Goodrich v. State

1

DIANDRE GOODRICH v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 1050-2023

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

December 5, 2024

UNREPORTED^[*]

Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No C-15-CR-22-000138

Zic, Ripken, Wright, Alexander, Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

OPINION

Ripken, J. Diandre Goodrich ("Appellant") was tried before a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County in March of 2023. He was found guilty of attempted second-degree murder, armed robbery, and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. The circuit court sentenced Appellant to thirty years' incarceration. Appellant noted a timely appeal. For the following reasons, we shall affirm.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Appellant presents the following issues for our review:^[1]

I. Whether the circuit court erred in addressing the joint motion for a continuance.

II. Whether the circuit court erred or abused its discretion in admitting body worn camera footage depicting the victim.

III. Whether the circuit court erred in permitting the State to question Appellant regarding other witnesses.

IV. Whether plain error review should be exercised regarding the circuit court's control of closing arguments.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In December of 2021, police responded to a residence on Poppyseed Lane and discovered Pierre Darnell Toliver ("Toliver") in the sunroom. Toliver had suffered a gunshot wound to the face. He was transported to a trauma center and subsequently taken by helicopter to a Baltimore hospital where he underwent surgery and then remained comatose for a month. Upon coming out of his comatose state Toliver told police that he had been shot by a man he knew only by the nickname "Dre." Toliver never identified "Dre" either during police interviews or in court.

In January of 2022, police interviewed Zaphire Acevedo-Hodge ("Acevedo-Hodge"), Appellant's former girlfriend. Acevedo-Hodge stated that she had witnessed the shooting and identified Appellant as the shooter. She entered into a plea agreement that included testifying at Appellant's trial. Khianna Crews ("Crews"), a friend of Acevedo-Hodge, testified at trial. Sarah Fazenbaker ("Fazenbaker"), who lived in the Poppyseed Lane house, also testified at trial.

On the night Toliver was shot, Acevedo-Hodge, Crews, and Appellant drove together to purchase Methylenedioxymethamphetamine ("MDMA"), also known as Ecstasy or Molly, and then went to the Poppyseed Lane house. Appellant and Acevedo-Hodge joined Toliver in the sunroom and the three smoked MDMA together. Appellant then demanded that Toliver "give him everything," pulled out a gun, and shot Toliver in the face. Appellant searched Toliver's pockets, took his wallet and cell phone, and departed with Acevedo-Hodge. At trial, the testimony regarding this timeline of events was corroborated by cell phone tracking data. The data showed Appellant's cell phone located and moving with cell phones that belonged to Acevedo-Hodge and Crews to Poppyseed Lane, and then departing with cell phones belonging to Acevedo-Hodge and Toliver.

At trial, the parties did not stipulate to facts; however, the sole issue contested by Appellant was identity.^[2] Appellant testified that he was not the man who shot Toliver. Appellant indicated that on the evening Toliver was shot, Appellant had spent time with Acevedo-Hodge and Crews at another friend's residence at a different location. Appellant testified that he permitted Acevedo-Hodge and Crews to leave with his mother's car so that Acevedo-Hodge could use the car to go to work. He testified that he did not go with Acevedo-Hodge and Crews to purchase MDMA or to the Poppyseed Lane house. Appellant stated that he was using two cell phones at the time, and that the phone for which the State presented tracking data was kept permanently in the car that Acevedo-Hodge and Crews used. Additional facts will be discussed below as they become relevant.

DISCUSSION

I. The Circuit Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion When it Treated Appellant's Words as Opposition to a Motion to Continue.

Prior to trial, the court conducted a hearing on a joint motion to continue. During the hearing, Appellant's counsel informed the trial judge that Appellant "would rather represent himself and keep the same trial date." The trial judge referred the matter to the administrative judge to address the trial date.

