Granda v. Cal. Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys.

620 F.Supp.3d 1038

Sara GRANDA, an individual; Jose Granda, an individual, Plaintiffs, v. CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM; and Does 1-10, inclusive, Defendants.

No. 2:21-cv-01256-MCE-KJN

United States District Court, E.D. California

Signed August 9, 2022

Elise R. Sanguinetti, Arias Sanguinetti Wang & Torrijos, LLP, Emeryville, CA, Alfredo Torrijos, Arias Sanguinetti Wang & Torrijos LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Eugene Feldman, Law Offices of Jake D. Finkel, APC, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Alina Ananian, Jason Levin, Alston & Bird LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Remi Salter, Steptoe & Johnson LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR., SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Through the present lawsuit, Plaintiffs Sara Granda and Jose Granda allege they have been discriminated and/or retaliated against for seeking the medical reimbursement needed to procure skilled nursing services through a policy of health insurance issued by Defendant California Public Employees' Retirement System ("Defendant" or "CalPERS"). Plaintiffs assert a single cause of action for Violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, et seq. ("Title II of the ADA").

CalPERS now moves for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c),¹ on grounds that Plaintiffs have not stated a viable claim for violation of Title II. As set forth below, that Motion is DENIED.²

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Sara Granda ("Sara") was rendered a paraplegic as a result of a motor vehicle accident that occurred in 1997 when she was 17. Because she is ventilator dependent, Sara needs 24-hour a day skilled nursing assistance as opposed to non-licensed caregiving/attendant care in order to reside at home. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 18. Given her permanent disability, Sara is perpetually at high risk of life-threatening medical complications if the appropriate skilled nursing care is not provided.

Plaintiff Jose Granda ("Jose") has been employed at California State University, Sacramento for more than 37 years. As such, he is enrolled in the CalPERS system and receives health care coverage through CalPERS for himself and his family. Because Sara became disabled prior to the age of 26, she qualifies under Jose's insurance as a disabled dependent. In addition, Sara is also an employee of the State of California herself, having worked as an attorney for the Department of Health Care Services for the past 11 years. Id. at ¶ 11.

Sara alleges that, given the acuity of her condition, she needs access to consistent care in order to avoid hospitalization. She claims that under the terms of an agreement reached with CalPERS in approximately 1998, the agency facilitated the provision of appropriate health care at home by converting dollars available under its policy for skilled nursing care to be administered at Sara's own residence. Id. at ¶ 22. After 2014, however, the incidence of Sara's hospitalizations escalated dramatically with six separate admissions between 2014 and 2021. Sara alleges those hospitalizations could have been avoided had appropriate and consistent health care been provided to her at home. Id. at ¶ 19.

According to the Complaint, the problem rests with the fact that the CalPERS reimbursement rate for her care is 40-50% less than the market rate for comparable skilled nursing services in the greater Sacramento area. This discrepancy has been compounded by the high demand for nurses generally as a result of the COVID-19 crisis. The low rates Sara is able to provide have resulted, she claims, in constant turnover and retraining that have adversely affected her care and increased her rate of hospitalization, all imperiling her ability to live at home in the least restrictive environment. Sara asserts that CalPERS' refusal to increase the reimbursement rates for the skilled nursing care she needs constitutes discrimination on the basis of her disability.

In 2020, these shortcomings prompted Plaintiffs to seek modification of the 1998 agreement so as to protect Sara's access to appropriate services. Jose has advocated on his daughter's behalf and claims that CalPERS has retaliated against him by attempting to interfere with his efforts in that regard by prohibiting his direct communication with CalPERS' Board of Administration. Id. at ¶¶ 29-30.

As indicated above, Plaintiffs' Complaint, filed on July 16, 2021, contains a single cause of action for violation of Title II of the ADA. Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings on grounds that the circumstances of Plaintiffs' claim are not cognizable under Title II since they do not involve discrimination in the provision of public services, but instead are employment-related and therefore redressable, if at all, only under Title I.

STANDARD

Under Rule 12(c), "a party may move for judgment on the pleadings" after the pleadings are closed "but early enough not to delay trial." A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) challenges the legal sufficiency of the opposing party's pleadings. See, e.g., Westlands Water Dist. v. Bureau of Reclamation, 805 F. Supp. 1503, 1506 (E.D. Cal. 1992). Any party may move for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) after the pleadings are closed but within such time as to not delay trial.

The standard for evaluating a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as the standard applied to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). A motion for judgment on the pleadings should only be granted if "the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citation omitted). Judgment on the pleadings is also proper when there is either a "lack of cognizable legal theory" or the "absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). In reviewing a Rule 12(c) motion, "all factual allegations in the complaint [must be accepted] as true and construe[d] . . . in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). Judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is warranted "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Deveraturda v. Globe Aviation Sec. Servs., 454 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Courts have discretion to grant leave to amend in conjunction with motions made pursuant to Rule 12(c). Lonberg v. City of Riverside, 300 F. Supp. 2d 942, 945 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (citation omitted). Generally, leave to amend a complaint is denied only if it is clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

ANALYSIS

Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination in the provision of public services and specifies, inter alia, that no qualified individual with a disability shall, "by reason of such disability," be excluded from participation in, or be denied the benefits of, a public entity's services, programs or activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. As part of Title II's protections, the Attorney General was instructed to issue regulations implementing the proscriptions against discrimination contained within Title II. Id. at § 12134(a). One of those regulations, the so-called "integration" mandate, requires a "public entity [to] administer . . . programs . . . in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities." 28 C.F.R.§ 35.130(d). Another regulation calls for public entities to "make reasonable modifications" to avoid "discrimination on the basis of disability." Id. at § 35.130(b)(7).

In Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 119 S.Ct. 2176, 144 L.Ed.2d 540 (1999), the Supreme Court recognized that these provisions require that disabled individuals be placed into a community setting, provided the individuals would benefit and such placement can be reasonably accommodated. As the court reasoned, the "[i]nstitutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit from community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life" and thereby qualifies as discrimination. Id. at 583, 119 S.Ct. 2176. Instead, recognizing Title II's integration mandate, Olmstead noted that services to the disabled "should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the person's personal liberty." Id. at 599, 119 S.Ct. 2176.

In the present matter, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant's refusal to provide reimbursement adequate to cover the skilled nursing care Sara needs runs afoul of the integration mandate recognized by Olmstead. This is because, according to Plaintiffs, the rates for such care authorized by CalPERS are inadequate to ensure that Sara receives the consistent care necessary to live at home and work as an attorney at the California Department of Health Services. Because Sara has successfully been able to both live at home and work over the past 11 years provided such care is afforded to her, Plaintiffs assert that the integration mandate and Olmstead's holding make Defendant's refusal to accommodate the care she requires qualify as discrimination.

Plaintiffs argue that Sara's ventilator-dependent status, and the fact that without skilled nursing care at home she has to be hospitalized in an acute-care facility, meaning that she indeed is subject to an undue risk of institutionalization (through hospitalization) if her at-home services are compromised. As indicated above, Plaintiffs rely entirely on Title II in bringing...