Grant v. Grant

678 S.W.3d 629

2023 Ark. App. 492

Charles L. GRANT, Appellant

v.Eileen N. GRANT, Appellee

No. CV-22-511

Court of Appeals of Arkansas, DIVISION II.

Opinion Delivered November 1, 2023

APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, TWELFTH DIVISION [NO. 60DR-99-3015], HONORABLE ALICE S. GRAY, JUDGE

Mylissia M. Blankenship, for appellant.

Knollmeyer Law Office, P.A., Jacksonville, by: Michael Knollmeyer, for appellee.

N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Judge

₁Charles;Grant appeals an order of the Pulaski County Circuit Court interpreting the parties’ property-settlement agreement and requiring him to reimburse appellee Eileen Grant. On appeal, Charles argues that the circuit court modified the agreement without jurisdiction and erred in. its interpretation. We affirm.

The parties were divorced in 1999 after a thirty-one-year marriage. Charles served in the United States Air Force from the time the parties married until his retirement in 1993. Eileen worked for the civil service before and after the divorce. The parties entered into a property-settlement agreement that was incorporated into the divorce decree. The agreement divided the marital home, personal property, debts, and retirement accounts. The retirement portion of the agreement provided as follows:

₂6. Retirement. Each party has a retirement plan.

[Eileen] makes no claim on the FERS retirement of [Charles].

[Charles] is entitled [to] fifty percent (50%) of the civil service retirement of [Eileen]. A Qualified Domestic Relations Order will be entered herein by separate document.

Each party waives any interest in the thrift savings plan of the other party. 7. Military Retirement. The parties were married February 26, 1968. The parties were married for longer than twenty (20) years during which time [Charles] served on active, duty with the Air Force. [Eileen] is entitled to 50% of the disposable military retirement pay of [Charles] as division of property and not as alimony.

In July 2020, Eileen filed a "Motion for Retirement Order and Motion for Refund." She stated that no qualified domestic relations order regarding Charles’s award of 50 percent of her civil-service retirement was ever entered. She alleged that although Charles was awarded only one-half of her retirement that existed at the time of the divorce, Charles had been receiving one-half of her total retirement benefits, including the benefits that accrued after the date of divorce. Eileen had worked for the civil service for seventeen years during the parties’ marriage and had continued to work for the civil service for sixteen years after the divorce, but she argued that Charles was not awarded a percentage of benefits earned after the divorce. She requested that the court enter an order specifying that Charles was awarded only one-half of the benefits that existed on the date of the divorce and ordering Charles to refund to her all sums he received in excess of that award.

After two hearings and two rounds of briefing, the circuit court entered an order on April 19, 2022, granting Eileen’s motion. The court found that the property-settlement agreement is clear and unambiguous and contemplated only a division of the retirement ₃benefits that were earned during the parties’ marriage and were divisible at the time of the divorce. The court found that the agreement does not state that Charles is also awarded 50 percent of any future civil-service retirement benefits that Eileen would earn after the divorce, The court also noted that by its terms, the property-settlement agreement divided marital property and that no reference was made to either party being awarded nonmarital property of the other party. The court found that since 2015 when Eileen retired, Charles had received $122,106.53 more than he should have received. The court granted Eileen a judgment in that amount and ordered that Charles would not receive any more payments until the judgment had been paid.

[1–3] We review domestic-relations cases de novo, but we will not reverse a circuit court’s finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous. Rowan ?. Rowan, 2022 Ark. App. 143, 643 S.W.3d 62. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to. support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the circuit court has made a mistake. Id. In reviewing a circuit court’s findings of fact, we give due deference to the court’s superior position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded to their testimony. Id.

[4–10] A court has no authority to modify a separate and independent property-settlement agreement that has been incorporated into a divorce decree. Id. However, the agreement is still subject to judicial interpretation, and questions relating to the construction,...