Goodville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Brenner

174 N.E.3d 1255

GOODVILLE MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellee

v.Virginia C. BRENNER, et al., Appellants

No. WM-20-007

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Sixth District, Williams County.

Decided: June 30, 2021

Peter C. Munger, Toledo, for appellees.

Robert A. Rutter, for appellant.

DECISION AND JUDGMENT

ZMUDA, P.J.

I. Introduction

{¶ 1} Appellants, Virginia Brenner and Amber Osmun, appeal the August 17, 2020 judgment of the Williams County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, Goodville Mutual Casualty Company ("Goodville"). For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

A. Facts and Procedural Background

On September 6, 2019, Goodville filed a declaratory judgment action pursuant to Civ.R. 57 and R.C. Chapter 2721, asking the trial court to declare the rights of the parties under a homeowner's insurance policy it issued to Brenner for property located at 10439 County Road 10A in Bryan, Ohio, following a fire which occurred on January 13, 2019. The policy's declarations page identifies coverages for a residence, related private structures, personal property, and additional living costs and loss of rents. Relevant to this appeal, the residence coverage refers to a farmhouse while the related private structures coverage refers to a two-story detached garage structure located approximately 150 feet from the farmhouse. The garage consisted of a first-floor storage area and a second-floor apartment. At the time of the fire, Brenner resided in the farmhouse. Osmun, Brenner's granddaughter, resided in the apartment with her son. The fire destroyed the detached garage structure, including the storage area and the apartment, and all of their contents. The farmhouse was not damaged.

{¶ 2} Brenner filed a claim for the damage to the structure and for her personal property which was destroyed. Osmun also filed a claim for her damaged personal property. On April 25, 2019, Brenner and Osmun appeared for an examination under oath regarding their respective personal property claims.¹

{¶ 3} In their testimony, it was revealed that Brenner had purchased insurance coverage for the property from Goodville annually since 2007 when her husband passed away. Osmun and her son resided in the farmhouse for nearly ten years prior to moving into the apartment in the spring of 2018. Osmun indicated that she moved into the apartment after Brenner's prior renters—Osmun's cousins—vacated the premises. Brenner did not keep any personal property in the apartment. Brenner did keep some personal property in the garage beneath the apartment. Brenner did not purchase any separate insurance coverage for the property of any renters that might occupy the apartment. Osmun likewise did not purchase any renter's insurance for her personal property or contact Brenner's agent to inquire about obtaining renter's insurance when she moved into the apartment.

{¶ 4} Both the farmhouse and the apartment share a single address. The utility bills for each structure were separate but both were in Brenner's name. Brenner paid the utility bills for the farmhouse and gave Osmun the apartment's utility bills for payment. Brenner performed all of her daily activities—cooking, cleaning, etc.—in the farmhouse. Brenner had never slept in the apartment and Osmun and her son did not sleep in the farmhouse from the time they moved into the apartment until the date of the fire. Brenner testified that she furnished the apartment with appliances prior to Osmun moving in but Osmun testified that she and Brenner purchased the appliances together.

{¶ 5} There was some dispute between Brenner and Osmun as to the status of the property and rent payments. The parties agree that their intention was to ultimately transfer the entirety of the property to Osmun after she moved into the apartment. Brenner believed that she was still the owner of the property at the time of the fire. Brenner also testified that Osmun paid her monthly rent once she moved into the apartment. Osmun testified, however, that she did not pay monthly rent and that on June 19, 2018, Brenner executed a quitclaim deed transferring ownership of the property to Osmun. Osmun testified that she would be taking over the mortgage on the property but that process had not yet been completed at the time of the fire.

