Grace v. Steward Health Care Sys.

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JOANNE GRACE, Plaintiff, v. STEWARD HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, LLC, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:23CV2178

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division

August 29, 2024

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER [RESOLVING ECF NO 11]

Benita Y. Pearson United States District Judge

Pending is Defendants Steward Health Care System, LLC (“Steward”), Christina Stanko (“Stanko”), and Carol Snowberger (“Snowberger”)'s Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration (ECF No. 11). Defendants contend that Plaintiff Joanne Grace cannot maintain this lawsuit in federal court because her claims of discrimination and retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (Count I), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (Counts II and IV), and Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(A) and (I) (Counts III and V) are covered by an Arbitration Agreement (ECF No. 112) between Steward and Plaintiff.^[1]

After the within motion was fully briefed, a voluntary petition for relief in a case under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) was filed by Steward in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, being Case No 24-90304, and is being jointly administered under the lead case Steward Health Care System LLC, Case No. 24-90213. Therefore, further proceedings in the within cause are perpetually stayed against Steward subject to reopening upon written motion of Plaintiff or any other proper party in interest, after the bankruptcy case is closed, dismissed, or discharge in bankruptcy is granted or denied, or the granting of relief from the stay imposed by 11 U.S.C. § 362 or any injunction imposed by virtue of 11 U.S.C. § 524. See Judgment Entry Perpetually Staying Further Proceedings Against Defendant Steward Health Care System, LLC Only (ECF No. 17). In response to ECF No. 17, Plaintiff subsequently filed a Notice (ECF No. 18) advising the Court, Stanko, and Snowberger that she will continue to pursue Count I of the Complaint (ECF No. 1) against Stanko and Snowberger for unlawful retaliatory termination in violation of the FMLA.

I. Background

Because this case is addressed at the motion-to-dismiss stage, the following allegations as set out in the Complaint (ECF No. 1) are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 830 F.3d 376, 38283 (6th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff worked as a nurse for ValleyCare Health System of Ohio from 1976 until Steward took over operations of Hillside Rehabilitation Hospital (“Hillside”) and the Northside Medical Center in 2017. After the transition, Plaintiff chose to continue working for Steward as a Nurse Manager. She also had Patient Advocacy job duties. In 2020, Steward hired Stanko as Director of Nursing and she became Plaintiff's supervisor. Subsequently, Stanko began “culling” older nurses and replacing them with substantially younger nurses. Stanko regularly made comments to Plaintiff about her age, including suggesting that she retire. Snowberger is the Human Resources Director for Hillside. In December 2021, Plaintiff complained to her about Stanko's age-based comments and remarks. Snowberger dismissed Plaintiff's complaints. After falling ill with COVID-19 in February 2022, Plaintiff requested and was given leave under the FMLA. Five days after Plaintiff returned to work, Stanko terminated her employment in March 2022, citing department staffing level cutbacks as a result of the pandemic. An individual in their 20s, however, was hired to replace Plaintiff. Plaintiff (71 years old) then filed FMLA retaliation and ADEA discrimination claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).

As a condition of Plaintiff's continued employment with Steward, Defendants assert Grace was required to complete an Arbitration Agreement (ECF No. 11-2). The Agreement states that “claims arising under federal, state, or local law based upon or related to discrimination, harassment, and retaliation,” including claims brought under the FMLA against Steward's employees, must be resolved through arbitration. ECF No. 11-2 at PageID #: 65-66. Steward placed the Arbitration Agreement in “Steward University,” which is Steward's name for its employee web-based training platform, so that Steward employees, like Plaintiff, could review the Arbitration Agreement and, if they agreed to its terms, could electronically sign the Agreement. Defendants claim Plaintiff agreed to arbitration when she completed the online training titled “Arbitration Agreement With Signature SH 19” on June 12, 2019. See Employee Transcript of Joanne Grace (ECF No. 11-3) at PageID #: 70. In addition to the transcript of Plaintiff's completed training, Defendants have produced the Arbitration Agreement (ECF No. 11-3), a Certificate of Achievement presented to Plaintiff for the successful completion of “Arbitration Agreement With Signature SH 19” (ECF No. 11-4), and Snowberger's Declaration stating that Plaintiff “electronically reviewed, signed, and accepted the Arbitration Agreement's terms.” ECF No. 11-1 at PageID #: 64, ¶ 6.

