Grace v. Dist. of Columbia

187 F.Supp.3d 124

Matthew Grace and Pink Pistols, Plaintiffs,

v.District of Columbia and Cathy Lanier, in her official capacity as Chief of Police for the Metropolitan Police Department, Defendants.

Civil Case No. 15-2234 (RJL)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed May 17, 2016

Charles Justin Cooper, David Henry Thompson, Peter A. Patterson, Cooper & Kirk, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Andrew J. Saindon, Chad Alan Naso, Holly Michelle Johnson, Office of the Attorney General, District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RICHARD J. LEON, United States District Judge

In 2008, the Supreme Court recognized for the first time that "the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms." District of Columbia v. Heller , 554 U.S. 570, 595, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008). As such, it struck down as unconstitutional the District of Columbia's ("the District's") total ban on handguns in the home. Id. at 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783. Since then, various courts have considered a multitude of challenges to gun laws, charting the contours of a constitutional right that has been the people's since the infancy of our Nation. In this case, plaintiffs Matthew Grace ("Grace") and the Pink Pistols challenge the constitutionality of yet another law, and set of regulations, enacted by the District. In particular, they contend that the District's requirement that applicants for a license to carry a concealed firearm demonstrate a "good reason to fear injury to his or her person or property" or "any other proper reason for carrying a pistol," as further defined by District law and regulations (collectively "the ‘good reason’ requirement"), is inconsistent with the individual right to bear arms under the Second Amendment and therefore unconstitutional. See Compl. ¶¶ 11-15 [Dkt. #1] (quoting D.C. Code § 22-4506(a) ). Presently before the Court is plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary and/or Permanent Injunction to enjoin the District and Chief of Police Cathy Lanier ("defendants" or "the District") from enforcing the "good reason" requirement. Pls.' Mot. for Prelim. and/or Permanent Inj. [Dkt. #6]. Upon consideration of the record, the relevant law, and the pleadings, briefs, and oral arguments submitted and presented by the parties and the amici curiae, I find that plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that the District's "good reason" requirement is unconstitutional, that they will suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary injunctive relief, and that the equities and the public interest weigh in plaintiffs' favor. I will therefore GRANT plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the District from requiring individuals to comply with the "good reason" requirement when applying for a concealed carry permit.

Statutory and Regulatory Background

In Heller , the Supreme Court held that the District's ban on the possession of handguns in the home violated the Second Amendment. 554 U.S. at 635, 128 S.Ct. 2783. Shortly thereafter, the District adopted the Firearms Registration Amendment Act of 2008 ("FRA"), 56 D.C. Reg. 1365-80 (Feb. 13, 2009), to conform to the Supreme Court's ruling and to provide a "new scheme for regulating firearms." Heller v. District of Columbia ("Heller II "), 670 F.3d 1244, 1249 (D.C.Cir.2011). The FRA required registration of handguns but provided that individuals who were not retired police officers could only obtain "registration of pistols for use in self-defense within the registrant's home" and, therefore, could not carry firearms outside the home. 56 D.C. Reg. 1365. Six years later, in Palmer v. District of Columbia , visiting Judge Frederick J. Scullin, Jr.,¹ sitting by designation, ruled that "the carrying of an operable handgun outside the home for the lawful purpose of self-defense, though subject to traditional restrictions, constitutes ‘bear[ing] Arms' within the meaning of the Second Amendment."

59 F.Supp.3d 173, 181–82 (D.D.C.2014) (quoting Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego , 742 F.3d 1144, 1166 (9th Cir.2014) ) (alteration in original).² He went on to hold that the District's "complete ban on the carrying of handguns in public [was] unconstitutional." Id. at 183.

