Goulds Pumps (IPG), LLC v. United Steel Workers Local Union No. 3298

583 F.Supp.3d 427

GOULDS PUMPS (IPG), LLC, Plaintiff,

v.UNITED STEEL WORKERS LOCAL UNION NO. 3298, Defendant.

6:21-CV-06367 EAW

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed February 3, 2022

Glen P. Doherty, Scott Christopher Paton, Hodgson Russ LLP, Albany, NY, for Plaintiff.

Brian Joseph LaClair, Blitman & King LLP, Syracuse, NY, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, Chief Judge

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Goulds Pumps (IPG), LLC ("Plaintiff") brings the instant action pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) et seq. (the "FAA"), and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 185 et seq. (the "LMRA"), seeking vacatur of an opinion and award (the "Arbitration Award") issued by arbitrator Douglas J. Bantle (the "Arbitrator") on February 11, 2021. (Dkt. 1). Defendant United Steel Workers Local Union No. 3298 ("Defendant") has asserted a counterclaim seeking confirmation of the Arbitration Award pursuant to the LMRA. (Dkt. 4 at 10).

Currently before the Court are the parties’ competing motions for summary judgment. (Dkt. 14; Dkt. 15). For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied and Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted, except to the extent that it seeks an award of attorney's fees and costs.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

The following facts are derived from Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 14-28), Defendant's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts submitted in support of its motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 15-2), the parties’ respective responses thereto (Dkt. 19-2; Dkt. 20-1), and the exhibits submitted by the parties. Unless otherwise noted, these facts are undisputed.

Plaintiff is a foreign limited liability company with its principal place of business in Seneca Falls, New York. (Dkt. 14-28 at ¶ 1; Dkt. 20-1 at ¶ 1). It "is engaged in the development, design, manufacturing and installation of valves that are used in a variety of industrial settings" and is in an industry affecting interstate commerce. (Dkt. 14-28 at ¶¶ 1-2; Dkt. 20-1 at ¶¶ 1-2). Defendant is a "labor organization" as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). (Dkt. 14-28 at ¶ 3; Dkt. 20-1 at ¶ 3).

Plaintiff and Defendant are parties to a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") that became effective on July 29, 2017, and expires on July 30, 2022. (Dkt. 14-28 at ¶ 7; Dkt. 20-1 at ¶7; see also Dkt. 1-2). Article VII of the CBA sets forth a grievance procedure and further provides for arbitration of grievances that are not resolved to the parties’ satisfaction. (Dkt. 1-2 at 35-39). Further, Article XI of the CBA sets forth specific procedures for grievances and arbitrations in cases involving discharge. (Id. at 42-43).

On December 26, 2018, Plaintiff discharged bargaining unit employee Paul Morrin ("Grievant") for alleged violations of Plaintiff's rules, including theft of time. (Dkt. 15-2 at ¶ 2; Dkt. 19-2 at ¶ 2). Plaintiff further asserts the following additional reasons for Grievant's discharge: (1) Grievant left Plaintiff's campus without punching out on several occasions; (2) Grievant was paid for hours that he was not on Plaintiff's campus working; (3) Grievant did not keep accurate records of time worked; and (4) Grievant did not follow Plaintiff's established operating procedures and policies. (Dkt. 19-2 at ¶ 2).

It is Plaintiff's position that it discovered on December 26, 2018, that Grievant was leaving work to attend to his personal laundromat business without punching out, and that this was the basis for Grievant's termination. (Dkt. 14-28 at ¶ 5). Defendant maintains that Plaintiff did not have proper cause to terminate Grievant. (Dkt. 20-1 at ¶ 5).

Defendant filed a grievance regarding Plaintiff's termination of Grievant on December 26, 2018. (Dkt. 14-28 at ¶ 6; Dkt. 20-1 at ¶ 6). The grievance was processed in accordance with the terms of the CBA and proceeded to arbitration. (Dkt. 14-28 at ¶ 7; Dkt. 20-1 at ¶ 7).

