Graves v. Utah Cty. Gov't

551 P.3d 1029

2024 UT App 80

Greg GRAVES, Appellant,

v.UTAH COUNTY GOVERNMENT, Nathan Ivie, Cammie Taylor, and William Lee, Appellees.

No. 20200296-CA

Court of Appeals of Utah.

Filed May 23, 2024

Fourth District Court, American Fork Department, The Honorable Robert C. Lunnen, No. 190100114

Ryan J. Schriever, Spanish Fork, Attorney for Appellant

Andrew M. Morse and Andrew L. Roth, Salt Lake City, Attorneys for Appellees

Judge Michele M. Christiansen Forster authored this Opinion, in which Justice Jill M. Pohlman and Senior Judge Kate Appleby concurred.¹

Amended Opinion^*

CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:

¶1 Cammie Taylor lodged a complaint against then-county commissioner Greg Graves, alleging that he sexually harassed and retaliated against her while she was employed as the human resources director for Utah County (the County). The County hired an independent investigator, who produced an internal report (the report) to address Taylor’s allegations. In response to public records requests from two media outlets, the other two county commissioners voted to disclose redacted copies of Taylor’s complaint and the report. After the vote, the two commissioners communicated with the press and the public regarding the accusations and the investigation, publicly named Graves as the subject of the report, and called on him to resign.

¶2 Graves sued the County, the two commissioners, and Taylor, bringing causes of action for false light invasion of privacy, defamation, slander/libel per se, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted a motion to dismiss Graves’s complaint, and Graves appealed. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶3 We recite here the relevant allegations Graves made in his civil complaint filed in the district court.

¶4 Graves served as a county commissioner for three years, from 2015 to 2018. In October 2017, Taylor, a county employee, filed a "Notice of Charge of Discrimination" with the Utah Antidiscrimination and Labor Division of the Utah Labor Commission (UALD complaint) alleging Graves had sexually harassed and discriminated against her. Taylor also sent a notice of claim to the County. In response, Graves asserted that "Taylor fabricated allegations of sexual harassment against [him] for malicious and improper purposes, including … retaliation, leverage to avoid termination, and/or leverage to force a settlement with [the] County when she was terminated from her job."

¶5 The County hired an investigator to conduct a factual inquiry into Taylor’s allegations of sexual harassment and gender discrimination and prepare the report. The investigator did not conduct a legal analysis of the merits of the harassment and retaliation claims made in Taylor’s UALD complaint But based upon the report, Graves asserted that the investigator was "unable to conclude" that Graves had "engaged in any unwelcome sexual or suggestive behavior or conduct toward" Taylor.

¶6 Graves’s district court complaint alleged that around this time, Taylor contacted media reporters to inform them of the UALD complaint. Subsequently, two media outlets made public records requests under the Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA), see generally Utah Code §§ 68G-2-101 to -901, for "the complaint against Commissioner Graves," "[a]ll emails sent between Utah County Commissioner Greg Graves and Cammie Taylor, the Utah County personnel director," and "any complaint of sexual harassment against Utah County Commissioner Greg Graves." The County initially denied the GRAMA requests because it had not yet received the UALD complaint and "there were no documents to produce." Once the County received the UALD complaint, it continued to deny the requests pending an investigation.

¶7 County commissioners Nathan Ivie and William Lee (the Commissioners) later held a GRAMA appeal hearing regarding the documents that had been requested related to Graves’s alleged misconduct. The Commissioners voted to release the requested documents but to redact personal identification information from them. Immediately after the hearing, however, Ivie addressed the media, announcing that the report was about Graves and that Ivie would release a prepared statement on his official social media page. Lee reposted Ivie’s prepared statement to his own official social media page.

¶8 The County released a partially redacted UALD complaint, but Graves’s name was included in it. The next day, the County released the report, in which all the names— including Graves’s—and identifying information were redacted. Graves alleged that the Commissioners "knew or should have known" that publishing the UALD complaint (with his name included) "without simultaneously releasing the [report] would portray Graves in a false light in that people would falsely believe he was guilty of sexual harassment." Following the release of the UALD complaint, the media reported extensively about the allegations of Graves’s sexual harassment, leading to calls for his resignation.

