furthermore, and in accordance with the Local Rules cited above, the Court did not accept submissions with incorrect citations that could not easily be identified by the Court, or submissions with citations to missing pages in the record.

With this in mind, and pursuant to the parties' submissions, the Court deems the following facts uncontested.

1. Plaintiff began working for McNeil Pharmaceutical in Dorado (hereinafter "McNeil-Dorado"), on May 12, 1997 as a regular employee in the position of Process Operator ("Operador de Procesos"). (P. Exhibit 1, Exhibit 2 to deposition).

2. In his employment application, Valentín informed McNeil-Dorado that he could not work on Saturdays due to religious beliefs. (D. Exhibit A P.32, L.20-25; P.33, L.1-3).

3. Valentín is an Adventist. (Docket No. 1 ¶13).

4. When Plaintiff began to work at McNeil-Dorado, he received the Johnson and Johnson Family of Companies Employee Handbook. (D. Exhibit A P.34, L15-18).

5. When Plaintiff began to work at McNeil-Dorado he was assigned to the first shift, from 6:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., from Monday through Friday, which did not interfere with his religious observances. (D. Exhibit A P.36, L.10-25).

6. On October 25, 2000, Valentín was notified that the McNeil operations in Dorado were closing in December 2000 and that he would be dismissed. (D. Exhibit A P.39, L.6-13, D. Exhibit B).

7. Prior to leaving McNeil-Dorado, Valentín sought and was offered employment at Janssen-Gurabo, to begin in 2001. (D. Exhibit A P.40, L.9-25; P.41, L.1-4).

8. At Janssen-Gurabo, Valentín was offered the position of Manufacturing Operator, with a salary rate of $12.32 per hour. (D. Exhibit A P.42, L.7-12).

9. When Valentín began to work at Janssen-Gurabo, he completed an employment application and indicated that he was available to work on Holidays and Sundays, but not on Saturdays. (D. Exhibit A P.43, L.13-25; P.44, L.1-4).

10. When Valentín began his employment with Janssen-Gurabo, he received the Employee Handbook. (D. Exhibit A P.44, L.13-16).

11. When Valentín began working at Janssen-Gurabo in 2001, he discussed with a supervisor and a Human Resources official two restrictions due to his religious beliefs: a) not to perform work from sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday;

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