Goodridge v. Siemens Energy, Inc.

THEDA H. GOODRIDGE, Plaintiff,

v.SIEMENS ENERGY, INC., Defendant.

Case No.: 4:11-CV-240-VEH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA MIDDLE DIVISION

DONE: January 30, 2013

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Theda Goodridge ("Ms. Goodridge"), who is proceeding pro se, initiated this action against her former employer, Defendant Siemens Energy Inc. ("SEI") on January 26, 2011. (Application, Doc. #1). The court ordered Ms. Goodridge to file an Amended Complaint. (Order, Doc. #2). The Amended Complaint (Doc. # 3), as amended by the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #10) alleges, against SEI, claims of: (1) employment discrimination (pay, failure to promote, and termination) based on her gender, in violation of 42 USC §§ 2000 et seq. ("Title VII") (Count One); (2) employment discrimination (pay, failure to promote, and termination) based on her age, in violation of 29 USC §§ 621 et seq. ("ADEA") (Count Two); and (3) violations of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. §206(d)(Count Three).

On October 1, 2011, SEI filed its Motion for Summary Judgment, with accompanying brief and evidentiary material (the "Motion," Docs. # 20, 21). Ms. Goodridge twice requested (Docs. # 22, 23) and received (Margin Orders dated 10/24/2012 and 11/26/2012) extensions of time to respond to the Motion. The deadline for Ms. Goodridge to respond expired on December 13, 2012. Ms. Goodridge has failed to oppose the Motion. Accordingly, SEI's Motion for Summary Judgment is now under submission for a decision. Upon consideration of the record and the relevant law, the court concludes that SEI's Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

"Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' "Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); FED.R.CIV.P. Rule 56(a) ("The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant isentitled to judgment as a matter of law.").¹ The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue [-now dispute-] of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant (here, SEI) may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party (here, Ms. Goodridge) has failed to present evidence in support of some element of her case on which she bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at 322-324.

In this case, as demonstrated below, SEI has met its evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of any genuine dispute of material fact. Thus, the burden shifts to Ms. Goodridge to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to her case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir.1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e)(3) ("Ifa party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the record including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court may ... grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it.") A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263. Consequently, to survive SEI's properly supported motion for summary judgment, Ms. Goodridge is required to produce "sufficient [favorable] evidence" which would be admissible at trial supporting her claims of age and gender discrimination. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . Thus, when a plaintiff such as Ms. Goodridge fails to set forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to her case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 ("[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial."); Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir.1987) (If on any part of the prima facie case the plaintiff presentsinsufficient evidence to require submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material fact. Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir.1990) ("Although we must view factual inferences favorably toward the nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to a liberal interpretation by the courts, we hold that a pro se litigant does not escape the essential burden under summary judgment standards of establishing that there is a genuine issue as to a fact material to his case in order to avert summary judgment."). Thus, Ms. Goodridge's pro se status alone does not mandate this court's disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. In this case, Ms. Goodridge fails to demonstrate a requisite genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude summary judgment.

A plaintiff in an employment discrimination case maintains the ultimate burden of proving that the adverse employment decision was made because of intentional discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509-12 (1993); Nix v. WLCYRadio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir. 1984). Although the Supreme Court previously established the basic allocation of burdens and order of proof in a disparate treatment case, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), as modified by Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), that allocation scheme applies only in cases where there is no direct evidence of discrimination, Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 595 (11th Cir. 1987).

Under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine scheme, a plaintiff first has the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Once the plaintiff proves a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. Finally, if the defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff must either prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant are merely a pretext for discrimination or present sufficient evidence, of any type, for a reasonable jury to conclude that discrimination was a "motivating factor" for the employment action, even though defendant's legitimate reason may also be true or have played some role in the decision. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-05; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-54; Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101-02.

More specifically, regarding a nonmovant's failure to oppose summaryjudgment, "the district court cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the mere fact that the motion [is] unopposed, but, rather, must consider the merits of the motion." United States v. One Piece of Real Property, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Dunlap v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 629, 632 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). While this court is not required to examine every item of evidence before it when considering a motion for summary judgment, it must make certain that the motion is "supported by evidentiary materials." One Piece of Real Property, 363 F.3d at 1101.

At the very least, this court must consider all the evidence submitted by the movant in support of its motion. Id. (citing Jeroma v. Massey, 873 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (". . . the district court must review the motion and the supporting papers to determine whether they establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.")). The movant must demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of material fact; if the movant fails to meet his burden, this court may deny the motion, without regard to whether the nonmovant has filed a response. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 776 F.3d at 1279 (citing John v. State of Louisiana, 757 F.2d 698, 708 (5th Cir. 1985)). However, if the nonmovant has not supplied the court with a response to dispute any issue of fact, this court may receive the movant's factual account as "a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment." Eversley v. MBank Dallas, 843F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex, 477 U.S. 317).

III. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

1. Ms. Goodridge was born in 1960, and was 45 years old as of May 15, 2006. [Pl. Dep. 22:21 - 23:1; 13:6-9; 144:11-15].

2. SEI hired Ms. Goodridge on May 15, 2006, as a Procurement Specialist 1 in the indirect purchasing department. [Pl. Dep. 13:6-9; 144:11-15...