¶9 Graves’s lawsuit against the Commissioners, Taylor, and the County alleged that Taylor’s accusations against him were false and that she acted with malice in asserting claims of sexual harassment and gender discrimination. Graves also claimed that the Commissioners "acted with malice in publishing the false statements." He asserted that this conduct "irreparably damaged" his reputation, resulting in loss of employment opportunities, marital problems, bullying of his children, and exacerbation of a preexisting traumatic brain injury. He sought economic and non-economic damages.

¶10 In response, the County, the Commissioners, and Taylor filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted, see Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that Graves’s claims were barred by the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (UGIA), see generally Utah Code §§ 63G-7-101 to -904; that Graves did not and could not properly plead that the Commissioners or Taylor acted with actual malice; and that Graves’s infliction of emotional distress claims failed as a matter of law.

¶11 The district court orally granted the motion to dismiss. Its subsequent written order explained that, under GRAMA and Deseret News Publishing Co. v. Salt Lake County, 2008 UT 26, 182 P.3d 372, the Commissioners and the County were required to disclose the report because it was not a protected record, and that, accordingly, "as a matter of law," Graves could not "prove they acted with actual malice." As to Taylor’s conduct—including lodging the UALD complaint and allegedly surreptitiously disclosing to the media her claims of sexual harassment and gender discrimination—the court concluded that Graves’s claims were barred by the UGIA because reporting and investigating sexual harassment allegations were mandatory and both actions were governmental functions. Moreover, the district court concluded that Taylor’s intentional acts, including her alleged leaking of the sexual harassment allegations to the media, were activities for which immunity was not waived. Accordingly, the court dismissed with prejudice Graves’s claims of false light invasion of privacy, defamation, and slander/libel per se. The parties stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of the emotional distress claims. Graves appeals the district court’s decision.

ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1, 2] ¶12 Graves asserts that the district court erred in dismissing his claims. "A motion to dismiss should be granted only if, assuming the truth of the allegations in the complaint …, it is clear that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Hudgens v. Prosper, Inc., 2010 UT 68, ¶ 14, 243 P.3d 1275 (quotation simplified). We generally review a district court’s decision to dismiss claims under rule 12(b)(6) for correctness. Blanch v. Farrell, 2018 UT App 172, ¶ 14, 436 P.3d 285.²

ANALYSIS

I. Claims Against the Commissioners and Taylor

¶13 The district court relied on Deseret News Publishing Co v. Salt Lake County, 2008 UT 26, 182 P.3d 372, in reaching its conclusion that the Commissioners were required to release the report. Regarding Tay- lor, the district court turned to Utah Code section 63G-7-201(4) in determining that Taylor was protected by the UGIA. We agree with the district court’s decision dismissing Graves’s claims against the Commissioners and Taylor, but for a different reason. See Okelberry v. West Daniels Land Ass’n, 2005 UT App 327, ¶ 11, 120 P.3d 34 ("It is well established that we may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court." (quotation simplified)).

[3, 4] ¶14 Governmental immunity shields the State and its employees acting in their official capacities from suit unless the State expressly consents to being sued. The UGIA states that "each governmental entity and each employee of a governmental entity are immune from suit for any injury that results from the exercise of a governmental function." Utah Code § 63G-7-201(1); see also Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, ¶ 10, 40 P.3d 632 ("The [UGIA] grants the state and its political subdivisions broad, background immunity from injuries that result due to the exercise of a governmental function." (quotation simplified)). To determine if an employee of a "governmental entity is immune from suit under the [UGIA], we apply a three-part test, which assesses (1) whether the activity undertaken is a governmental function; (2) whether governmental immunity was waived for the particular activity; and (3) whether there is an exception to that waiver." Van de Grift v. State, 2013 UT 11, ¶ 8, 299 P.3d 1043 ...