GRACE, Inc. v. City of Miami

674 F.Supp.3d 1141

GRACE, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF MIAMI, Defendant.

Case No. 1:22-cv-24066-KMM

United States District Court, S.D. Florida

Signed May 23, 2023

Caroline Andrews McNamara, American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Miami, FL, Daniel Boaz Tilley, ACLU Foundation of Florida, Inc., Miami, FL, Christopher J. Merken, Pro Hac Vice, Jocelyn Kirsch, Pro Hac Vice, Dechert LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Neil A. Steiner, Pro Hac Vice, Dechert LLP, New York, NY, Nicholas Lyndol Villacor Warren, ACLU Foundation of Florida, Inc., Tallahassee, FL, for Plaintiffs GRACE, Inc., Engage Miami, Inc., South Dade Branch of the NAACP, Miami-Dade Branch of the NAACP, Clarice Cooper, Yanelis Valdes, Jared Johnson, Alexandra Contreras.

Caroline Andrews McNamara, American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Miami, FL, Nicholas Lyndol Villacor Warren, ACLU Foundation of Florida, Inc., Tallahassee, FL, for Plaintiff Steven Miro.

Andre Velosy Bardos, George Ty Levesque, Jason Lawrence Unger, GrayRobinson, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, Christopher N. Johnson, Marlene Quintana, GrayRobinson, P.A., Miami, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER

K. MICHAEL MOORE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon the Report and Recommendation of the Honorable Lauren F. Louis, United States Magistrate Judge ("R&R") (ECF No. 52). Therein, Magistrate Judge Louis recommends that the Court grant Plaintiffs' Expedited Motion for Preliminary Injunction ("Motion" or "Mot.") (ECF No. 26).¹See generally R&R. Defendant City of Miami ("City" or "Defendant") filed objections to the R&R ("Obj.") (ECF No. 55), Plaintiffs filed a response ("Resp.") (ECF No. 57), and Defendant filed a reply ("Reply") (ECF No. 59). As set forth below, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual circumstances of this case have been discussed at length, both in the Parties' briefings and in the R&R. Therefore, for the purposes of this Order, the Court presumes that the Parties are familiar with the relevant background and adopts the facts as set forth in the R&R.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiffs bring this Action alleging that Defendant approved a new redistricting plan (the "Enacted Plan") for the five electoral districts in the City of Miami which resulted in a racial gerrymander, thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See (ECF No. 23 ¶¶ 358-64) ("Am. Compl." or "Amended Complaint"). After initiating this Action, Plaintiffs filed the Motion requesting that the Court enjoin Defendant from conducting the election in November 2023 under the Enacted Plan. See generally Mot. The Court referred the Motion to Magistrate Judge Louis for an R&R, see (ECF No. 27), who in turn recommended that the Court grant the injunction. See generally R&R.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The Court "must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). A de novo review is therefore required if a party files "a proper, specific objection" to a factual finding contained in the report. Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App'x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006). "It is critical that the objection be sufficiently specific and not a general objection to the report" to warrant de novo review. Id.

However, a party's objections are improper if they expand upon and reframe arguments already made and considered by the magistrate judge, or simply disagree with the magistrate judge's conclusions. See Melillo v. United States, No. 17-CV-80489, 2018 WL 4258355, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2018); see also Marlite, Inc. v. Eckenrod, No. 10-23641-CIV, 2012 WL 3614212, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2012) ("It is improper for an objecting party to ... submit [] papers to a district court which are nothing more than a rehashing of the same arguments and positions taken in the original papers submitted to the Magistrate Judge. Clearly, parties are not to be afforded a 'second bite at the apple' when they file objections to a R & R.") (quoting Camardo v. Gen. Motors Hourly-Rate Emps. Pension Plan, 806 F. Supp. 380, 382 (W.D.N.Y. 1992)).

When the objecting party has improperly objected, or failed to object, to the magistrate judge's findings, "the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) advisory committee's note to 1983 addition; see Lopez v. Berryhill, No. 1:17-CV-24263, 2019 WL 2254704, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2019) (stating that a district judge must "evaluate portions of the R & R not objected to under a clearly erroneous standard of review").

