Goussev v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.

EVGENIY GOUSSEV and STACY RITCH, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC., Defendant.

No. 3:21-cv-05708-DGE

United States District Court, W.D. Washington, Tacoma

May 5, 2022

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

David G. Estudillo United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

In their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiffs allege Defendant Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (“Toyota”) manufactures and sells vehicles with infotainment systems designed to allow drivers (or other passengers in a vehicle) to use their personal cellphones hands free while a vehicle is being operated. As part of their design, however, the infotainment systems also independently download, copy, and store indefinitely the call logs and text messages of any cellphone connected to the systems without the knowledge or consent of the cellphone owner. This stored information is extractable by third parties.

Plaintiffs assert the infotainment systems unlawfully intercept and record call logs and text messages by downloading, copying and indefinitely storing them. There is no assertion that the infotainment systems are acting in any capacity on behalf of Toyota after a vehicle is purchased by an end user, such as Plaintiff Evgeniy Goussev. This is because there is no assertion Toyota-other than having designed or installed the infotainment system-reviews, utilizes, benefits from, or even has the ability to retrieve the cellphone data collected and stored by an infotainment system.

The Washington State Privacy Act prohibits “any individual partnership, corporation, association, or the State of Washington, its agencies and political subdivisions” from intercepting or recording any private communication transmitted by telephone. It also requires an injury to one's business, person, or reputation. Because an infotainment system installed in a vehicle sold by Toyota is not an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or the State of Washington, its agencies and political subdivisions, and is not alleged to be acting in any agency capacity on behalf of Toyota when the infotainment system downloads, copies and stores indefinitely call logs and text messages, and because Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient injury, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

As there is no justiciable controversy absent the Washington Privacy Act claim, Plaintiffs' requests for declaratory and injunctive relief are not actionable.

Accordingly, Toyota's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Evgeniy Goussev (“Goussev”) and Stacy Ritch (“Ritch, ” and collectively “Plaintiffs”) bring this proposed class action alleging Toyota made unlawful recordings of text messages and call logs^[1] stored on Plaintiffs' cellphones in violation of the Washington Privacy Act, Wash. Rev. Code § 9.73.060 (“WPA”). Plaintiffs also seek declaratory and injunctive relief that Defendant has violated the WPA (Dkt. No. 22 at 21), and seek to bring a class action of similarly situated individuals in Washington. (Id. at 18-20.)

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in Thurston County Superior Court before Defendant removed the action to federal court. (Dkt. No. 1.) After Toyota filed its initial Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 17), Plaintiffs filed the FAC. (Dkt. No. 22.) Toyota now brings the present Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 23.)

A. Toyota Vehicles Are Manufactured and Sold with Infotainment Systems

As alleged in the FAC, modern Toyota vehicles contain “infotainment systems” that allow one to connect a smartphone to the vehicle and use apps and other smartphone functionality through the controls in the vehicle. (Dkt. No. 22 at 3.) Common uses of the infotainment system include playing music stored on a smartphone through the speakers of the vehicle or talking on the phone using vehicle microphones and speakers. (Id.)

Plaintiffs allege that from at least 2014, infotainment systems in Toyota vehicles automatically record, download, store, and are capable of transmitting a copy of all text messages and call logs existing on a smartphone when it is connected to the vehicle. (Id. at 3-4.) The infotainment systems also automatically record, download, store, and are capable of creating a copy of all text messages and call logs made while connected to a smartphone. (Id. at 4.) This includes all call logs and text messages, including both those sent and received by a connected smartphone. (Id.)

According to Plaintiffs, once the information is copied and downloaded to the vehicle, it is stored in the vehicle's onboard memory and the owner of the vehicle is unable to access or delete it. (Id.) Although Plaintiffs do not allege that the data was transmitted to or accessed by anyone outside of the vehicle, equipment exists that would allow third parties to connect and access the stored information from the infotainment systems. (Id. at 4-5.)

B. Plaintiffs' Alleged Injuries

Goussev owns a Toyota vehicle manufactured in 2015 and has connected his smartphone to its infotainment system on multiple occasions. (Id. at 15.) Ritch has sent Goussev at least one text where Goussev subsequently connected his smartphone to his Toyota's infotainment system. (Id. at 16-17.) Both Plaintiffs allege that their information was downloaded and stored onto Goussev's Toyota vehicle, in violation of the WPA. (Id.)

1. Plaintiff Goussev's Alleged Injuries

Plaintiff Goussev alleges he was injured in his person: (1) because “Plaintiff Goussev's private and confidential text messages and call logs now reside on his Toyota vehicle, can be accessed without his authorization by Berla systems, and cannot be deleted by Plaintiff Goussev. Each of Plaintiff Goussev's private and confidential text messages and call logs is accessible at any time by law enforcement, by Berla, and by similar private actors without his authorization”; and (2) because Goussev has been deprived “of the right and ability to engage in private phone calls and text communications without Toyota intercepting and recording a call log or text message copy for access by third parties such as Berla and law enforcement, without his authorization.” (Id. at 17-18.)

2. Plaintiff Ritch's Alleged Injuries

Plaintiff Ritch alleges he was injured in his person: (1) because “Plaintiff Ritch's private and confidential text messages now reside on Plaintiff Goussev's Toyota vehicle, and can be accessed without his authorization by Berla systems, and cannot be deleted by either Plaintiff Goussev or Ritch. Each of Plaintiff Ritch'[s] private and confidential text messages to Plaintiff Goussev is accessible at any time by law enforcement, by Berla, and by similar private actors without his authorization”; and (2) because Ritch has been deprived “of the right and ability to engage in private text communications without Toyota intercepting and recording a copy for access by third parties such as Berla and law enforcement without authorization.” (Id. at 18.)

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss may be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Material allegations are taken as admitted and the complaint is construed in the plaintiff's favor. Keniston v. Roberts, 717 F.2d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir. 1983). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-55 (2007) (internal citations omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555. The complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 547.

B. The FAC Does Not Support a WPA Claim

1. Infotainment Systems Are Not Alleged to be Acting in Any Agency Capacity

The WPA makes it unlawful “for any individual, partnership, corporation, association” to intercept or record any private communications or conversations. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.73.030. Moreover, § 9.73.060 provides that “[a]ny person who, directly or by means of a detective agency or any other agent, ” violates the provisions of this chapter shall be subject to legal action for damages. Reading these two provisions together, the Supreme Court of Washington has held that liability under the WPA “encompass persons acting as ‘agents' on behalf of someone in Washington.” State v. Fowler, 139 P.3d 342, 347 (Wash. 2006). The law makes clear that “[liability rests with the party recording or intercepting the conversation.” Kearney v. Kearney, 974 P.2d 872, 876 (Wash.Ct.App. 1999).

Although Washington Courts have had little opportunity to determine who may be liable under the WPA, the Washington Court of Appeals addressed alleged WPA violations when computer software recorded communications between law enforcement and a suspect. State v. Bilgi, 496 P.3d 1230, 1233 (Wash.Ct.App. 2021), review denied, 504 P.3d 827 (Wash. 2022).

In Bilgi, law enforcement, posing as a minor communicated with the appellant using a software program called Callyo. Id. at 1233. Callyo automatically recorded all...