The administrative judge inquired of Appellant directly about his words regarding representing himself. In response, Appellant began by stating: "I do not want the case postponed." He expressed that he was unhappy about the postponement because he wanted his day in court. He stated, "I would like an attorney, but I don't want to waive my speedy trial. I need my day in court, sir." He repeated, "I would like my day in court, and this is very psychologically damaging for me to see my court date that I've been waiting on for months [] be pushed back several more months." Appellant concluded by stating, "I'm willing to risk whatever it takes if I can just keep my trial date where it's at."

The administrative judge responded, "Well, sir, I want you to have an attorney, given what you're facing. You are very confident about that .... But I'm going to postpone this trial date, sir." The administrative judge granted the joint continuance motion and set a new trial date. Neither the trial judge nor the administrative judge made a formal ruling on a potential discharge of Appellant's counsel.

A. Party Contentions

Appellant argues that he did request to represent himself and keep his original trial date which was akin to a Rule 4-215(e) request to discharge counsel, and that the circuit court was required to follow the mandatory procedure in ruling on such a motion. He argues that neither the trial judge nor the administrative judge made a requisite determination as to whether the reasons he supplied in his request to represent himself were meritorious and that this failure amounts to an error requiring reversal.

The State argues that Appellant's sole basis for the words regarding representing himself amounted merely to an intended support of his opposition to the postponement, and that he expressed no conflict with his attorney warranting discharge or invoking the rule. The State further argues that because Appellant stated he would like an attorney, and because the court found that a postponement was unavoidable, Appellant's comment regarding self-representation was merely transitory and did not require a full Rule 4-215 inquiry.

B. Analysis

Under Maryland Rule 4-215(e), "[i]f a defendant requests permission to discharge an attorney whose appearance has been entered, the court shall permit the defendant to explain the reasons for the request. If the court finds that there is a meritorious reason for the defendant's request, the court shall permit the discharge of counsel[.]" A trial court's compliance with the requirements of the Maryland Rules is a question of law reviewed by this Court de novo. State v. Graves, 447 Md. 230, 240 (2016). To trigger application of the rule, a defendant "must simply express to the court that [the defendant is] dissatisfied with [the defendant's] current attorney." State v. Davis, 415 Md. 22, 31 (2010). Any statement which would reasonably alert the court that the defendant has the intent to discharge counsel can invite the court to inquire further. Graves, 447 Md. at 241-42. The rule protects a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and right to self-representation; either way, the procedural steps are the same. See Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 262-63 (1987).

Once application of Rule 4-215(e) is triggered, the trial court must first provide the defendant with a forum to explain their reasons for requesting the discharge. State v. Taylor, 431 Md. 615, 631 (2013). The record must sufficiently reflect that the court considered whether the defendant's reasons were meritorious. Id. The court must then grant or deny the request. Pinkney v. State, 427 Md. 77, 94 (2012).

A defendant must have a present intent to discharge counsel in order to mandate application of Rule 4-215(e). Henry v. State, 184 Md.App. 146, 171 (2009). In Henry, the defendant, through his counsel, requested a continuance so that new counsel could be substituted. Id. at 169. The trial court in Henry did not rule on whether to discharge the defendant's counsel, but rather ruled, "'I'm not going to grant the continuance.'" Id. at 170. This Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in treating Henry's request as a motion for a continuance, because his request for a continuance did not demonstrate a present intent to discharge his counsel. Id. at 171-72.

In a subsequent case analyzing Henry, the Supreme Court of Maryland approved this view, noting that "neither Henry nor his counsel conveyed to the court any displeasure with his current representation, leading the court to appropriately assume that he was not requesting to discharge counsel, but merely petitioning for a continuance so that he could attempt to engage [new counsel]." Davis, 415 Md. at 34. The Supreme Court contrasted the request in Henry with the request in Davis, where the defendant expressed dissatisfaction with his attorney's work, a statement which should have triggered application of the rule. Id. at 35. The Court therefore held that a defendant's intent to discharge counsel must be "current and established." Id. at 33.

Similarly in Taylor, the Supreme Court noted that, where Taylor's request to be represented by a different attorney was contingent on the granting of a continuance and Taylor expressed no dissatisfaction or disagreement with his present attorney, the trial court properly "treated the...