IV. DISCUSSION

As set forth in the R&R, Magistrate Judge Louis recommended that the Court grant Plaintiffs' Expedited Motion for Preliminary Injunction. See generally R&R. In doing so, Magistrate Judge Louis found that Plaintiffs collectively had standing, met each of the Eleventh Circuit's prerequisites for the granting of a preliminary injunction, and that the potential grant of an injunction by Plaintiffs' requested May 23, 2023 deadline would not occur too close to an election period such that a remedy would be impracticable. See generally id. Defendant's Objections consisted of both generalized grievances with the R&R's conclusions, as well as proper, specific objections to the R&R's findings. See generally Obj. Where the objections are proper, the Court reviews the R&R's findings de novo. Macort, 208 F. App'x at 784. Where Defendant makes an improper objection or raises no objection at all, the Court reviews the R&R for clear error. Lopez, 2019 WL 2254704, at *2.

The Court's analysis below mirrors the structure of the R&R and proceeds in two parts. The Court first addresses whether Plaintiffs have standing to bring the instant Action. Next, the Court analyzes whether Plaintiffs have properly demonstrated that a preliminary injunction should be granted. In doing so, the Court specifically considers the findings of fact and law in the R&R, Defendant's Objections, Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Objections, and the record as a whole.

A. Standing

The R&R found that the Individual and Organizational Plaintiffs have standing to bring the instant Action. See R&R at 52-56. An individual who resides in a racially gerrymandered district "has standing to challenge the legislature's action" in that specific district. United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 745, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995). The R&R found that the Individual Plaintiffs satisfied this standard because the Individual Plaintiffs each "submitted signed declarations supporting their averments that they reside in the challenged districts" and that Defendant produced no evidence to the contrary. R&R at 55-56. Regarding the Organizational Plaintiffs, standing exists when: (1) the interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose; (2) the claim does not require the participation of individual members in the lawsuit, and (3) its members would otherwise have standing to bring suit. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). Here, the R&R found that the unrefuted evidence demonstrates the Organizational Plaintiffs satisfied the requirements for standing. See R&R at 52-56; see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19-29 (noting that the Organizational Plaintiffs have members residing in each challenged district); (ECF No. 24-33); (ECF No. 24-34); (ECF No. 24-35); (ECF No. 24-36) (explaining the interests of each Organizational Plaintiff as relevant to the instant Action).

After carefully evaluating the R&R's findings, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs have standing to bring this Action. The record demonstrates that Plaintiffs reside in each challenged district. Further, as the R&R correctly identified, each Organizational Plaintiff attested to having members residing in each challenged district, and that the interests at stake in the instant Action were germane to the organization's purpose. See R&R at 55 n.20. Thus, the Court agrees with the R&R and finds that both the Individual and Organizational Plaintiffs satisfy the standing requirements to bring this Action.

Defendant raises three objections to this conclusion: (1) Plaintiffs assert a shotgun pleading; (2) Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a link between any specific plaintiff and any specific districting decision; and (3) Plaintiffs have not suffered any harm. See Obj. at 16-17. The Court finds that the objections are properly pled and reviews them de novo. For the following reasons, the Court finds each objection unavailing.

First, Defendant objects to the R&R's conclusion that Plaintiffs have standing because according to Defendant, Plaintiffs assert a shotgun pleading. Id. This argument has no bearing on the question of standing. A shotgun pleading analysis is relevant to a determination of whether Plaintiffs have complied with the procedural requirements to give Defendant adequate notice of the claims against it, not whether the Court has power to adjudicate the dispute. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015) (explaining that a shotgun pleading involves the violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) or 10(b)). Accordingly, the Court finds that this objection is irrelevant to the R&R's standing analysis. Even so, the Court holds that the Amended Complaint is not a shotgun pleading because Plaintiffs assert a single cause of action, against one Defendant, with each factual allegation in the Amended Complaint supporting Plaintiffs' claim that the Defendant's redistricting process resulted in a racial gerrymander. See generally Am. Compl. The Amended Complaint surely "give[s] the defendant[] adequate notice of the claims against [it] and...