Undaunted, the District went back to the drawing board and, mimicking legislation in New York, Maryland, and New Jersey, see Council of the District of Columbia, Comm. on the Judiciary and Pub. Safety, Report on Bill 20-930, at 9 (2014), enacted a concealed carry licensing scheme that became effective June 16, 2015. License to Carry a Pistol Amendment Act of 2014, 62 D.C. Reg. 1944-57 (Feb. 6, 2015). Under the current law, "[n]o person shall carry within the District of Columbia either openly or concealed on or about their person, a pistol, without a license issued pursuant to District of Columbia law ..." D.C. Code § 22-4504(a). The law provides for a multi-hurdle process for obtaining a concealed carry license, but the open carrying of firearms is, of course, still prohibited. See id. § 7-2509.07(e); Transcript of Prelim. Inj. Proceedings at 48 [Dkt. #33]. Applicants for a concealed carry license must meet a variety of age, criminal history, personal history, mental health, and physical requirements. D.C. Code §§ 7-2502.03 ; 7-2509.02. Thereafter, they must satisfactorily complete a mandatory gun training and safety program and an in-person interview with a member of the Metropolitan Police Department to verify the information included in their application form. D.C. Code §§ 7-2509.02(a)(4), (f). Of relevance here, however, is a different hurdle embedded in a provision which states that the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department "may" issue otherwise suitable applicants a license to carry a concealed firearm only if "it appears that the applicant has good reason to fear injury to his or her person or property or has any other proper reason for carrying a pistol ...." Id. § 22-4506(a).

Chief Lanier was directed to issue rules establishing criteria for determining whether an applicant has shown "good reason to fear injury to his or her person" or another "proper reason for carrying a concealed pistol." D.C. Code § 7-2509.11(1). The criteria to determine "good reason to fear injury to his or her person" were "at a minimum [to] require a showing of a special need for self-protection distinguishable from the general community as supported by evidence of specific threats or previous attacks that demonstrate a special danger to the applicant's life." Id. § 7-2509.11(1)(A). As to other "proper reason[s]" the criteria were "at a minimum [to] include types of employment that require the handling of cash or other valuable objects that may be transported upon the applicant's person." Id. § 7-2509.11(1)(B).

Chief Lanier issued regulations stating, "A person shall demonstrate a good reason to fear injury to his or her person by showing a special need for self-protection distinguishable from the general community as supported by evidence of specific threats or previous attacks which demonstrate a special danger to the applicant's life." D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 24, § 2333.1. To satisfy this requirement, an applicant must "allege, in writing, serious threats of death or serious bodily harm, any attacks on his or her person, or any theft of property from his or her person" and must also "allege that the threats are of a nature that the legal possession of a pistol is necessary as a reasonable precaution against the apprehended danger." Id. § 2333.2. "The fact that a person resides in or is employed in a high crime area shall not by itself establish a good reason to fear injury to person or property for the issuance of a concealed carry license." Id. § 2333.4. Furthermore, an applicant "may allege any other proper reason that the Chief may accept for obtaining a concealed carry license," including that his or her employment "requires the handling of large amounts of cash or other highly valuable objects that must be transported upon the applicant's person" or that the applicant has an immediate family member "who is physically or mentally incapacitated to a point where he or she cannot act in defense of himself or herself" and who "can demonstrate a good reason to fear injury to his or her person by showing a special need for self-protection distinguishable from the general community .... " Id. § 2334.1.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The laws and regulations at issue here were first challenged in Wrenn v. District of Columbia , 107 F.Supp.3d 1 (D.D.C.2015). This Court's calendar committee assigned that case to visiting Senior Judge Scullin, and in granting the plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction he held that the "good reason" requirement likely "r[an] afoul of the Second Amendment." Id. at 12. On appeal, however, our Circuit Court ruled that Judge Scullin's designation to this Court "was limited to specific and enumerated cases" and that Wrenn was "not one of those cases." Wrenn , 808 F.3d at 83. Accordingly, the Circuit Court vacated Judge Scullin's order.³ Id. at 84. Shortly thereafter, on December 22, 2015, the plaintiffs in this case filed a challenge to these same laws in a new complaint against defendants the District of Columbia and Chief Lanier, in her official capacity. See Compl. On December 28, 2015, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary and/or permanent injunction. See Pls.' Mot. for a Prelim. and/or Permanent Inj.

Plaintiff Grace is a law-abiding, responsible United States citizen and resident of the District. Compl. ¶ 2, 16. He owns four handguns and has lawfully registered them with the District. Compl. ¶ 17. He would like to carry them outside his home for self-defense and has completed the firearm training required under District law to obtain a concealed carry license. Compl. ¶ 17. Grace concedes he does not face any specific threat that differentiates him from a typical resident of the...