Grace v. Sec'y, Dep't. of Corr.

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WESLEY THOMAS GRACE, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.

No. 8:21-cv-621-MSS-AEP

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division

February 8, 2024

ORDER

MARY S. SCRIVEN, UNITED TATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Grace petitions for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and challenges his state court convictions for armed burglary with assault or battery, aggravated assault, and tampering with a witness. (Doc. 1 at 1) After reviewing the petition (Doc. 1), the response (Doc. 5), and the relevant state court record (Doc. 5-1), the Court DENIES the petition.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A jury found Grace guilty of armed burglary of a dwelling with assault, two counts of aggravated assault, and tampering with a witness. (Doc. 5-2 at 323-25) The trial court sentenced Grace as a prison releasee reoffender to life in prison for the burglary conviction, a concurrent thirty years for the tampering conviction, and concurrent five years for the aggravated assault convictions. (Doc. 5-2 at 364-67) Grace appealed, and the state appellate court affirmed. (Doc. 5-2 at 371) Grace moved for post-conviction relief (Doc. 5-2 at 429-40), the post-conviction court denied relief (Doc. 5-2 at 516-17), and the state appellate court affirmed. (Doc. 5-2 at 579) Grace's federal petition follows.

FACTS

On June 12, 2016, at 2:00 P.M., Grace knocked on the front door of the home belonging to James and Michelle Young. (Doc. 5-2 at 165-66) James answered and observed Grace dressed in black clothing and wearing a motorcycle helmet and flip-flops. (Doc. 5-2 at 166-67, 185) Grace told James, “I want my sh*t,” and James responded that Grace came to the wrong house. (Doc. 5-2 at 168) Grace clarified that he wanted his four-wheeler and believed that James hid the four-wheeler in a shed in the backyard. (Doc. 5-2 at 168-69) James walked outside and showed Grace that the shed in the backyard was too small to store a four-wheeler. (Doc. 5-2 at 169) When Grace told James that he planned to go into the backyard James warned Grace that his two bulldogs would bite Grace. (Doc. 5-2 at 170) After Grace replied that he would kill the dogs, James became upset, returned inside, and told Michelle to call the police. (Doc. 5-2 at 170)

Grace followed James through the front door. (Doc. 5-2 at 170-71) James told Grace to leave, Michelle who was inside pushed Grace, and Grace brandished a knife. (Doc. 5-2 at 171-72 187) Grace swung the knife near James's face and caused James to fall to the ground. (Doc. 5-2 at 172, 186-87) James repeatedly told Michelle to call the police, and Grace knocked the telephone out of Michelle's hands. (Doc. 5-2 at 173, 186-88) Michelle grabbed the telephone from the floor, and Grace brandished the knife in her face and threatened, “Don't make me motherf*cking kill you.” (Doc. 5-2 at 188-89) James and Michelle ran out to the backyard. (Doc. 5-2 at 174, 189) Grace followed, and the bulldogs attacked Grace. (Doc. 5-2 at 174, 190) Grace returned inside, locked the back door, tapped his knife on the window, threatened to “cut” James, and left through the front door. (Doc. 5-2 at 174-75)

That afternoon, a neighbor, who had known Grace for about ten years, unexpectedly saw Grace dressed in black clothing and wearing a motorcycle helmet and flip-flops. (Doc. 5-2 at 199-200, 205) Grace asked the neighbor to drive him to Auburndale. (Doc. 5-2 at 201) During the car ride, Grace told the neighbor that he had confronted a person who had stolen his four-wheeler and had tried to enter the person's backyard, but the person did not allow him to enter. (Doc 5-2 at 201-03)

Two weeks later, a detective interrogated Grace about the burglary. (Doc. 5-2 at 153) After waiving his constitutional rights, Grace told the detective that he did not know anything about the burglary and denied knowing the neighbor. (Doc. 5-2 at 157) The detective showed James and Michelle a photographic lineup that contained a photograph of Grace. (Doc. 5-2 at 158-59) The detective testified that neither James nor Michelle could identify a suspect. (Doc. 5-2 at 159, 254) Both James and Michelle testified that they did identify Grace in the photographic lineup, and both identified Grace in court as the burglar. (Doc. 5-2 at 176 178, 191-92, 195) Michelle testified that, after identifying Grace in the photographic lineup, she and James learned Grace's name and “looked him up, [ ] to see who he was, and [they] knew that's who it was.” (Doc. 5-2 at 194)

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

AEDPA

Because Grace filed his federal petition after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, AEDPA governs his claims. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to require:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the U.S. Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the U.S. Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). A decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the U.S. Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. Clearly established federal law refers to the holding of an opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court at the time of the relevant state court decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.

“[AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). A federal petitioner must show that the state court's ruling was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility of fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Grace asserts ineffective assistance of counsel - a difficult claim to sustain. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 687 (1984), explains:

First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.

“There is no reason for a court . . . to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. “[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

“An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is a “probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Strickland cautions that “strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. A defendant cannot meet his burden by showing that the avenue chosen by counsel was unsuccessful. White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 1992).

Because the standards under Strickland and AEDPA are both highly deferential, “when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly' so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. “Given the double deference due, it is a ‘rare case in which an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that was denied on the merits in state court is found to merit relief in a federal habeas proceeding.'” Nance v. Warden, Ga. Diag. Prison, 922 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).

In a decision without a written opinion, the state appellate court affirmed the order denying Grace post-conviction relief. (Doc. 5-2 at 579) A federal court “‘look[s] through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale [and] presume[s] that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct 1188, 1192 (2018). Because the post-conviction court provided reasons for denying Grace's claims in a written order (...