Gonzalez v. Perdue

SHAWN V. GONZALEZ, Plaintiff, v. SONNY PERDUE, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:18cv459

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Richmond Division

March 17, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the Court on four motions:

(1) Pro Se Plaintiff Shawn V. Gonzalez's Rule 60 Motion for Relief From the Court's February 15, 2019 Memorandum Order (the "Rule 60 Motion"), (ECF No. 19);

(2) Gonzalez's Rule 60(a)(b)(1) Motion to Correct a Clerical Mistake in the Court's March 8, 2019 Memorandum Order (the "Rule 60(a)(b)(1) Motion"), (ECF No. 21);

(3) Gonzalez's Rule 59(e) Motion to Amend the Court's March 8, 2019 Memorandum Order (the "Rule 59(e) Motion"), (ECF No. 22); and,

(4) Defendant Sonny Perdue's Motion to Dismiss in Part Gonzalez's Second Amended Complaint (the "Partial Motion to Dismiss"), (ECF No. 33).

Perdue¹ responded to Gonzalez's Rule 60 Motion, Rule 60(a)(b)(1) Motion, and Rule 59(e) Motion, (ECF Nos. 23, 24, 25), and Gonzalez replied, (ECF Nos. 26, 27, 28). Gonzalez responded to Perdue' Partial Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 36), and Perdue replied, (ECF No. 37). Gonzalez submitted an unauthorized sur-reply to Perdue's Partial Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 38).

These matters are ripe for adjudication. The Court dispenses with oral argument because the materials before it adequately present the facts and legal contentions, and argument would not aid the decisional process. The Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).² For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant the Partial Motion to Dismiss and deny the Rule 60 Motion, the Rule 60(a)(b)(1) Motion, and the Rule 59(e) Motion.

I. Factual and Procedural History

A. Factual Background³

In her Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), Gonzalez brings this eighteen (18) count action against Sonny Perdue, in his official capacity, alleging disability discrimination during her time as an employee of the United States Department of Agriculture ("DAG") between June 9, 2014, to October 1, 2014.

On June 9, 2014, DAG began to employ Gonzalez as a "Single Family Housing Technician" in Rural Development. (SAC ¶ 6, ECF No. 16.) Gonzalez alleges that she "was a qualified individual with a disability within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act" and that she was "a disabled veteran with a mental health designation . . . within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act." (Id. ¶ 7.)

The Court offers a brief description of the factual basis for Gonzalez's claims. Gonzalez alleges three types of discrimination. First, Gonzalez posits that other DAG employees discriminated against her on the basis of her disability. Gonzalez alleges a thirty (30) percent veteran's disability based on her mental health and personality disorder. (SAC ¶¶ 5, 8.) Specifically, she contends that "Defendant summarily denied all my reasonable accommodation requests" and made no attempts to otherwise "engage in the interactive process to determine what [her] mental health disability limitations involved." (SAC ¶ 10.) As to this claim, Gonzalez adds that other employees subjected her to a hostile work environment⁴ She states that a coworker, Brenda Johnston, physically threatened her. (Id. ¶ 19.) Another coworker, Anne E.E. Herring, harassed her for "refusing to leave the workplace" with Johnston. (Id.) Gonzalez claims that yet another employee, Cheryl Bates, approached Gonzalez to inform her that the employee "objected to [Gonzalez] being . . . hired with . . . veteran disability status." (Id. ¶ 51.)

Second, Gonzalez asserts that she experienced racial discrimination when two of her supervisors "pressured [her] to accuse" various coworkers "of racial discrimination instead of disability discrimination." (SAC ¶ 91.) Gonzalez states that she "vehemently opposed" attempts to coerce her to accuse coworkers of racial discrimination. (Id.) After that, one of hersupervisors "refused to speak to [Gonzalez] after [her] disagreement with him about racial discrimination." (Id.)

Third, Gonzalez complains that DAG employees retaliated against her for certain whistleblowing activities. She states that "on or about July 05, 2014," she noticed "irregularities with processing housing, banking, energy, research, and marketing appropriations outlined in the 2014 Farm Bill." (SAC ¶ 31.) Gonzalez reported those violations to a supervisor who then supposedly "violated [her] disability rights and removed [her] from employment" in order to protect himself. (Id.) Gonzalez also alleges that she was "subjected to reprisals as a result of objecting to . . . [a] program violation." (Id.)

