Goudreau v. Goudreau

534 F.Supp.3d 713

The ESTATE OF Peter GOUDREAU, THROUGH Its Administrator, Jeffrey GOUDREAU, Plaintiff,

v.The ESTATE OF Linda Faye GOUDREAU, THROUGH Its Administrator, Claudia HOLLAND, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 4:20-cv-970

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Sherman Division.

Signed April 16, 2021

Chad Thomas McLain, Jordan Flournoy LLP, Dallas, TX, Larry Adrian Flournoy, Jr., Jordan Houser & Flournoy, Richardson, TX, for Plaintiff.

Katherine Kelly Valent, Scheef & Stone LLP, Frisco, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMOS L. MAZZANT, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Defendant The Estate of Linda Faye Goudreau, Through Its Administrator, Claudia Holland's Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Dkt. #3). Having considered the Motion and the relevant pleadings, the Court finds the Motion should be granted.

BACKGROUND

In 1981, Peter John Goudreau ("Peter") and Linda Faye Goudreau ("Linda") married in the state of Texas. During their marriage, Peter worked for Texas Instruments, Inc. ("TI"). As a TI employee, Peter participated in several benefits programs offered by his employer, including the 401(k) plan, the employee-savings plan, and the stock-option plan. After nearly four decades of marriage, Linda passed away on June 18, 2018. At the time of her death, Peter was alive and still worked for TI. Then on July 26, 2018, Peter passed away. At the time of his death, Peter was unmarried and remained employed by TI.

Both Peter and Linda died intestate. Separate heirship proceedings were opened in Collin County on August 14, 2018, and October 1, 2018, respectively. On September 28, 2018, the Collin County Probate Court ("the Probate Court") entered its Order Granting Independent Administration and Authorizing Letters of Independent Administration, naming Jeffrey Goudreau as the Independent Administrator of and sole heir to Peter's Estate. On December 12, 2018, the Probate Court entered its Order Declaring Heirship, naming Claudia Holland as the Independent Administrator of Linda's Estate.

In the course of Peter's estate administration, a dispute arose between Peter's Estate and Linda's Estate over the funds contained in the 401(k) plan, the employee-savings plan, and the stock-option plan in which Peter had participated while employed by TI.¹ On October 23, 2019, Linda's Estate filed a claim against Peter's Estate, maintaining that, despite predeceasing Peter, Linda had a community-property interest in several assets, including the proceeds from these three plans. Peter's Estate disputes this claim, arguing that ERISA governs these plans, which thereby preempts Linda's Estate's claim. When Peter's Estate did not accept the claim and thirty days passed from the claim's filing, the claim was rejected by operation of law (Dkt. #1 at p. 4). See TEX. ESTATES CODE ANN. § 355.002(b). On December 11, 2020, Linda's Estate filed a notice of hearing on its claim in the probate proceeding of Peter's Estate. The Probate Court set a hearing on the issue for December 29, 2020.

On December 21, 2020, Peter's Estate filed its Original Petition and Request for Declaratory Judgment (Dkt. #1), requesting the Court declare the claim of Linda's Estate to be preempted by ERISA law. As a result, at the December 29, 2020 hearing, the Probate Court required the proceeds from the plans to be preserved, and stayed any further action pending resolution of the proceedings currently before the Court. On January 12, 2021, Linda's Estate filed its Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Dkt. #3), currently before the Court. On January 25, 2021, Peter's Estate filed its response (Dkt. #4). And on February 1, 2021, Linda's Estate filed its reply (Dkt. #5).

LEGAL STANDARD

" ‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.’ " Xitronix Corp. v. KLA-Tencor Corp. , 916 F.3d 429, 435 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) ); see 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL. , FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3522 (3d ed.) ("A federal court's entertaining a case that is not within its subject matter jurisdiction is no mere technical violation; it is nothing less than an unconstitutional usurpation of state judicial power."). Absent subject matter jurisdiction, federal courts are without authority to act. Lower Colo. River Auth. v. Papalote Creek II, L.L.C. , 858 F.3d 916, 927 (5th Cir. 2017). And while "[c]ourts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists," Hertz Corp. v. Friend , 559 U.S. 77, 94, 130 S.Ct. 1181, 175 L.Ed.2d 1029 (2010) (citing Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006) ), parties may challenge the constitutional or statutory subject matter jurisdiction of a federal court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), Kumar v. Frisco Indep. Sch. Dist. , 443 F. Supp. 3d 771, 777 (E.D. Tex. 2020). See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), (h)(3). If a 12(b)(1) analysis indicates that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, then the case must be dismissed without prejudice. Mitchell v. Bailey , 982 F.3d 937, 944 (5th Cir. 2020).

