Gonzalez v. LeClair

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TONY G. GONZALEZ v. BRIAN LeCLAIR, et al.

C. A. No. 23-00116-JJM

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island

April 6, 2023

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

LINCOLN D. ALMOND, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Tony G. Gonzalez, is an inmate at the Adult Correctional Institution (“ACI”) in Cranston, Rhode Island. In 2013, a Superior Court jury convicted Plaintiff of first-degree murder, assault with intent to commit a felony and two counts of discharging a firearm while committing a crime of violence. State v. Gonzalez, 254 A.3d 813 816 (R.I. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S.Ct. 1388 (Mar. 21, 2022). Subsequently, the Rhode Island Supreme Court vacated his conviction upon concluding that the trial justice committed error. Id. Plaintiff was retried in 2017 and convicted again on all counts. Id. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction, plus several consecutive sentences for the other crimes. Id.

Following Plaintiff's initial conviction in 2013, the Rhode Island Family Court entered a decree terminating his parental rights to his minor daughter, based, in part, on his convictions. See In re Izabella G., 140 A.3d 146, 147 (R.I. 2016). After his convictions were vacated by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, he moved to vacate the decree terminating his parental rights, and the matter was remanded to the Rhode Island Family Court. Id. In 2017, the Family Court issued a second decision terminating Mr. Gonzalez's parental rights. In re Izabella G., 196 A.3d 736, 740 (R.I. 2018).

On March 22, 2023, Plaintiff initiated this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff names as Defendants two attorneys that represented him in the state court proceedings, Brian LeClair and Paul Rioles, as well as three employees of the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families (“DCYF”) - Tracey Bonang, Audrey Shaw, and Diane Leyden. He claims that all Defendants violated his civil rights. Id. at pp. 2-3. The Complaint centers around his dissatisfaction with the decisions rendered in the state courts pertaining to the termination of his parental rights. He presently brings claims under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. He asserts that his rights were violated beginning April 10, 2013 and continued through November 29, 2018. Id. at p. 5. He claims that he did not “discover” the present claims until October 2022. (ECF No. 1-6 at p.1).

Neither Plaintiff nor his general allegations are new to this Court. This is the fifth lawsuit Plaintiff has filed in this Court since 2019. Although not identical, the Complaints in four of his five cases focus on allegations concerning his state court cases. The first case (Gonzalez v. Raimondo, C. A. No. 19-402-JJM) was filed on July 25, 2019. Plaintiff initially sought in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status, but his Complaint was summarily dismissed as time barred, and his Motion to Proceed IFP was denied on that basis. (See ECF Nos. 2, 3 in C. A. No. 19-402). Subsequently, he moved to Amend the Complaint and paid the filing fee in full. (See ECF Nos. 6, 9). In his Amended Complaint, he alleged that Attorneys Brian LeClair and Paul Rioles, as well as two DCYF employees, violated his constitutional rights in the state court proceeding that resulted in termination of his parental rights. The Court dismissed the Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine which precludes litigants from challenging state court judgments in Federal Court. (See ECF No. 23 in C. A. No. 19-402). Plaintiff did not appeal that dismissal. The second case (Gonzalez v. Coyne-Fague, C. A. No. 21-349-MSM) was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge ACI policy and to assert constitutional rights to sexually explicit material while he was incarcerated. He filed the case on August 26, 2021, was granted IFP status, and his case was dismissed on March 9, 2022 for failure to state a claim. (See ECF No. 13 in 21-349-MSM). Plaintiff filed an appeal that remains pending. The third case (Gonzalez v. State, C. A. No. 21-394-MSM) was filed on September 28, 2021. Plaintiff was granted IFP status, and his case was dismissed because the relief he sought (a Writ of Mandamus directing the Rhode Island Supreme Court to permit him to reargue his appeal) failed to state a claim because the Court is without authority to issue such a writ. (See Judgment dated May 12, 2022 in C. A. No. 21-394). The fourth case, (Gonzalez v. Coyne-Fague, C. A. No. 22-174-JJM) was filed on April 27, 2022 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and remains active in this Court.

Standard of Review

In connection with proceedings in forma pauperis, section 1915(e)(2), 28 U.S.C., directs the Court to dismiss a case at any time if the Court determines that the action is, inter alia, frivolous or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Similarly, section 1915A, 28 U.S.C., directs courts to screen complaints filed by prisoners against a governmental entity, officer or employee and dismiss such claims for identical reasons. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Section 1915A is part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) and was enacted by Congress to curtail meritless prisoner suits. See Bieregu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.Supp.2d 342, 345-346 (D.N.J. 2003) (citing Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 755 (3^rd Cir. 1996)).

A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Further, a claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when the facts alleged are “irrational or wholly incredible.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (“[A] court is not bound, as it usually is when making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the plaintiff's allegations” when such factual allegations describe “fantastic or delusional scenarios”).

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A is identical to the legal standard used for ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion. See Pelumi v. Landry, No. 08-107, 2008 WL 2660968 at *2 (D.R.I. June 30, 2008). In making this determination, the Court must accept plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, although the Court need not credit bald assertions, unverifiable conclusions, or irrational factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Denton, 504 U.S. at 33. Further, the Court must review pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citation omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Finally, dismissal under § 1915 may be based on statute of limitations grounds. Street v. Vose, 936 F.2d 38 (1^st Cir. 1991).

Discussion

This is exactly the type of case and litigant that Congress had in mind when it enacted the PLRA's screening requirement. Plaintiff is a convicted murderer serving a life sentence. He is indigent so he qualifies financially for in forma pauperis status, i.e., excusal from prepayment of the civil case filing fee. He has plenty of time on his hands to prepare court filings and no economic or other disincentive from repeatedly filing frivolous lawsuits.

As noted above, this is one of five cases filed by Plaintiff in this Court during his incarceration. Since only two of the other four cases (C.A. Nos. 21-349 and 21-394) were dismissed on the merits, this case does not technically violate the three-strike rule. Under the PLRA, a prisoner is barred from filing a lawsuit if he has, on three or more prior occasions, filed lawsuits that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious or for failing to state a claim unless “the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). However, even though it is not Plaintiff's third strike, this case is repetitive and frivolous and should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) and constitute Plaintiff's third strike.

In this case, Plaintiff names as Defendants two attorneys he previously sued in C. A. No. 19402, as well as several employees of the Rhode Island DCYF. The Court has closely reviewed Plaintiff's Complaint in this case, and it contains very similar allegations to those set forth in the Complaint and Amended Complaint in his 2019 case. Both his 2019 case and this case focus on Plaintiff's dissatisfaction with the decisions rendered in the State Court pertaining to the termination of his parental rights. He argues that the Defendants in this case “abused their positions” and seeks injunctive relief and punitive damages. (ECF No. 1 at p. 5). He presently brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violation of his rights secured by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim in Rhode Island is three years. Tripp v. DeCarlo, No. CA 11-325 S, 2013 WL 836791, at *3 (D.R.I. Mar. 6, 2013). He asserts that his rights were violated beginning April 10, 2013 and through November 29, 2018. (ECF No. 1 at p. 5).

Chief Judge McConnell dismissed his initial Complaint in C. A. No 19-402 on statute of limitations grounds which alleges similar claims during the same time period. In his summary dismissal order, Chief Judge McConnell noted that “Mr. Gonzalez' Complaint fails to state a cause of action because it is clear on its face that any claims that he may have had are barred by the statute of limitations.” (ECF No. 3 in C. A. No. 19-402). Plaintiff subsequently...