Graham v. Graham

306 A.3d 499

222 Conn.App. 560

Cheryl L. GRAHAM

v.William GRAHAM

(AC 45657)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 11, 2023

Officially Released November 28, 2023

David F. Sherwood, Glastonbury, for the appellant-cross appellee (defendant).

Andrew P. Nemiroff, Old Greenwich, for the appellee-cross appellant (plaintiff).

Moll, Cradle and Suarez, Js.

CRADLE, J.

[1, 2] ₅₆₃In this postjudgment marital dissolution matter, the defendant, William Graham, appeals, and the plaintiff, Cheryl L, Graham, cross appeals, from the judgment of the trial court rendered with respect to two postjudgment motions for contempt filed by the plaintiff. The defendant claims that the court improperly found him in contempt for wilfully violating postjudgment orders pertaining to his obligations to pay alimony to the plaintiff and the medical expenses of the parties’ children. The defendant also challenges the court’s award of attorney’s fees to the plaintiff. The plaintiff claims that the court erred in dismissing an offer of compromise that she filed to resolve her claim that the defendant violated the court’s postjudgment order relating to his alimony obligation. We conclude that the court properly declined to award interest pursuant to the plaintiff's offer of compromise, but the form ₅₆₄of the judgment with respect thereto is improper and we remand the case with direction to strike the plain- tiff's offer of compromise.¹ We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the claims on appeal. The parties’ marriage was dissolved on April 7, 2011. At the time of judgment, the parties had two minor children. The parties entered into a separation agreement that was incorporated into the judgment of the court and provided, inter alia, that the defendant would pay to the plaintiff a certain sum of unallocated alimony and child support² for a nonmodifiable period of nine years, or until the death of either party or the remarriage of the plaintiff. Pursuant to the formula set forth in the separation agreement, the maximum amount the defendant would be obligated to pay to the plaintiff each year was $504,000. The separation agreement also specified that the provisions of ₅₆₅General Statutes § 46b-86 (b) would apply to the defendant’s alimony obligation.³

The separation agreement also obligated the defendant to pay 60 percent of the uninsured or unreimbursed reasonably necessary medical, optical, surgical, hospital, dental and orthodontic expenses of the parties’ children, including the cost of prescription drugs, and 100 percent of "mutually agreed upon psychiatric or psychological services …."

On April 25, 2019, the defendant filed a motion to modify the dissolution judgment, seeking the immediate termination, suspension or reduction of his periodic support obligation, on the ground that the plaintiff was cohabitating with another individual, was benefiting financially from that cohabitation, and was engaged to be married to that same individual. On July 22, 2019, the parties entered into a stipulation that was approved by and made an order of the court. The stipulation modified the dissolution judgment in relevant part⁴ as ₅₆₆follows: "The defendant’s obligation to pay unallocated alimony and child support, pursuant to the parties’ separation agreement, dated April 7, 2011, shall terminate immediately, subject to him making the following payments: (a) $217,000 within two weeks of this stipulation as payment in full for his 2018 unallocated alimony and child support obligation; and (b) $504,000 payable as follows (in two parts) in full satisfaction of his 2019 unallocated alimony and child support obligation: (i) $300,000 payable on or before January 31, 2020; and (ii) $204,000 payable on or before April 30, 2020." The stipulation also modified the separation agreement by obligating the defendant to pay 100 percent of the children’s unreimbursed medical expenses going forward. The stipulation further stated: "Except as provided herein, the parties’ separation agreement and parenting plan remain in full force and effect to the extent there are remaining obligations thereunder."

On February 20, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt, alleging that the defendant wilfully violated the terms of the July 22, 2019 stipulation. The plaintiff alleged that, although the defendant paid the $217,000 to satisfy the 2018 alimony and child support obligation ₅₆₇within two weeks of the July 22, 2019 stipulation, the defendant’s attorney had informed her attorney, by letter dated January 29, 2020, that the defendant would not be making the two payments that were due on January 31 and April 30, 2020, because his alimony obligation had terminated upon the plaintiff's remarriage pursuant to the separation agreement. The defendant did not make either of those payments, which totaled $504,000, to satisfy his 2019 alimony and child support obligation.

