Grady v. Quiros

1

DONALD GRADY, Petitioner, v. ANGEL QUIROS, COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION, Respondent.

No. 3:22-cv-597 (MPS)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

April 3, 2024

RULING ON PETITION FOR HABEAS RELIEF

MICHAEL P. SHEA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Petitioner Donald Grady, an inmate incarcerated at MacDougall-Walker Correctional Institution in Suffield, Connecticut, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2254. He challenges his conviction, after a jury trial, for sexual assault and risk of injury to a child. Pet., ECF No. 1. In his second amended petition, Petitioner requests habeas relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of his trial defense counsel. Second Am. Pet., ECF No. 33.

Respondent has filed a memorandum, arguing that the Petition should be denied on the merits. Resp't Mem., ECF No. 40. Petitioner has filed a reply brief. Pet'r Reply, ECF No. 43.

For the reasons that follow, the Petition is denied.

I. Procedural Background^[1]

Petitioner was the defendant in a criminal case, docket number CR09-0072182-T, in the judicial district of Ansonia/Milford at Milford after he was arrested and charged with one count of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70(a)(1), one count of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70(a)(2),^[2] one count of sexual assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-72a(a)(1)(A),^[3]and three counts of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21(a)(2).^[4] See Grady v. Warden, No. CV144006185S, 2019 WL 1093301, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2019). After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of all counts except the count of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of Connecticut General Statutes § 53a-70(a)(1) that stemmed from a 2008 Christmas party incident, for which the jury returned a verdict of not guilty. State v. Donald H.G., 148 Conn.App. 398, 403 (2014).

On February 14, 2012, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of thirty years of incarceration, ten years of which were mandatory, followed by five years of parole with special conditions, and lifetime registration as a sexual offender. State v. Donald H.G., 148 Conn.App. at 403.

Direct Appeal

Petitioner filed a direct appeal, arguing: (1) the trial court erred by allowing the state to introduce evidence of uncharged misconduct; (2) the trial court erred when it refused to conduct an in-camera review of the victim's psychological records; (3) the trial court responded improperly to a question posed by the jury during its deliberations and thereby deprived him of a fair trial; and (4) the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during closing and rebuttal argument. Id. at 400.

The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. Id. at 427. It held that: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting prior uncharged sexual misconduct evidence involving the victim (id. at 408-411); (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Petitioner's in-camera review request because Petitioner's request was vague and speculative and because he had failed to show that the victim had a mental condition affecting her “ability to perceive, recall, or relate events or her testimonial capacity[;]” (id. at 413-414); (3) there was no reasonable probability the jury was misled by a trial court response to a jury inquiry, when viewed in combination with the court's main instructions to the jury (id. at 414-420); and (4) the prosecutor did not make any inappropriate remarks during closing and rebuttal argument and Petitioner had failed to provide legal authority for his claim of prosecutorial misconduct (id. at 420-427).

On May 7, 2014, the Connecticut Supreme Court denied certification for discretionary review. State v. Donald H.G., 311 Conn. 951 (2014).

First Habeas Action

On April 30, 2014, Petitioner filed his first of two applications for writ of habeas corpus in the Connecticut Superior Court for the Judicial District of Tolland. This first habeas action was assigned docket number TSR-CV14-4006185-S. See Grady, 2019 WL 1093301, at *1.

In an amended petition, Petitioner asserted that he received ineffective assistance from his counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment “on four delineated grounds.” Id. at *3. He asserted that his trial defense counsel was ineffective (1) by failing to elicit testimony from four witnesses (Linda and Gary Hoppes and Dennis and Janet Bludniki) with respect to his presence at a December 24, 2007 Christmas party; (2) by engaging in an attorney-client sexual relationship with Petitioner; (3) by referring to the complainant as a “victim” during trial and when he failed to object and correct the prosecutor's use of the term “victim;” and (4) by failing to “investigate, consult and present” Theresa Charette to impeach the victim's credibility regarding her testimony about uncharged sexual conduct between Petitioner and the victim during a family ski trip at Okemo Mountain. Resp't ex. D, ECF No. 18-10; see Grady, No. CV144006185S, 2019 WL 1093301, at *4-*7; see also Resp't ex. A at 75-78, Trial Transcript (victim testimony), ECF No. 18-1.

