Grant v. Target Corp.

126 F.Supp.3d 183

Kevin Grant, Plaintiff,

v.Target Corporation, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION No. 1:15-cv-12972-ADB

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Signed September 3, 2015

Fran J. Cimler, Jr., Derry, NH, Lisa Debrosse Johnson, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.

Daniel B. Klein, Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

BURROUGHS, DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 16, 2015, Plaintiff Kevin Grant ("Plaintiff") filed this civil action against his former employer, Target Corporation ("Target") in Essex County Superior Court. Plaintiff alleges that Target wrongfully terminated his employment in April 2015, and he seeks damages for breach of contract (Count I), violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count II), wrongful termination in violation of public policy (Count III), misrepresentation (Count IV), and defamation (Count V). [See Complaint, ECF No. 8 ("Compl.").] In July 2015, Target removed this action to federal district court, asserting diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.¹ Presently before the Court is Target's Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted [ECF No. 6]; Plaintiff's Opposition; [ECF No. 9.]; and Target's Reply [ECF No. 14]. For the reasons set forth herein, Target's Motion to Dismiss is allowed in part and denied in part.

II. FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges the following facts in his Complaint, which the Court accepts as true for purposes of this Motion to Dismiss.

In April 2015, Plaintiff was employed by Target as a "temporary store team leader," assigned to the Target store in Haverhill, Massachusetts. [Complaint ¶ 4.] On Saturday, April 18, 2015, Plaintiff was out with his wife and friends in Manchester, New Hampshire. [Id. ¶ 6.] Plaintiff was not scheduled to work at Target that night. [Id. ] Over the course of the evening, Plaintiff consumed two alcoholic beverages and a meal. [Id. ¶ 7.] He alleges that he was "not impaired." [Id. ]

When Plaintiff returned to his vehicle sometime prior to 2:50 a.m., he noticed a missed text message from Jonathan Kingsley, Target's Asset Protection Business Partner for the Haverhill store. [Id. ¶ 8.] The message indicated that an alarm had been triggered at the Haverhill store, and that none of the store's executive team leaders were responding to phone calls. [Id. ¶ 9.] Plaintiff responded to Kingsley's message, indicating that he would attempt to contact the team leaders himself. [Id. ¶ 10.] Plaintiff, however, was unsuccessful in reaching any of them. [Id. ] Plaintiff texted Kingsley a second time, informing him that he was out with his wife, but that he would respond to the alarm problem if necessary. [Id. ] Kingsley asked whether a response could wait until the responsible team leader arrived at the store at 7 a.m. [Id. ¶ 11.]² Plaintiff then contacted the alarm company, and one of the company's representatives told Plaintiff that he should report to the Haverhill store as soon as possible. [Id. ¶ 12.] Plaintiff texted Kingsley to advise him that he would arrive at the store in approximately one hour. [Id. ] Plaintiff also telephoned Target Store Team Leader Trainer Patrick Chaffee at approximately 3:15 a.m. to "confirm that he was following protocol for the alarm." [Id. ¶ 14.] Chaffee did not answer the call. [Id. ]

Plaintiff and his wife arrived at Target; entered the store; and waited for the alarm technician to arrive, as the alarm company representative had advised Plaintiff that it would be unsafe to wait in the parking lot. [Id. ¶ 15.] They waited in the store until the alarm technician and Katherine Finneran, one of the Target team leaders, arrived on location. [Id. ¶ 16.] Plaintiff and his wife left the store at approximately 5:30 a.m., once the alarm had been disarmed and Plaintiff was confident that Ms. Finneran could handle the matter going forward. [Id. ¶ 17.]

On Monday, April 20, 2015, Plaintiff spoke to each of his store executives and advised them that in the future, they should be available by telephone so as not to miss any alarm calls. Plaintiff also stated to the executives that he had been out with his wife celebrating on the night of April 18th, and that he was one hour away from the store when he was notified of the alarm. [Id. ¶ 18.]

Approximately one week later, on April 28, 2015, Plaintiff arrived at the Haverhill store and spoke with Target District Manager Andrew Chiarelli. [Id. ¶ 19.] Mr. Chiarelli said that he had been informed that Plaintiff "was drinking and took an alarm call." [Id. ] When he asked Plaintiff if this was true, Plaintiff explained that he had been out with friends and had only consumed two drinks. [Id. ¶ 20.] Chiarelli also read the text messages Plaintiff had exchanged with Kingsley. [Id. ¶ 21.] Despite Plaintiff's explanation, Target allegedly terminated his employment for "gross misconduct." [Id. ¶ 21.]

Plaintiff alleges, upon information and belief, that "Target's agents and employees made false statements regarding Plaintiff's integrity and the propriety of his conduct." [Id. ¶ 38.]³ Plaintiff further alleges that when terminating his employment, Target failed to follow its own policies and procedures, as stated in Target's employee handbook and elsewhere. [Id. ¶ 22.] Plaintiff claims that at the outset of his employment, he was "familiarized" with Target's employee handbook, as well as its policies and procedures pertaining to termination of employees, and that he "relied upon the same in connection with his own conduct." [Id. ] Plaintiff also alleges that his termination violated the terms and conditions of his original written offer letter from Target, which he signed and accepted at the outset of his employment, and upon which terms he relied in accepting Target's offer of employment. [Id. ¶¶ 5, 22.]⁴

III. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

Plaintiff is pursuing four claims for relief against Target.⁵ Count I of his Complaint alleges that Target breached its employment contract with Plaintiff by failing to follow the policies and procedures outlined in Plaintiff's offer letter and in Target's employee handbook. Plaintiff claims that he suffered damages from this breach in the form of lost income and severe emotional distress. [Compl. ¶¶ 23–26.] Count II of his Complaint alleges that Target also violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implicit in Plaintiff's employment contract, and that Plaintiff suffered damages of lost income and severe emotional distress. [Id. ¶¶ 27–29.] Count IV alleges that Target is liable for misrepresentation, on the grounds that Plaintiff was not terminated in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in Target's employee handbook and Plaintiff's written offer of employment, upon which he relied when conducting himself. Again, Plaintiff claims lost income and emotional distress damages. [Id. ¶¶ 33-36.] Finally, in Count V, Plaintiff alleges that Target is liable for defamation, on the grounds that unnamed Target agents and employees made false statements about Plaintiff's conduct and integrity. Plaintiff alleges that as a result of these defamatory statements, his reputation has been damaged; he has lost income; and he has suffered severe emotional distress. [Id. ¶¶ 37-39.]

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Under the notice pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff is required to submit "a short and plain statement of the claim" in order to give the defendant "fair notice" of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ; see Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Although notice pleading does not require detailed factual allegations, "more than labels and conclusions" are needed to survive a motion to dismiss. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The facts alleged must "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. A "formulaic recitationof the elements of a cause of action" is not enough. Id.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc. , 647 F.3d 377, 384 (1st Cir.2011). However, courts are not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). "Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate ‘if the complaint does not set forth factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.’ " Lemelson v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n , 721 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir.2013) (quoting United States ex rel. Hutcheson , 647 F.3d at 384 ).

B. Analysis

i. Plaintiff Adequately Pleads a Breach-of-Contract Claim.

Count I of the Complaint alleges that Target terminated Plaintiff in violation of Target's own policies and procedures, as set forth in Target's employee handbook and Plaintiff's offer letter, thereby breaching its implied employment contract with Plaintiff. These allegations are sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief on an implied-contract theory. "It is well-settled in Massachusetts that an employee handbook or personnel manual may form the basis of an employment contract that is beyond that of at-will employment." Beebe v. Williams Coll. , 430 F.Supp.2d 18, 23 (D.Mass.2006) ; see O'Brien v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. , 422 Mass. 686, 691, 664 N.E.2d 843 (1996) (discussing circumstances under which a personnel manual may give rise to a binding contract).

Target argues that Count I should be dismissed because Plaintiff does not allege "the circumstances concerning Target's policies, procedures, or handbook necessary to...