On May 8, 2020, the plaintiff filed another motion for contempt, alleging that the defendant failed to pay 100 percent of their daughters’ medical expenses, as required under the July 22, 2019 stipulation, in that he refused to reimburse her for a $5000 concierge fee charged by a physician, Sarah Gamble, who was treating the parties’ older daughter.

On August 24, 2020, the plaintiff filed an offer of compromise, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-192a⁵ ₅₆₈and Practice Book § 17-14,⁶ offering to resolve her claim against the defendant for his alleged violation of the provision of the July 22, 2019 stipulation that required the defendant to make two payments to her in the total amount of $504,000 to satisfy his 2019 alimony and child support obligation.⁷

On May 24, 2022, the court held a hearing on the plaintiff's motions, at which both the plaintiff and the defendant testified and introduced into evidence numerous documents. The court filed a memorandum of decision dated June 29, 2022, in which it granted the plaintiff's motions for contempt. The court found that the defendant wilfully failed to make the two lump sum payments set forth in the July 22, 2019 stipulation. In so doing, the court set forth the following findings: "That as of January 31, 2020, there was legally due and owing to the [plaintiff] the sum of $300,000; that as of that date, the [defendant] wrongfully detained said sum; that as of April 30, 2020, there was legally owing to the [plaintiff] the sum of $204,000; that as of that date, the [defendant] wrongfully detained said sum; that said ₅₆₉sums remain due and owing as of the date hereof; and that, under all [of] the circumstances, the court finds it fair and equitable to award the [plaintiff] simple interest on each of said sums [pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a]⁸ at the rate of 5 percent per annum from and including the date of wrongful detention to and including the date of payment in full." (Footnote added.) The court also found that the defendant wilfully violated the order requiring him to pay 100 percent of the unreimbursed medical expenses for the parties’ daughters when he failed to pay the $5000 concierge fee charged by Dr. Gamble. The court ordered the defendant to pay those amounts within thirty days and awarded attorney’s fees to the plaintiff in the amount of $22,590.50. The court dismissed the plaintiff's offer of compromise. This appeal and this cross appeal followed.

On July 19, 2022, the plaintiff filed a motion for additional attorney’s fees for the time period from May 19, 2022, just before the hearing on the plaintiff's motions, through the filing of posthearing briefs on June 7, 2022, in the amount of $12,812.50.⁹

₅₇₀On November 1, 2022, the court held a hearing on, inter alia, the plaintiff's motions for attorney’s fees, at which both parties testified. By way of a memorandum of decision filed November 16, 2022, the court granted both motions, ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff's counsel the sum of $12,812.50 for attorney’s fees for the period from May 19 through June 7, 2022. The defendant thereafter amended his appeal to challenge this award of additional attorney’s fees. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly found him in contempt for wilfully violating the July 22, 2019 stipulation by refusing to make the lump sum payments in satisfaction of his 2019 alimony and child support obligations and failing to pay 100 percent of the medical expenses of the parties’ children. We disagree.

[3, 4] The following legal principles are applicable to the defendant’s challenges to the court’s judgment of contempt. "Contempt is a disobedience to the rules and orders of a court which has power to punish for such an offense. … A contempt judgment cannot stand when, inter alia, the order a contemnor is held to have violated is vague and indefinite, or when the contemnor, through no fault of his own, was unable to obey the court’s order.

…

[5–8] "First, we must resolve the threshold question of whether the underlying order constituted a court order that was sufficiently clear and unambiguous so as to support a judgment of contempt. … This is a legal inquiry subject to de novo review. … Second, if we conclude that the underlying court order was sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we must then determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in issuing, or refusing to issue, a judgment of contempt, which ₅₇₁includes a review of the trial court’s determination of whether the violation was wilful or excused by a good faith dispute or misunderstanding. … A finding of contempt is a question of fact, and our standard of review is to determine whether the court abused its discretion in [finding] that the actions or inactions of the [party] were in contempt of a court order. … In domestic relations cases, [a] judgment rendered in accordance with … a stipulation of the parties is to be regarded and...