Goodwyn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

JERMAINE GOODWYN v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY

No. 3488

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2018

March 18, 2020

Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Case No. 24-C-18-004042

UNREPORTED

Fader, C.J., Reed, Shaw Geter, JJ.

Opinion by Fader, C.J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

Section 19-513(e) of the Insurance Article (Repl. 2017; Supp. 2019) requires that the "benefits payable" under underinsured motorist coverage be reduced to the extent that the insured has recovered related, unreimbursed workers' compensation benefits.¹ The appellant, Jermaine Goodwyn, contends that the appellee, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, used the wrong definition of "benefits payable" in determining that it did not owe him any underinsured motorist benefits. Based on the plain language of the statute, we agree with State Farm. We will, therefore, affirm the Circuit Court for Baltimore City's entry of summary judgment in favor of State Farm.

BACKGROUND

The Statutory Scheme

Since 1973, motor vehicle insurance carriers in Maryland have been required "'to offer certain minimum uninsured motorist coverage in every motor vehicle policy issued' in this State." Kurtz v. Erie Ins. Exch., 157 Md. App. 143, 147 (2004) (quoting Waters v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 328 Md. 700, 710 (1992)). Maryland's uninsured motorist statutes, which are set forth in §§ 19-509 through 19-511 of the Insurance Article, were "enacted as part of a broad comprehensive statutory scheme governing motor vehicle insurance," Revis v. Md. Auto. Ins. Fund, 322 Md. 683, 687 (1991), for the purposes of, among other things, "providing . . . coverage for certain types . . . of economic loss" and "prohibiting the duplication of benefits," 1972 Md. Laws, ch. 73; see Erie Ins. v. Curtis,330 Md. 160, 175 (1993). Although the statutes "refer[] only to 'uninsured' motorist coverage," GEICO v. Comer, 419 Md. 89, 91 n.1 (2011), "the statutory scheme . . . includes uninsured and underinsured coverage,"² State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. v. Crisfulli, 156 Md. App. 515, 522 (2004).

Section 19-509 sets forth general requirements of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. Section 19-509(g) defines the carrier's "limit of liability" for such coverage as "the amount of that coverage less the amount paid to the insured, that exhausts any applicable liability insurance policies, bonds, and securities, on behalf of any person that may be held liable for the bodily injuries or death of the insured." In other words, where an insured receives any proceeds from a tortfeasor's insurer, his or her own insurer's "limit of liability" is reduced by the amount of those proceeds.

In cases where the insured also receives workers' compensation benefits, § 19-513(e) provides for a further reduction:

Benefits payable under the coverage[] described in §[] 19-509 of this subtitle shall be reduced to the extent that the recipient has recovered benefits under the workers' compensation laws of a state or the federal government for which the provider of the workers' compensation benefits has not been reimbursed.

Factual Background

Mr. Goodwyn was on foot and about to enter his company vehicle when he was struck by a car being driven by Sharda Crenshaw. He sustained injuries as a result of the accident. Ms. Crenshaw was insured—coincidentally, also by State Farm—under a policy with applicable limits of $30,000. In a settlement, State Farm agreed to pay those policy limits to Mr. Goodwyn.

Because the accident occurred while Mr. Goodwyn was working, he also pursued a claim for workers' compensation benefits, for which he ultimately received $45,759.42. By agreement, Mr. Goodwyn used $9,844.19 of his recovery from Ms. Crenshaw's insurance policy to reimburse a portion of the workers' compensation lien, leaving a total of $35,915.23 in unreimbursed workers' compensation benefits.

State Farm insured the company vehicle Mr. Goodwyn was about to enter under a policy that provides underinsured motorist coverage up to a limit, as relevant here, of $50,000 per person. The relevant insuring agreement provides that State Farm "will pay compensatory damages . . . an insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle . . . caused by an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of an uninsured motor vehicle." (emphasis removed). Included in the policy's definition of an "uninsured motor vehicle" is a vehicle that is insured, but under a policy for which "the limits are less than required by" Maryland law.

