Grabowski v. Martin

537 F.Supp.3d 204

Piotr Jan GRABOWSKI, Petitioner,

v.Daniel MARTIN, Warden for Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility; Wing Chau, U.S. Marshal for District of Rhode Island; and "John Doe," Fictitious Name, U.S. Marshal for District of Connecticut, Respondents.

C.A. No. 21-039-JJM-PAS

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

Signed April 30, 2021

Filed May 3, 2021

Livius Ilasz, Pro Hac Vice, Ilasz and Associates, New York, NY, George J. West, Providence, RI, for Petitioner.

Brian J. Lamoureux, Pannone Lopes Devereaux & O'Gara LLC, Johnston, RI, for Respondent Warden Daniel Martin.

Konstantin Lantsman, DOJ-USAO, New Haven, CT, for Respondents Wing Chau, John Doe.

MEMORANDUM and ORDER

JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., Chief United States District Judge.

Piotr Jan Grabowski has been certified for extradition to Poland, where he had been convicted of two crimes nearly twenty years ago. He petitioned this Court for habeas corpus, and in the alternative requested bail for the remainder of his extradition proceedings. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES his claims for relief. ECF No. 1.

I. FACTS

On October 3, 2001, a court in Poland tried and convicted Piotr Jan Grabowski of rape and participating in a beating that led to injury. The Court sentenced him to prison for two years and six months. ECF No. 7 at 1-2.

The Government of Poland submitted the following facts in support of extradition. The victim told her mother and the police that Mr. Grabowski and another man used force to assault her sexually. Id. at 6. When the victim's mother found her, her clothing was torn, and she was crying and in great distress. Id. A medical exam a day after the assault documented that she had suffered physical injuries that caused bruising and pain consistent with the events she described to the police. Id. During her struggle with Mr. Grabowski and another man, the victim left her underwear and a watch in the unfinished residential building where the assault occurred. The police found the watch and underwear in the place that she had described. Id. at 5.

At his trial in Poland, Mr. Grabowski initially denied having sexual contact with the victim, but then stated that she had willingly performed oral sex on him after declining vaginal sex. Id. at 6. Mr. Grabowski did not explain the victim's injuries or torn clothing. Id. At trial, the victim recanted and said that although Mr. Grabowski dragged her into the room, he did not personally rape or assault her. Id. After weighing all the evidence, the Polish court convicted Mr. Grabowski and sentenced him to confinement for two years and six months minus time served during the proceedings. Mr. Grabowski appealed and, after making similar considerations, the appellate court affirmed his conviction. Id. at 6-7.

After Mr. Grabowski was convicted, he failed to report to the penal institution to serve his sentence and instead he fled to the United States. The Government of Poland now seeks to extradite him in accordance with treaty obligations between the United States and Poland. Id. at 2.

Mr. Grabowski was arrested in Connecticut and the United States sought certification for extradition. At the hearing, the magistrate judge excluded the victim's recantation evidence because the Polish court had already weighed it. The magistrate judge issued an Order and Committal for Extradition. Id. Now, Mr. Grabowski has applied to this Court for habeas review regarding his detention for extradition or, in the alternative, seeks to be released on bond for the remainder of the extradition process because of the COVID-19 pandemic. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 2, ¶ 4.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In extradition proceedings, "habeas corpus is available only to inquire whether the magistrate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty." Aguasvivas v. Pompeo , 984 F.3d 1047, 1055 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Fernandez v. Phillips , 268 U.S. 311, 312, 45 S.Ct. 541, 69 L.Ed. 970(1925) ). The First Circuit has applied the "any evidence" standard liberally in deference to the findings of the magistrate judge. See Koskotas v. Roche , 931 F.2d 169, 176 (1st Cir. 1991).