In considering a 12(b)(1) motion, courts may examine "any of the following: ‘(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by the undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.’ " Lane v. Halliburton , 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Barrera-Montenegro v. United States , 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 1996) ). Courts "accept as true all well-pleaded allegations set forth in the complaint and construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Earl v. Boeing Co. , No. 4:19-CV-00507, –––F. Supp. 3d ––––, ––––, 2020 WL 759385, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2020) (citing Truman v. United States , 26 F.3d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 1994) ). Once a defendant moves for dismissal under 12(b)(1), "the party asserting jurisdiction" bears "[t]he burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction" "by a preponderance of the evidence." In re S. Recycling, L.L.C. , 982 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2020) ; Morris v. Thompson , 852 F.3d 416, 419 (5th Cir. 2017) ("The party asserting jurisdiction ‘constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.’ " (quoting Ramming v. United States , 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) )). "Yet that is no high bar: ‘It is extremely difficult to dismiss a claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.’ " Outlaw Lab., LP v. Shenoor Enter., Inc. , 371 F. Supp. 3d 355, 360 (N.D. Tex. 2019) (cleaned up) (quoting Santerre v. Agip Petrol. Co. , 45 F. Supp. 2d 558, 566 (S.D. Tex. 1999) ).

ANALYSIS

In the Motion, Linda's Estate contends that the assets at issue "were either never subject to an ERISA plan or are no longer governed by ERISA since they were paid out 100% to Peter's Estate," and, as a result, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute given the absence of a federal question (Dkt. #3 at p. 5). In response, Peter's Estate asserts that "because the issues in this case involve interpretation and application of federal ERISA laws," a federal question is implicated, and the Court has subject matter jurisdiction (Dkt. #4 at p. 1).

"Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the district courts have original jurisdiction of suits involving federal questions." Renegade Swish, L.L.C. v. Wright , 857 F.3d 692, 695 (5th Cir. 2017) (footnote omitted).² "The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams , 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) ; see The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co. , 228 U.S. 22, 25, 33 S.Ct. 410, 57 L.Ed. 716 (1913) ("[T]he party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon, and therefore does determine whether he will bring a ‘suit arising under’ the ... law of the United States by his declaration or bill.").

Here, Peter's Estate asserts that because the immediate controversy concerns federal law—ERISA—the Court has subject matter jurisdiction.³ Assuming without deciding that this suit implicates ERISA, Peter's Estate's assertion is not enough to show that the Court possesses subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Before the Probate Court, the alignment of the parties is reversed—Linda's Estate is the plaintiff, and Peter's Estate is the defendant. Before this Court, Peter's Estate is the nominal plaintiff. But because state courts possess concurrent subject matter jurisdiction with federal courts on several issues directly implicating ERISA, see, e.g. , Gorman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. , 811 S.W.2d 542, 545–46 (Tex. 1991), the Court understands Peter's Estate to argue that the instant issue is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, see Schuster v. Percheron Healthcare, Inc. , 493 F.Supp.3d 533, 536 (N.D. Tex. 2021) ("An exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule exists where there is complete preemption of the state claim by federal law.").

The Supreme Court has articulated that "[w]hen [a] federal statute completely pre-empts the state-law cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope of that cause of action, even if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law." Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson , 539 U.S. 1, 8, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003). ERISA is one such statute. Lone Star OB/GYN Assocs. v. Aetna Health Inc. , 579 F.3d 525, 529 (5th Cir. 2009) ; see, e.g. , Brackeen v. Haaland , 994 F.3d 249, 417–19 (5th Cir. 2021) (en banc). ERISA preemption comes in two forms: complete and conflict. See ...