Gorrio v. Francis, Civil Action 2:19-1297

MICHAEL GORRIO, Plaintiff, v. CORRECTIONAL OFFICER FRANCIS, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 2:19-1297

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

May 7, 2021

Nicholas Ranjan Magistrate Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

PATRICIA L. DODGE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. Recommendation

It is respectfully recommended that the Court grant in part and deny in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.78) the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 43.) It is further recommended that the Court dismiss three of the defendants named in the Amended Complaint pursuant to the screening provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. Report

A. Relevant Procedural History

Plaintiff Michael Gorrio is a state prisoner in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) who is currently housed at SCI Phoenix. The events in question in this lawsuit occurred between December 2018 and February 2020 when Plaintiff was housed at SCI Fayette. Plaintiff alleges that the numerous defendants in this case, all of whom worked at SCI Fayette during the relevant time period, engaged in a wide-ranging conspiracy to commit violations under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (“RICO”) Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. Plaintiff also claims Defendants violated the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-15, and brings numerous constitutional tort claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as related state-law claims.

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. He commenced this action in October 2019 when he was housed at SCI Fayette. In December 2019 the Court granted his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and his Complaint (ECF No. 6) was docketed. In May 2020 Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, which the Court granted. (See ECF Nos. 40, 41). Plaintiff then filed the Amended Complaint (ECF No. 43), which is the operative pleading, in June 2020. He also filed a RICO Case Statement. (ECF No. 44.)

Plaintiff names as defendants the following thirty-four officials and employees of SCI Fayette: (1) Superintendent Mark V. Capozza; (2) CO Scoles; (3) CO Evans; (4) CO Terravechia; (5) CO Dicks; (6) CO Emminger; (7) CO Rockridge; (8) CO Francis; (9) CO Caraselly; (10) CO Fetchco; (11) CO Hailey; (12) CO Burrie; (13) CO Minor; (14) CO Poland; (15) CO Regina; (16) CO Cox; (17) CO Ohrman; (18) CO Twardzik; (19) CO Saxion; (20) CO Henry; (21) Sgt. McKileen; (22) Sgt. Walshan; (23) Sgt. Haines; (24) Sgt. Wiles; (25) Lt. Wood; (26) Lt. Dailey; (27) Lt. Rusnak; (28) Lt. Parker; (29) Lt. Rhodes; (30) Superintendent Assistant Rhonda House and (31) Luis Allen, who were the Grievance Coordinators at SCI Fayette; (32) Edward Bohna, the Certified School Principal at SCI Fayette; (33) Brittany Kimmel, the School Guidance Counselor at SCI Fayette; and, (34) Beth Rudzinski, the Hearing Examiner at SCI Fayette. (Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 6-8.) Plaintiff sued each defendant in his or her official and individual capacities. (Id.)

Plaintiff also states in the Amended Complaint that he seeks to bring claims against numerous John/Jane Doe defendants who worked at SCI Fayette, including medical personnel and other correctional officers and lieutenants. (Id. ¶¶ 7-8.)

Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 78) the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) in which they seek to dismiss certain claims asserted by Plaintiff. (See also Brief in Support, ECF No. 79.) As explained below, Defendants are seeking dismissal of eleven of the seventeen causes of action Plaintiff brings in the Amended Complaint. They are not seeking dismissal of his constitutional tort claims related to incidents of excessive force, sexual assault, the interference with and/or deprivation of his education, or his state law claim of assault and battery. In his brief in opposition to Defendants' motion, Plaintiff contends that the Court should not dismiss any of his claims. (ECF No. 86.)

B. Standard of Review

At the pleading stage, Rule 8 requires a “short plain statement” of facts, not legal conclusions, “showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The Supreme Court held that, pertaining to Rule 12(b)(6)'s standard of review, a complaint must include factual allegations that “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[W]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only ‘fair notice' but also the ‘grounds' on which the claim rests.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008).

In determining whether a plaintiff has met this standard, a court must reject legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements;” “labels and conclusions;” and “‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted).

Mere “possibilities” of misconduct are insufficient. Id. at 679.

The Court of Appeals has summarized this inquiry as follows:

To determine the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must take three steps. First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1947, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 1950. Third, “whe[n] there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id. This means that our inquiry is normally broken into three parts: (1) identifying the elements of the claim, (2) reviewing the complaint to strike conclusory allegations, and then (3) looking at the well-pleaded components of the complaint and evaluating whether all of the elements identified in part one of the inquiry are sufficiently alleged.

Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).

“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings is well-established.”).

C. Facts Alleged in the Amended Complaint

1. The December 16, 2018 excessive force incident and Plaintiff's subsequent confinement in the RHU for 18 days

On December 16, 2018, Plaintiff was in the HC Unit attempting to negotiate the sale of chicken pieces to another inmate. CO Francis approached Plaintiff, accused him of being high on drugs, and handcuffed him. (Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 10-11.) Other officers arrived on the scene to escort Plaintiff to the medical unit and/or the “level 5” or Restrict Housing Unit (“RHU”). (Id. ¶ 14) Plaintiff alleges that Sgt. Walshan and other corrections officers subjected him to excessive force when they restrained him during this incident. (Id. ¶¶ 15-18.) Afterwards, Plaintiff was examined by medical personnel and taken to the Psychiatric Observation Center (“POC”) where he spent the night. (Id. ¶¶ 19-21.)

The following day, on December 17, 2018, Plaintiff was placed in the RHU in solitary confinement and he remained there for approximately 18 days. (Id. ¶ 21.) During this time Plaintiff submitted a Request to Staff. On December 29, 2018, Lt. Wood responded: “You become a problem you stay in the hole.” (Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff was released from the RHU to the general population after his toxicology tests came back negative. (Id. ¶ 21.)

2. Plaintiff's allegations pertaining to his college correspondence courses

Plaintiff was taking correspondence college courses with Colorado State University and Adams State University while he was incarcerated at SCI Fayette. (Id. ¶ 51.) In January 2019, Plaintiff sent a Request to Staff Member to Kimmel, the Guidance Counselor at SCI Fayette, in which he inquired about education-related matters. In a response dated January 25, 2019, Kimmel informed Plaintiff: “Per institutional policy any inmate pursuing correspondence courses must be 6-month misconduct free. You can write me in July. You misbehave we revoke your education completely and place you in the RHU, per Supt. Capozza.” (Id. ¶ 24.)

Plaintiff contacted Edward Bohna, SCI Fayette's Certified School Principal, in February 2019 inquiring about the completion of his ongoing college courses. Similar to Kimmel, Bohna advised Plaintiff that he would have to wait six months to take his exams. (Id. ¶ 25.) Plaintiff avers that the delay would have resulted in the automatic disqualification of the courses in which he was enrolled at the time. (Id.)

Plaintiff's father contacted the Chief Education Administrator of the Western Region. (Id. ¶ 26.) According to the Amended Complaint, the Administrator stated that Plaintiff was “authorized and entitled to impending college correspondence courses, and that Bohna and Kimmel were directed to administer the examinations and rectify the issue at bar.” (Id.)

Around this same time, Plaintiff submitted a Request to Staff Member to Lt. Wood, who responded: “You already went to the hole for using drugs. The answer is NO and we are not going to do more work after you...