Gonzalez Villanueva v. Warner Lambert, No. CIV. 01-1322SEC.

339 F.Supp.2d 351

Alma GONZALEZ VILLANUEVA Plaintiff v. WARNER LAMBERT, et als. Defendants

No. CIV. 01-1322SEC.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

September 30, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Aurimir Arocho-Torres, Manuel Porro Vizcarra Law Office, Guaynabo, PR, for Alma Gonzalez Villanueva, Plaintiff.

Carl E. Schuster, Schuster Usera & Aguilo LLP, Lourdes C. Hernandez-Venegas, Schuster Usera & Aguilo LLP, San Juan, PR, Rafael E. Lazaro-Castro, Schuster Usera & Aguilo LLP, San Juan, PR, for Warner-Lambert Company, and/or Pfizer Global Manufacturing, John Doe 01CV1322, Plan Administrator, Medical Card System, Inc., Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

CASELLAS, District Judge.

This is an action for benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § § 1001, et seq. ("ERISA"), for compensation on account of an alleged failure to provide notice of continuation of medical plan coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1161 et seq. ("COBRA"), and for dismissal without just cause pursuant to Puerto Rico Act No. 80 of May 30, 1976, 29 L.P.R.A. § § 185a et seq. (Act. No. 80), brought by Plaintiff Alma González Villanueva against her former employer, Pfizer Pharmaceutical, Inc. (formerly Warner-Lambert), and their plan administrator, Medical Card System, Inc. (MCS).

Now pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket # 29). Plaintiff has timely opposed said request (Docket # 40). Defendants have filed a reply (Docket # 43), and Plaintiff has filed a sur-reply (Docket # 46). In addition, Defendants have also filed a motion supplementing their motion for summary judgment (Docket # 47) and, in turn, Plaintiff has also supplemented her opposition (Docket # 48). After a careful review of the parties' filings and the applicable law, we find that Defendants' motion must be GRANTED.

Background

Plaintiff was an employee of Warner-Lambert who was a participant in several benefits plans maintained by said company for its employees, including the medical plan, the Short Term Disability (STD) Benefits Plan, and the Long Term Disability (LTD) Benefits Plan. Due to a medical condition, Plaintiff commenced sick leave in August of 1998, and later began to receive STD benefits. Eventually, on January 4, 1999, she applied for LTD benefits. After compiling and evaluating the medical evidence supplied by Plaintiff and her employer, as well as the results of an independent evaluation, Co-defendant MCS denied Plaintiff's application for long term benefits, inasmuch as she was found not to be totally disabled under said Plan. Plaintiff appealed said decision. Ultimately, however, the decision was upheld on appeal.

In the meantime, in September of 1999, Pfizer received a copy of a notification from MCS addressed to Plaintiff regarding her denial of LTD benefits. Since Plaintiff had been absent from work in excess of one (1) year and had exhausted all medically related leave, Pfizer considered Plaintiff to be voluntarily terminated, and proceeded to issue the corresponding termination documents, including the termination of medical plan benefits, and the issuance of the corresponding notice of employee rights in regard to the Company's benefits, including the COBRA notice.

However, due to an error in the internal notification procedure, Plaintiff's employment was not terminated until February 29, 2000, even though she had been notified in September of 1999 that her medical plan benefits would cease as of October 1, 1999. Notwithstanding, at the time of her termination in February 2000, Plaintiff was sent the corresponding COBRA notice. Subsequently, Plaintiff was approved for Social Security Disability (SSD) benefits and Pfizer took the decision to reinstate her retroactively to the medical plan coverage. Pfizer reinstated Plaintiff's benefits effective March 1, 2000, exactly one day after her termination.

On March 7, 2001 Plaintiff filed a civil action before the Puerto Rico Court of First Instance, Bayamón Superior Part alleging that Defendants had unlawfully denied her LTD benefits, had failed to properly notify her of her rights under COBRA, and had terminated her employment without just cause. Thereafter, on March 20, 2001, Defendant Warner-Lambert removed said claim to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446.