The Arbitrator held a hearing on February 12 and 13, 2020, in Seneca Falls, and remotely via videoconference on October 29, 2020. (Dkt. 14-28 at ¶ 7; Dkt. 15-2 at ¶ 5; Dkt. 19-2 at ¶ 5; Dkt. 20-1 at ¶ 7). At the hearing, the Arbitrator requested and obtained consent from the parties to audio record the proceeding for his own use only. (Dkt. 14-28 at ¶ 8; Dkt. 15-2 at ¶ 7; Dkt. 19-2 at ¶ 7; Dkt. 20-1 at ¶ 8).

The Arbitrator issued the Arbitration Award on February 13, 2021, sustaining Defendant's grievance and ordering that Grievant be reinstated with full back pay and benefits. (Dkt. 1-1; Dkt. 14-28 at ¶ 9; Dkt. 20-1 at ¶ 9). The Arbitration Award was delivered to counsel for both parties via email at 2:14 p.m. on February 13, 2021. (Dkt. 14-28 at ¶ 12; Dkt. 20-1 at ¶ 14).

At 2:52 p.m. on February 13, 2021, counsel for Plaintiff sent the Arbitrator an email requesting his "transcript recordings." (Dkt. 1-3). The Arbitrator sent a reply email at 5:13 p.m. stating that no such recordings existed and that "[a]s a matter of course, when I render a decision, my notes and any records are destroyed, per the advice of the National Academy of Arbitrators [NAA]." (Dkt. 1-4).

On February 17, 2021, Plaintiff's counsel sent the Arbitrator an email asking for "any resources concerning the Academy's position/advice about the destruction of notes and transcripts upon the rendering of a decision." (Dkt. 1-5). The Arbitrator sent a response email later that day indicating that he was not aware of any writings on the topic but that he had been a member of the NAA since the 1990s and that "Legal Representation reps" for the organization had "over and over again" advised that upon rendering a decision, arbitrators should destroy their notes and any recordings they had made for their own use. (Dkt. 1-6).

Plaintiff has not complied with the Arbitration Award and has not reinstated Grievant's employment nor provided him back pay and benefits. (Dkt. 15-2 at ¶ 10; Dkt. 19-2 at ¶ 10).

II. Procedural Background

Plaintiff commenced the instant action on May 5, 2021. (Dkt. 1). Defendant filed its answer and counterclaim on June 16, 2021. (Dkt. 10). The parties agreed that no discovery was necessary. (Dkt. 12 at 1).

The instant competing motions for summary judgment were filed on July 16, 2021. (Dkt. 14; Dkt. 15). Responses were filed on August 20, 2021 (Dkt. 19; Dkt. 20), and replies were filed on September 3, 2021 (Dkt. 21; Dkt. 22). The Court heard oral argument on January 24, 2022, at which time it reserved decision. (Dkt. 24).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review of Motions for Summary Judgment

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment should be granted if the moving party establishes "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court should grant summary judgment if, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the Court finds that no rational jury could find in favor of that party. Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ).

"The moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact...." Crawford v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp. , 758 F.3d 473, 486 (2d Cir. 2014). "Where the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the party moving for summary judgment may meet its burden by showing the evidentiary materials of record, if reduced to admissible evidence, would be insufficient to carry the non-movant's burden of proof at trial." Johnson v. Xerox Corp. , 838 F. Supp. 2d 99, 103 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). Once the moving party has met its burden, the opposing party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, and may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation." Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc. , 781 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co. , 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011) ). Specifically, the non-moving party "must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact." Brown , 654 F.3d at 358. Indeed, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

II. Standard of Review of the Arbitration Award

"Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185 ..., provides federal courts with jurisdiction over petitions brought to confirm labor arbitration awards." Local 802, Associated Musicians of Greater N.Y. v. Parker Meridien Hotel , 145 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1998). The FAA also empowers a party to an arbitration proceeding to "apply to the court ... for an order confirming the award," which the court "must grant ... unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected[.]" 9 U.S.C. § 9. However, § 301 of the LMRA is "analytically distinct from the FAA." Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of New York v. Soft Drink & Brewery Workers Union Loc. 812 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters , 242 F.3d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 2001) ; see also Time Warner Cable of New York City LLC v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers , 170 F. Supp. 3d 392, 412 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) ("The LMRA, rather than the Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’) governs actions involving contracts of employment of ... workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." (quotation omitted)), aff'd, 684 F. App'x 68 (2d Cir. 2017). Nevertheless, in deciding a case under § 301 of the LMRA, courts "at...