Plaintiff signed into her training account with a unique user ID and password. Declaration of Joanne Grace (ECF No. 13-1) at PageID #: 86, ¶¶ 6-7. While she admits to completing online training for Steward, she denies signing or even seeing the Arbitration Agreement. See ECF No. 13-1 at PageID #: 87, ¶ 9 (“I did not complete an ‘arbitration' training and I never agreed to arbitration or signed an arbitration agreement.”). Plaintiff also declares Steward's information technology (“IT”) helpdesk could access her account and had previously done so to solve computer issues. See ECF No. 13-1 at PageID #: 87, ¶ 8.

II. Standard of Review

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., generally applies to employment contracts with arbitration provisions. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001). When a party fails or refuses to arbitrate under a written arbitration agreement, the aggrieved party may petition the court for an order compelling the failing party to uphold the agreement. 9 U.S.C.A. § 4. In examining a motion to compel arbitration, “courts treat the facts as they would in ruling on a summary judgment motion, construing all facts and reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Jones v. U-HAUL Co. of Mass. and Ohio, Inc., 16 F.Supp.3d 922, 930 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (quoting Raasch v. NCR Corp., 254 F.Supp.2d 847, 851 (S.D. Ohio 2003)). Arbitration agreements are favored and are to be broadly construed with doubts being resolved in favor of arbitrability. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Comms. Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648-50 (1986); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). The FAA reflects an “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution,” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. SolerChrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985), and it evinces a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 345-46 (2011) (“[O]ur cases . . . have repeatedly described the [FAA] as embodying a national policy favoring arbitration and a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). All doubts or ambiguities concerning the scope of the parties' agreement should be resolved in favor of arbitration. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25 (1983).

“When considering a motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration under the [FAA], a court has four tasks: first, it must determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; second, it must determine the scope of that agreement; third, if federal statutory claims are asserted, it must consider whether Congress intended those claims to be nonarbitrable; and fourth, if the court concludes that some, but not all, of the claims in the action are subject to arbitration, it must determine whether to stay the remainder of the proceedings pending arbitration.” Stout v. J.D.Byrider, 228 F.3d 709, 714 (6th Cir. 2000). Because arbitration agreements are contracts, they are governed by state contract law. Glazer v. Lehman Bros. Inc., 394 F.3d 444, 450 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1214 (2006) (citing Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 340 F.3d 386, 394 (6th Cir. 2003)). As such, the court applies Ohio contract law when analyzing the formation of the arbitration agreement in the case at bar. Jones, 16 F.Supp.3d at 930.

III. Analysis

A. Agreement to Arbitrate

At issue in this case is whether the parties agreed to arbitration. Under Ohio contract law, both parties must manifest their assent to enter into the agreement. Dantz v. Am. Apple Grp.,LLC., 123 Fed.Appx. 702, 707 (6th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff contends she never viewed or signed an arbitration agreement from Defendants. See ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 6, ¶ 61; ECF No. 13-1 at PageID #: 87, ¶ 9. In general, “an ‘unequivocal denial' that takes the form of admissible ‘evidence' can create a genuine dispute of fact.” Boykin v. Fam. Dollar Stores of Mich., LLC, 3 F.4th 832, 841 (6th Cir. 2021). Mindful of the Court's obligation to construe facts and inferences in Plaintiff's favor and not to weigh evidence at this juncture, the Court is not required to accept Plaintiff's implausible version of events in order to survive dismissal and an order compelling arbitration. “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris...