Grant v. Slattery

1

MOSHE GRANT, Plaintiff, v. THOMAS J. SLATTERY, personally and in his capacity as School Safety Supervisor, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 22-941 (FLW)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

September 29, 2022

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

Hon Freda L. Wolfson, U.S. Chief District Judge.

Presently before the Court is a motion to dismiss plaintiff Moshe Grant's (“Plaintiff”) Amended Complaint against Marlboro Board of Education (the “Board”) and Thomas J. Slattery (“Slattery”)^[1], among others affiliated with Marlboro Township Public Schools, (together “Defendants”)^[2] for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. of Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff's claims arise from Defendants' alleged violations of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights predicated on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and N.J.S.A. 10:6-2c, an alleged conspiracy by Defendants to violate those rights in contravention of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and an alleged violation of Plaintiff's equal protection rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED.

However, in lieu of dismissal, Plaintiff is given leave to amend his equal protection claim under section 1983 only. He may do so within 21 days from the date of the accompanying order.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The relevant facts are derived from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and the attached exhibits. Plaintiff is a resident of Morganville, New Jersey, and a parent of a child in the Marlboro Township School system. Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”), at ¶ 4. On February 16, 2022, Plaintiff received a warning letter from Slattery regarding Plaintiff's alleged conduct at prior board meetings, which is attached to the Amended Complaint. (See Ex. A, February 16, 2022 Letter re: “Unruly Conduct at February 8, 2022 Marlboro Board of Education Meeting,” (“Letter” or “Warning Letter”).) The letter referenced two public school board meetings that Plaintiff attended. Specifically, on January 18, 2022 and February 8, 2022, the Board held meetings at the Marlboro Memorial Middle School located in Morganville, New Jersey. Am. Compl. at ¶ 18. These public meetings are not used for any classroom study purposes. Id. at ¶ 19. According to Plaintiff, he is well-known to Defendants as a parent who has voiced his disagreement with Marlboro Public Schools' masking policies for children due to his view of the perceived harm that such masking mandates are imposing on children. Id. at ¶ 20.

During the January 18, 2022 public meeting, Plaintiff spoke out against the Board's masking policies and used the obscene phrase “whatever the hell.” Id. at ¶ 21. Plaintiff concedes that he apologized for using such language. Id.

During the February 8, 2022 meeting, Plaintiff spoke out a second time against the school's masking policies. Id. at ¶ 23. At the end of the February meeting, Plaintiff and a large group of other individuals who attended the meeting removed their masks. Id. at ¶ 26. According to Plaintiff, Slattery then “harassed” Plaintiff for taking off his mask and asked him to wear the mask. Id. at ¶ 27. However, the Warning Letter states that a security guard had asked Plaintiff to place his mask back on and Plaintiff refused. (Letter, p.1.) Further, the Letter states that when asked a second and third time to wear the mask, Plaintiff responded “[n]o, what are you on some fucking power trip” and challenged the security guard to compare “ball size[s].” Id.^[3]

As a result of those incidents, the Letter warned Plaintiff that his behavior was in direct violation of the school district's civility policy, Policy 9202:

This disruptive behavior and use of offensively coarse language is concerning and will not be tolerated ....Moving forward, you will cease all offensive, disrespectful, and confrontational language in our district buildings and with our district employees . . . Further disruptive behavior shall result in you being banned from any or all school related events which is our prerogative . . . Repeated behavior described above and a refusal to leave school grounds will result in the assistance of law enforcement to facilitate your removal from school property. We will also press the requisite criminal charges.

(Id.) (emphasis in original) According to Defendant, and not disputed by Plaintiff, Plaintiff spoke at another public Board meeting on March 8, 2022, where he was permitted to speak freely and did so without using profanity or exhibiting disruptive behavior.

On February 22, 2022, Plaintiff filed an initial complaint in which he alleged that Defendants violated his civil rights under the First Amendment and N.J.S.A. 10:6-2c and conspired to violate his civil rights. Pl. Compl., at ¶¶ 33-43. Thereafter, Plaintiff amended his complaint, alleging the same claims against Defendants, as well as an additional claim that Defendants violated Plaintiff's equal protection rights under § 1982. Am. Compl., ¶¶ 33-48. On April 6, 2022, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Motion to Dismiss (“Mot. Dismiss”).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

a. Rule 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a claim “for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the moving party “bears the burden of showing that no claim has been presented.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)); United Van Lines, LLC v. Lohr Printing, Inc., No. 11-4761, 2012 WL 1072248, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2012).

When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, courts first separate the factual and legal elements of the claims, and accept all of the well-pleaded facts as true. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not require that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). Thus, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to raise a plaintiff's right to relief above the speculative level, so that a claim “is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570; Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). All reasonable inferences must be made in the plaintiff's favor. See In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010).

III. DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff disputes the content of the Warning Letter from the Board. Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he assertions of fact in the subject letter were mostly false, taken out of context, [] misconstrued, [and] designed to damage [Plaintiff's] good name and reputation in the community and generally.” Am. Compl., ¶ 31. Although Plaintiff acknowledges that consistent with the Letter, he used the phrase “whatever the hell” at the first meeting on January 18, 2022, he takes issue with the Letter's description of the events that unfolded following the conclusion of the second meeting on February 8, 2022. According to Plaintiff, he remained fully masked during the meeting, but removed his mask as he was on his way out of the building. Id. at ¶ 26. Plaintiff alleges that Slattery then “approached and harassed [him] for having taken off his mask.” Id. at ¶ 27. According to Plaintiff, Slattery's actions were undertaken “with knowledge and approval of some or all other defendants in order to punish [him] for exercising his constitutionally protected civil rights.” Id. at ¶ 28. Further, Plaintiff claims that the Letter's assertion that he was “inside [an MTPS] school building” disregards (1) the building's designation as a “mixed use building” and its use during a time not contemplated by the Executive Order, i.e., a time during which school classes and activities were not in session, and (2) the fact that the alleged conduct did not occur during the meeting, but rather following the meeting. Pl. Br., pp. 2, 8.

First as a matter of procedure, the Court can consider the Warning Letter because it is attached to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint and “integral to or explicitly relied upon in the [Amended Complaint].” In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Ins. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999) (emphasis and citations omitted). However, the Court will not consider the factual allegations in the Letter that are disputed by Plaintiff in the Amended Complaint. Specifically, I will not take as true the statement that Plaintiff stated to a security guard: “[n]o, what are you on some fucking power trip?” and that Plaintiff challenged the security guard to compare “ball size[s]” when asked to put on a mask. Rather, the Court will only consider the contents of the Letter to the extent it comports with Plaintiff's recounting of the incidents in his Amended Complaint. Namely, I will consider the Letter's assertion that Plaintiff cursed during the January 18, 2022 meeting as Plaintiff admitted using the phrase “whatever the hell,” and the allegations that Plaintiff had removed his mask while inside a school building in violation of the mask mandate, E.O. 251, and was approached by a personnel for violating that policy.

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