Goolsby v. Cnty. of San Diego

THOMAS GOOLSBY, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., Defendants.

Case No.: 17cv564-WQH (NLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

February 18, 2020

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[ECF No. 137]

Before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 137. For the reasons outlined below, the Court RECOMMENDS that the district judge GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN PART Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Thomas Goolsby ("Plaintiff"), a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that Defendants violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights stemming from his incarceration at the George Bailey Detention Facility and San Diego County Jail between December 12, 2016 and May 17, 2017. ECF No. 15 (Third Amended Complaint). Plaintiff's complaint alleges three claims: (1) lack of Fourteenth Amendment due process in his classification and extended placement in administrative segregation; (2) conditions of confinement that violate his Eighth Amendment rights, specifically, depriving him of sleep; and (3) conditions of confinement that violate his Eighth Amendment rights, specifically, depriving him outdoor exercise.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss in which the Court granted in part and denied in part. ECF No. 97. The Court dismissed Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims regarding conditions of confinement based on sleep deprivation as to all defendants, but permitted him to proceed on his Fourteenth Amendment claims regarding placement in administrative segregation against the County of San Diego and his Eighth Amendment claims regarding denial of outdoors and out of cell exercise against the County of San Diego. Id. at 10. All other individual defendants were dismissed from the case. Id.

After the close of discovery, Defendant County of San Diego filed a motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 137. The Court notified Plaintiff of the requirements for opposing summary judgment pursuant to Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988) and Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). ECF No. 138. Plaintiff filed an opposition, Defendant filed a reply, and Plaintiff filed a sur-reply. ECF Nos. 147, 150, 152.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The claims that remain in this litigation center around two events: (1) Plaintiff's placement into administrative segregation when he arrived at San Diego Central Jail in December 2016, and (2) Plaintiff's access to outdoor exercise at the George Bailey Detention Facility and San Diego Central Jail, starting February 7, 2017.

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A. Administrative Segregation

On December 12, 2016, Plaintiff was transferred from the California Department of Corrections to San Diego County Central Jail. ECF 147 (Goolsby Decl.) at 48, ¶ 5.¹ Plaintiff was issued green clothing and a green wristband. Id. at 2, ¶ 6. At some point during Plaintiff's intake and booking process, Deputy Frankie Leon and Plaintiff spoke about Plaintiff's prior housing placements, rules violations, and gang affiliations. Id.; ECF 137-5 (Leon Decl.) at 3, ¶ 9. Prior to the conversation, Deputy Leon familiarized himself with Plaintiff's Jail Information System History. Id. at 2, ¶ 7. During the conversation, Plaintiff indicated he was previously identified as a gang member by an Institutional Gang Investigator while in Tehachapi State Prison. Id. 3, ¶ 10. As a result of Plaintiff's gang verification, a field interview was conducted to document any tattoos. ECF 137-2 (Froistad Decl.) at 5, ¶ 26. Deputy Campos conducted the field interview. ECF 137-2 (Exh. I) at 70-85.

Deputy Leon then drafted a report recommending that the Plaintiff be housed in administrative segregation. ECF 137-2 (Exh. G) at 63-64. Sergeant Rose approved the suggestion the following day. Id. Pursuant to Deputy Leon's recommendation, Plaintiff was transferred into administrative segregation. ECF 137-5 (Leon Decl.) at 4, ¶ 14. On December 14, 2016, Plaintiff filed a grievance form contesting his placement in administrative segregation. ECF 137- 2 (Exh. H) at 66-68. The following day, December 15, 2016, Sergeant Lawson received and responded to Plaintiff's grievance. ECF 137-2 (Exh. J) at 87-88. Sergeant Lawson informed Plaintiff he was not deprived of due process or privileges as an inmate in the County of San Diego. Id.

B. Outdoor Exercise

Plaintiff was housed at the George Bailey Detention Facility during the period of February 7, 2017 to February 27, 2017 and from April 20, 2017 to May 17, 2017. ECF No. 137-6 (Mendoza Decl.) at 2, ¶ 6. He was housed in various modules at San Diego Central Jail for the time in between, from February 27, 2017 to April 20, 2017. Id.

Plaintiff alleges and states during his deposition and in his declaration that he never received any out of cell exercise or recreation yard time after February 7, 2017. ECF No. 15 at ¶ 108; ECF No. 147 (Goolsby Decl.) at 51-52, ¶ 16. He further states that he never once refused yard time when he was offered. ECF No. 147 (Goolsby Declaration) at 52, ¶ 17.

Defendant instead presents evidence from Deputy Sheriff Mendoza that Plaintiff was offered a total of 23 days of yard time between February 7 to May 17, 2017, for a total of 46.5 hours, averaging 3.875 hours per week. ECF No. 137-6 (Mendoza Decl.) at 2-3, ¶¶ 8-13. Of these offered days, Deputy Mendoza states that Plaintiff started recreation time at least 12 times. Id. at 3, ¶¶ 10-11.

Plaintiff also alleges and states in his deposition and declaration that on March 6, 2017, he filed a grievance regarding his lack of exercise time, which was handed to and accepted by M.R. Meza. ECF No. 147 (Goolsby Decl.) at 52, ¶ 19; ECF No. 137-2 (Goolsby Dep.) at 39:12-25, 40:21-41:1. Plaintiff states he did not receive a response to this grievance. ECF No. 147 (Goolsby Decl.) at 52, ¶ 19; ECF No. 137-2 (Goolsby Dep.) at 41:2-42:6. Plaintiff also states that later in March or early April 2017, he wrote a letter to Sheriff Gore complaining about the same issue and he also never received a response to this letter. ECF No. 147 (Goolsby Decl.) at 53, ¶ 24; ECF No. 137-2 (Goolsby Dep.) at 42:7-43:18.

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III. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex. Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when it affects the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is "genuine" if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

The moving party can establish an absence of a genuine issue of material fact by (1) presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the non-moving party's case; or (2) demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to establish an essential element of that party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-323. The moving party must identify the pleadings, depositions, affidavits or other evidence that the party "believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323. If the moving party fails to bear the initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party's evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).

If the moving party meets its burden, the non-moving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by his own affidavits, or by 'the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. V. Cities Serv. Co., 391 US. 253, 289 (1968)). In making this determination, the court must view the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. The court should not engage incredibility determinations, weighing of evidence, or drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts; these functions are for the trier of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

IV. Discussion

A. Administrative Segregation Placement

Defendant County of San Diego bears the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and demonstrating its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex, 477 at 323. Here, the Defendant fails to satisfy its initial burden. For the reasons explained below, the Court recommends the District Judge deny Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to this claim.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides, "[n]o State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Prisoners who wish to invoke due process protections must establish the existence of a protected interest and show it was denied without due process. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). The Constitution itself does not confer on inmates "a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement." Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Administrative segregation in and of itself typically does not implicate a liberty interest. Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003).

However, state regulations may create a liberty interest where the nature of the confinement "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life."² Id. at 222. In such cases where a liberty interest does exist, due process requires:

Prison officials must hold an informal nonadversary

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