Standard of Review

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b) provides that: "A party against whom a claim ... is asserted ... may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part [of the claims asserted against him/her]." The Court may grant the movant's motion for summary judgment when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202(1986); NASCO, Inc. v. Pub. Storage, Inc., 29 F.3d 28 (1st Cir.1994). "The principal judicial inquiry required by Rule 56 is whether a genuine issue of material fact exists." 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 2725, p. 401.

In this regard, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that for a dispute to be "genuine," there must be sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable trier of fact to resolve the issue in favor of the non-moving party. U.S. v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir.1992); see also Boston Athletic Assn. v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 24 (1st Cir.1989); Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990) ("[a] `genuine' issue is one that must be decided at trial because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, would permit a rational factfinder to resolve the issue in favor of either party.") (citations omitted).

By like token, "material" means that the fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Morris v. Gov't Dev. Bank of P.R., 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir.1994). "A fact is material if it tends to resolve any of the issues that have been properly raised by the parties." Wright, Miller & Kane, supra, § 2725 at p. 419. "Not every genuine factual conflict necessitates a trial. It is only when a disputed fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under the governing law if found favorably to the nonmovant that the materiality hurdle is cleared." Martínez v. Colón, 54 F.3d 980, 983-984 (1st Cir.1995).

In addition, when determining whether to grant summary judgment, the Court may not weigh the evidence. Casas Office Machs., Inc. v. Mita Copystar Am., Inc., 42 F.3d 668 (1st Cir.1994). Summary judgment "admits of no room for credibility determinations, no room for the measured weighing of conflicting evidence such as the trial process entails." Id. (citing Greenburg v. P.R. Mar. Shipping Auth., 835 F.2d 932, 936 (1st Cir.1987)). Accordingly, if the facts permit more than one reasonable inference, the court on summary judgment may not adopt the inference least favorable to the non-moving party. Casas Office Machs., 42 F.3d at 684.

While the moving party has the burden of initially establishing that there is "an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case," Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994); the nonmovant has a "corresponding obligation to offer the court more than steamy rhetoric and bare conclusions." Lawton v. State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of Am., 101 F.3d 218, 223 (1st Cir.1996). Furthermore, "the nonmovant must `produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form' sufficient to limn a trialworthy issue. ... Failure to do so allows the summary judgment engine to operate at full throttle." Id.; see also Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir.1991) (warning that "the decision to sit idly by and allow the summary judgment proponent to configure the record is likely to prove fraught with consequence."); Medina-Muñoz, 896 F.2d at 8, (quoting Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989)) (holding that "[t]he evidence illustrating the factual controversy cannot be conjectural or problematic; it must have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve.").

Local Rule 56(b), moreover, requires the moving party to file annexed to the motion "a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts, set forth in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried." Unless the non-moving party controverts this statement, all the material facts set forth therein "shall be deemed to be admitted." Id.; Cosme-Rosado v. Serrano-Rodriguez, 360 F.3d 42 (1st Cir.2004). This is the so-called "anti-ferret rule." See, e.g., Orbi. S.A. v. Calvesbert & Brown, 20 F.Supp.2d 289, 291 (D.P.R.1998). While failure to comply with this rule does not automatically warrant the granting of summary judgment, "it launches the nonmovant's case down the road toward an early dismissal." Tavárez v. Champion Prods., Inc., 903 F.Supp. 268, 270 (D.P.R.1995).

Applicable Law and Analysis

Plaintiff's Claims under ERISA

ERISA is a "comprehensive and reticulated statute." Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361, 100 S.Ct. 1723, 64 L.Ed.2d 354 (1980). It governs the rights and responsibilities of parties in relation to employee pension and welfare benefits plans. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 650-51, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995). Said statute establishes a cause of action for plan participants and other beneficiaries "to recover benefits due to him [or...