After a trial, the state habeas court denied Petitioner's amended petition on all four grounds. Grady, No. CV144006185S, 2019 WL 109330, at *5-*7. As to the first ground, the habeas trial court concluded (1) that Petitioner failed to show his trial defense counsel was “deficient for not asking the Hoppes and Bludnickis about the petitioner's absence from the December 24, 2007 family party[,]” which “would have jeopardized the defense to the charge arising from another date and incident when the petitioner had not acknowledged his presence and physical contact with [the victim,]” and (2) that Petitioner failed to show how he was prejudiced. Id. at *5.

The habeas trial court denied Petitioner's second ground because Petitioner's assertion of his sexual relationship with counsel was “completely not credible,” “outlandish and, ... only intended to humiliate former counsel.” Id. at *6.

As to the third ground, the habeas court recognized that the word “victim” had been used during the jury trial and “that reasonably competent criminal defense counsel would raise timely objections, request curative instructions, and refrain from using the term ‘victim' after the trial court granted counsel's motion in limine to preclude the use of that phrase.” Id. at *7. Nonetheless, the habeas court concluded that “its usage was not so prevalent as to prejudice the petitioner.” Id. (noting “complainant was mostly referred to as C.D. or as the complainant, not as the victim.”).

With respect to fourth ground, the habeas trial court noted that Charette testified at the habeas trial that she did not know if Petitioner was at Okemo on the weekend at issue, which "leaves open the reasonable possibility that the petitioner was at Okemo, unbeknownst to [her] and not seen by her.” Id. The habeas trial court concluded that Charette's “testimony was of marginal impeachment value and does not undermine this court's confidence in the outcome of the criminal trial.” Id.

Petitioner appealed the trial court's denial, asserting that the habeas court improperly found no ineffective assistance of counsel where his trial defense counsel (1) had failed to present testimony from four witnesses about the Petitioner's whereabouts at the family Christmas party on December 24, 2007; (2) had referred to the complainant as the “victim” and failed to object or request a curative instruction when the prosecutor also referred to the complainant as the “victim,” and (3) had failed to investigate the Okemo ski house allegations “and present an alibi defense, after Petitioner informed counsel to do so “with Ther[esa] (Tess) Charette wh[o]m CD [the victim] had placed on the scene the night in question.” See Pet'r's ex. 14(a), Pet'r Appellate Brief, ECF No. 1-2 at 2. See also Donald G. v. Comm'r of Correction, 203 Conn.App. 58, 59-60, 74, cert. denied, 337 Conn. 907 (2021).

As to the first ground, the Appellate Court concluded that the habeas trial court properly held that Petitioner “failed to sustain his burden of overcoming the presumption that counsel's actions were the result of sound trial strategy.” Id. at 69-70.

With regard to Petitioner's second claim, the Appellate Court affirmed that Petitioner failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any deficient performance by trial defense counsel arising from references to “the victim” as Petitioner had been acquitted of one of the sexual assault charges. Id. at 72-73.

With respect to his third ground regarding failure to investigate and procure Charette's testimony, the Appellate Court noted Petitioner's trial defense counsel's testimony about Petitioner having admitted to being present at the Okemo ski trip; thus, the Appellate Court concluded that the “decision of the petitioner's trial counsel not to pursue testimony from a witness in an effort to rebut a claim that the petitioner had readily admitted as true cannot be deemed unreasonable or tactically unsound.” Id. at 74-75.

On June 29, 2021, the Connecticut Supreme Court denied Petitioner's certification for appeal. Donald G. v. Comm'r of Correction, 337 Conn. 907 (2021).

Second Habeas Action

On June 19, 2017, Petitioner filed another application for a writ of habeas corpus in the Judicial District of Tolland assigned docket number TSR-CV17-4008907-S. Donald G. v. Comm'r of Correction, 2022 WL 375499, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 2022). In his amended petition, Petitioner asserted ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on his direct appeal. Id. The habeas trial court observed that ...