Mr. Goodwyn's Action Against State Farm

Mr. Goodwyn filed an action against State Farm in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to recover benefits allegedly owed to him under his employer's underinsured motoristpolicy. The critical issue in the litigation was the proper interpretation of the term "benefits payable" in § 19-513(e):

• State Farm contended that "benefits payable" means the amount of benefits potentially owed under its underinsured motorist coverage. As set forth in § 19-509(g), State Farm argued, that amount is $20,000, which is its policy limit of $50,000, less the $30,000 recovered from Ms. Crenshaw's insurance policy. Because that amount is less than the $35,915.23 Mr. Goodwyn received in unreimbursed workers' compensation benefits, State Farm calculated that it does not owe Mr. Goodwyn any coverage;

• Mr. Goodwyn contended that "benefits payable" means his total damages, which he alleged are approximately $90,000 to $100,000, less the $30,000 recovered from Ms. Crenshaw's insurance policy. Subtracting $35,915.23 from that amount would leave at least $24,084.77 in available coverage, although Mr. Goodwyn acknowledged that State Farm's potential liability is separately capped at $20,000 pursuant to § 19-509(g).

The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment as to the meaning of "benefits payable." After a hearing, the court entered a written order in which it agreed with State Farm. Mr. Goodwyn appealed.

DISCUSSION

We review an appeal from a grant of summary judgment without deference to determine "whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Georg, 456 Md. 616, 651 (2017) (quoting Chateau Foghorn LP v. Hosford, 455 Md. 462, 482 (2017)).

THE CIRCUIT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO STATE FARM.

This dispute turns on an issue of statutory interpretation. "The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the General Assembly." Md. Ins. Admin. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 451 Md. 323, 335 (2017) (quoting Bottiniv. Dep't of Fin., 450 Md. 177, 187 (2016)); see Revis, 322 Md. at 686 (observing that the "ultimate aim is to effect the legislative intent" of the statute). "[W]e look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning." Md. Ins. Admin., 451 Md. at 335 (quoting Bottini, 450 Md. at 187). We do so because "the General Assembly is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant." Id. In discerning "the 'normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute,'" we read its language "as a whole so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory." Duffy v. CBS Corp., 458 Md. 206, 229 (2018) (quoting Koste v. Town of Oxford, 431 Md. 14, 25-26 (2013)). Where appropriate, we will also consider "the context of the entire statutory scheme of which [a statute] is a part," and will "avoid a construction of the statute that is unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense." Wireless One v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 465 Md. 588, 606 (2019) (quoting Lillian C. Blentlinger, LLC v. Cleanwater Linganore, Inc., 456 Md. 272, 295 (2017)).

"If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written." Md. Ins. Admin., 451 Md. at 335 (quoting Bottini, 450 Md. at 187-88). In other words, "[i]f the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, we 'need not look beyond the statute's provisions and our analysis ends.'" Koste, 431 Md. at 26 (quoting Barbre v. Pope, 402 Md. 157, 173 (2007)).

Although not required, it is often prudent to examine the legislative history to confirm that our plain language interpretation of a statute is correct. See, e.g., Brown[ v. State], 454 Md. [546,] 551 [2017] ("Occasionally we see fit to examine extrinsic sources of legislative intent merely as a check of our reading of a statute's plain language. In such instances, we may find usefulthe context of a statute, the overall statutory scheme, and archival legislative history of relevant enactments.").

Neal v. Balt. City Bd. of School Comm'rs, ___ Md. ___, No. 21, Sept. Term, 2019 (Feb. 28, 2020). But where the ordinary tools of statutory construction produce but one reasonable interpretation of a statute's plain language, we may also stop right there.

Applying these principles, we return to the statutory scheme applicable to underinsured motorist benefits, beginning with § 19-509. Under § 19-509(c), all motor vehicle liability insurance policies issued, sold, or delivered in Maryland must provide underinsured motorist coverage. General provisions applicable to that coverage are provided in § 19-509, with additional or related provisions contained in §§ 19-509.1, 509.2, 510, 511, and 511.1. Most notably for our purposes, § 19-509(g) provides that an insurer's "limit of liability" for underinsured motorist coverage "is the amount of that coverage less the amount paid to the insured, that exhausts any applicable liability insurance policies, bonds, and securities, on behalf of any person that may be held...