The role of the magistrate judge in extradition proceedings is set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3184. Upon a complaint from an extradition treaty partner, the magistrate judge issues an arrest warrant, provided the offense charged is covered by the treaty. See U.S. v. Kin-Hong , 110 F.3d 103, 109 (1st Cir. 1997). The judicial officer then holds a hearing to determine if the evidence is enough to sustain the charge under the treaty. Id. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3184, the role of the judicial officer is "limited to a narrow set of issues concerning the existence of a treaty, the offense charged, and the quantum of evidence offered." Id. at 110. The role of the judicial officer is "to determine whether there is competent evidence to justify holding the accused to await trial, and not to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to justify a conviction." Collins v. Loisel , 259 U.S. 309, 316, 42 S.Ct. 469, 66 L.Ed. 956 (1922). On habeas review, this Court will review the evidence to determine whether there is "any evidence" to justify finding probable cause.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Petition for Habeas Relief

Mr. Grabowski asserts that the Government has failed to show probable cause, thereby violating his Fourth Amendment rights. This alleged lack of probable cause is the basis for Mr. Grabowski's habeas petition. Therefore, this Court will examine whether the Government has shown any evidence that probable cause existed to satisfy the requirements of habeas review of extradition cases. In this context, probable cause is satisfied by the familiar domestic requirement necessary to hold someone for trial, rather than what would be required to convict. Sidali v. INS , 107 F.3d 191, 199 (3d Cir. 1997). Probable cause is incapable of a precise formulation, but the "substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, and that belief must be particularized with respect to the person to be searched or seized." Maryland v. Pringle , 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S.Ct. 795, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003) (citations and quotations omitted).

During the magistrate proceeding, the Government presented Mr. Grabowski's Polish trial and appellate court records. After reviewing them, the magistrate judge found that there was enough evidence to support a finding of probable cause. In his habeas petition, Mr. Grabowski challenges this outcome.

During his pre-certification proceedings before the magistrate judge, Mr. Grabowski sought to present recantation evidence from the victim¹ – claiming that this evidence negates the basis for his conviction, as well as any probable cause that may have existed for his arrest. Although the magistrate judge permitted the entry of an affidavit from the victim corroborating Mr. Grabowski's version of events, he excluded the recantation testimony. Mr. Grabowski argues that this exclusion was improper, whereas the Government counters that this consideration is beyond the scope of habeas review. Instead, they urge, this Court must show deference to the magistrate judge.

Though habeas review is limited to a narrow set of issues and is not a means for rehearing the findings of the magistrate judge, the First Circuit has recognized "that serious due process concerns may merit review beyond the narrow scope of inquiry in extradition proceedings." Matter of Extradition of Manzi , 888 F.2d 204, 206 (1st Cir. 1989) ; see also Hoxha v. Levi , 465 F.3d 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2006) ("We review a magistrate judge's decision to admit or exclude evidence in an extradition proceeding for abuse of discretion."). Excluded evidence affects a determination of probable cause, and so it is within the scope of habeas review to examine whether the magistrate judge abused his discretion by excluding evidence. See , e.g. , Manzi , 888 F.2d at 205.

A defendant may introduce a limited range of evidence at an extradition hearing. See Hoxha , 465 F.3d at 561. Traditionally, courts have "distinguished between inadmissible ‘contradictory evidence,’ which merely conflicts with the government's evidence, and admissible ‘explanatory evidence,’ which entirely eliminates probable cause." Id. ; see also Koskotas , 931 F.2d at 175 ("Although it is within the discretion of the district court to permit the relator to offer limited, explanatory evidence relating to the charges against him, contradictory evidence properly may be excluded."). There is some question whether recantation evidence is ever admissible, but there is no need to resolve the issue because it was appropriate to exclude the evidence in question here either way.

The victim's recantation was weighed at length by the Polish trial court. That court convicted Mr. Grabowski, and the Polish appeals court affirmed. The Polish courts found that Mr. Grabowski's narrative was not consistent with his earlier testimony, and that it was not consistent with the physical evidence gathered near the time of the incident. The victim's most recent recantation still does not explain or refute the other physical evidence that weighed so heavily in the Polish deliberations. This Court finds that, because the recantation testimony offered by Mr. Grabowski does not negate probable cause, the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding it.

Mr. Grabowski further contends that, when considering the evidence surrounding his criminal conviction, this Court must link the physical evidence with specific deeds that he committed. That may be true if this were a criminal trial; however, this is not a criminal trial requiring the Government to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a habeas petition regarding the extradition of a person who has already been tried and convicted...