{¶ 6} In conjunction with that transfer, Brenner and Osmun executed a lease agreement which granted Brenner a 99-year lease to remain on the property. The lease identified Osmun as the "landlord" and Brenner as the "tenant." The lease agreement does not require a monthly rent payment. Despite that, Osmun testified that Brenner pays her $400 per month which Osmun uses to pays the $811 monthly mortgage payment. Neither Brenner nor Osmun advised Goodville of the transfer of ownership.² Brenner testified that she paid all of the Goodville insurance premiums from the time Osmun moved into the apartment. Osmun testified that she gave Brenner $100 in cash each month to pay toward the insurance premium. Osmun also testified that she paid the sole real estate tax bill that had come due between the transfer of ownership and her examination under oath. Appellants did not provide any evidence of any of the rent, utility, or tax payments.

{¶ 7} Following the examinations, Goodville filed their declaratory judgment action alleging that Osmun was not an "insured" as defined by the policy. Brenner and Osmun filed their joint answer generally denying Goodville's allegations along with a counterclaim for declaratory judgment requesting the trial court find that Osmun was an "insured" under the Goodville policy.

{¶ 8} The policy includes the following relevant definitions:

1. The words "your" and "your" mean the person or persons named as the insured on the "declarations."

* * *

13. "Insured" means:

a. "you";

b. "your" relatives if residents of "your" household[.]

The policy does not define "resident" or "household."

{¶ 9} Goodville filed a motion for summary judgment on March 5, 2020, arguing that although Osmun was a relative of Brenner's, she was not a member of Brenner's household and, therefore, not an "insured." Brenner and Osmun filed their cross-motion for summary judgment on April 15, 2020 arguing that Osmun was an "insured" under the terms of the policy.

{¶ 10} On August 17, 2020, the trial court granted Goodville's motion for summary judgment and denied appellant's cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that Osmun was not a resident of Brenner's household under the plain meaning of those terms and, therefore, was not an "insured" as defined in the policy.

B. Assignment of Error

{¶ 11} Appellants timely appealed and assert the following errors for our review:

1. The trial court erred in concluding that the term "household" was not ambiguous in the context of a case where the residence consists of a structure and related structure;

2. The trial court erred in concluding that the only plain and ordinary meaning of "household" was the definition found in Websters (sic) Dictionary, and not the definition found in Black's law Dictionary;

3. The Trial Court erred in concluding that the structure and related structure were not considered "under the same roof."

II. Analysis

{¶ 12} We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court. Lorain Natl. Bank v. Saratoga Apts. , 61 Ohio App.3d 127, 129, 572 N.E.2d 198 (9th Dist.1989) ; Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. , 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is appropriate where (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact exists; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. , 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 375 N.E.2d 46 (1978).

{¶ 13} On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Dresher v. Burt , 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). In doing so, the moving party must point to some evidence in the record in the form of "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action[.]" Civ.R. 56(C) ; Dresher at 292–293, 662 N.E.2d 264. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to provide evidence showing that a genuine issue of material fact does exist. Dresher at 293, 662 N.E.2d 264. The failure to satisfy this reciprocal burden warrants judgment against the nonmoving party. Id. at 293, 662 N.E.2d 264. We find that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Goodville. Because they are interrelated, we address appellants’ first and second assignments of error together.

A. The policy definition "resident of your household" is not ambiguous.

{¶ 14} In their first and second assignments of error, appellants argue that the trial court erred in finding that the term "household" was not ambiguous. Specifically, appellants argue that because the policy does not define "household" and because multiple dictionaries define "household," that the term is ambiguous and should have resulted in coverage for Osmun's personal property claim.

{¶ 15} We review the interpretation of an insurance policy as a matter of law. Buehrer v. Meyers, 2020-Ohio-3207, 155 N.E.3d 222, ¶ 13. "It is well settled that ‘insurance policies should be enforced in accordance with their terms as are other written contracts. Where the provisions of the policy are clear and unambiguous, courts cannot enlarge the contract by implication so as to embrace an object distinct from that originally contemplated by the parties.’ " Id. at ¶ 14, citing Rhoades v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. Of U.S., 54 Ohio St.2d 45, 47, 374 N.E.2d 643 (1979). "A...