1. EEOC Activity

According to unmarked documents attached to the Second Amended Complaint, Gonzalez filed a complaint with DAG on October 10, 2014. (See SAC Ex. 1, Complaint of Employment Discrimination). Gonzalez's initial complaint with the DAG indicates that she brought her claims for "disability discrimination, harassment, retaliation and reprisal." Id. Based on a letter DAG officials sent Gonzalez on December 23, 2014, Gonzalez amended that complaint on November 10, 2014. (See SAC Ex. 10, December 23, 2014 Letter to Gonzalez.) The amendments, memorialized in the December 23, 2014 letter, did not specify any additional forms of discrimination, instead describing additional events which supported her initial claims. (See id.) On March 13, 2015, DAG sent Gonzalez an additional letter, this time indicating that her complaint had been dismissed. (See SAC Ex. 13, March 13, 2015 Letter to Gonzalez.)

On September 17, 2015, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") sent Gonzalez a letter, acknowledging receipt of an appeal from DAG's dismissal that Gonzalez filed on August 7, 2015. (See SAC Ex. 15, September 17, 2015 Letter to Gonzalez.)The documents submitted to the Court do not contain any information indicating that the EEOC appeal contained any different claims than those raised in her DAG complaint. Finally, on April 5, 2018, the EEOC sent Gonzalez a letter denying her request for reconsideration of her appeal on "the bases of physical and mental disabilities and reprisal." (See SAC Ex. 3, April 5, 2018 Letter to Gonzalez.)⁵ This lawsuit followed.

2. Amended Complaint at Bar

The Second Amended Complaint brings eighteen counts. In the Partial Motion to Dismiss, Perdue seeks dismissal of Counts 1-6, 9, 11, and 13-18.⁶

Count 1: Fourteenth Amendment violation;

Count 2: (The Second Amended Complaint does not contain a Count 2);

Count 3: Fourteenth Amendment Protection Against Workplace harassment;

Count 4: Reprisals for Efforts to Enforce Fourteenth Amendment Protections Against Workplace Harassment;

Count 5: Fourteenth Amendment Protections Against Wrongful Termination;

Count 6: Reprisals for Efforts to Enforce Fourteenth Amendment Protection Against Wrongful Termination;

Count 7: Violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.;

Count 8: Violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act; as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.;

Count 9: Violation of Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.;

Count 10: Reprisal in Violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.;

Count 11: Retaliation in Violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.;Count 12: Intentional Violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.;

Count 13: Violation of Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a;

Count 14: Participation Clause of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.;

Count 15: Opposition Clause of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.;

Count 16: Civil Service Reform Act of 1978;

Count 17: Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)); and,

Count 18: Whistleblower Retaliation Claim.

B. Procedural History In This Court

On July 3, 2018, Gonzalez filed her Complaint (the "Original Complaint"). (ECF No. 1.) On September 26, 2018, Gonzalez filed an Amended Complaint (the "First Amended Complaint"), but without any factual assertions. (ECF No. 3.) On November 26, 2018, Perdue filed a Motion to Dismiss (the "First Motion to Dismiss") citing Gonzalez's failure to "include . . . any factual information supporting her claims." (Mem. Supp. First Mot. Dismiss. 2, ECF No. 9.) Gonzalez filed a Motion for Leave of the Court to File a More Definite Statement of the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 13.)

On January 25, 2019, this Court concluded that the First Amended Complaint and Gonzalez's proposed additional documentation failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and ordered Gonzalez to file a Second Amended Complaint by February 14, 2019. (See Jan. 25 Order 1, ECF No. 14.) Gonzalez failed to timely file a Second Amended Complaint, so the Court dismissed the First Amended Complaint without prejudice on February 15, 2019, and directed the Clerk to close the case. (Feb. 15, 2019 Mem. Order 4, ECF No. 15.) Four dayslater, on February 19, 2019, Gonzalez filed a Second Amended Complaint.⁷ (ECF No. 16.) Given Gonzalez's pro se status, the Court directed the Court to reopen the case and reissue the summons for Perdue. (March 8, 2019 Order, ECF No. 17.)

On March 14, 2019, Gonzalez filed the first of three motions regarding what she viewed as the premature closure of her case. First, she filed a Rule 60 Motion⁸ arguing that this Court's January 25, 2019 Order "was not curable by granting a second amended complaint regarding entitlement to relief because Federal Rule of Civil Procedures were previously satisfied, and the Order did not provide specific fair notice." (R. 60 Mot. 11, ECF No. 19.) Second, on March 18, 2019—four days later—Gonzalez filed a Rule 60(a)(b)(1)⁹ Motion contending that the Court's finding that she filed her "complaint on February 19, 2019" amounted to "a clerical error that the...