Gray v. City of Evergreen

1

IVAN KEITH GRAY, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF EVERGREEN, ALABAMA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 24-00141-KD-B

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division

September 20, 2024

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

SONJA F. BIVINS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This action is before the Court on Defendants Stanley B Stallworth, Kenny Edwards, and Jerry Caylor's motion to dismiss Plaintiff Ivan Keith Gray's amended complaint and memorandum in support (Docs. 3, 4). The motion has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for consideration and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(S). Upon consideration of all matters presented, the undersigned recommends, for the reasons stated herein, that Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 3) be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 8, 2024, Plaintiff Ivan Keith Gray (“Gray”) commenced this action by filing a complaint in the Circuit Court of Conecuh County, Alabama. (Doc. 1-2 at 2-13). On the same day, Gray filed an amended complaint, which is now his operative pleading. (Id. at 15-27).

In his amended complaint, Gray names as Defendants the City of Evergreen, Alabama (“City of Evergreen”), its mayor, Stanley B. Stallworth (“Stallworth”), and two members of its city council, Kenny Edwards (“Edwards”) and Jerry Caylor (“Caylor”). (Id. at 15). Gray sues Defendants Stallworth, Edwards, and Caylor in their individual and official capacities. (Id. at 19).

Gray who is “African-American,” alleges that he was hired as chief of police for the City of Evergreen by a vote of the city council on August 1, 2023. (Id. at 16, 20). However, Gray alleges that Mayor Stallworth subsequently “unlawfully removed [Gray] from his being hired as City of Evergreen Chief of Police and instead at the City Council Meeting on August 15, 2023, the Mayor, acting in concert with” Defendants Edwards and Caylor “over the objection of other council members and without the actions of other council members,” appointed “a less qualified white applicant” as the City of Evergreen's chief of police. (Id. at 16, 19-21).

Gray asserts that he was the victim of “employment discrimination on the basis of race,” and that Defendants' actions violated federal and Alabama law and failed to comport with his rights to due process and equal protection under the law. (Id. at 16, 21-27). Gray asserts the following four causes of action: (1) “Employment Discrimination: Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e, et seq.”; (2) “Employment Discrimination, Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 Claim Equal Protection”; (3) “Employment Discrimination, Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 Claim”; and (4) “Due Process Violation; Declaratory Judgment Relief; Mandamus Relief.” (Id. at 22-27).

Defendants removed the action to this Court on May 3, 2024. (Doc. 1). On May 8, 2024, Defendants Stallworth, Edwards, and Caylor (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”) filed the instant motion to dismiss Gray's amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), along with a memorandum of law in support. (Docs. 3, 4).^[1] Gray filed a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss (Doc. 12), and the Individual Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion. (Doc. 13). Therefore, the Individual Defendants' motion to dismiss has been fully briefed and is ripe for resolution.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This necessarily requires that a plaintiff include factual allegations that plausibly support each essential element of his claim. Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 708 n.2 (11th Cir. 2010). “If the complaint contains a claim that is facially subject to an affirmative defense, that claim may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).” LeFrere v. Quezada, 582 F.3d 1260, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009).

When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court “must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Almanza v. United Airlines, Inc., 851 F.3d 1060, 1066 (11th Cir. 2017). That said, “[l]egal conclusions without adequate factual support are entitled to no assumption of truth.” Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2011). A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but it “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Title VII - Individual Capacity Claims

In his first cause of action, Gray asserts that the “City of Evergreen, by and through its officials, specifically the named individual defendants, engaged in actions tantamount to employment discrimination on the basis of race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.” (Doc. 1-2 at 22). The Individual Defendants argue that Gray's Title VII claims against them as alleged in his first cause of action are due to be dismissed “because there is no individual liability under Title VII.” (Doc. 3 at 2; Doc. 4 at 3-4).

The Individual Defendants are correct that “as a matter of law, there is no individual liability under Title VII.” Perkins v. Kushla Water Dist., 21 F.Supp.3d 1250, 1260 (S.D. Ala. 2014), aff'd, 598 Fed.Appx. 899 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam); see Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 403 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating that individuals “cannot be held liable under . . . Title VII”). “Relief under Title VII is available against only the employer and not against individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act, regardless of whether the employer is a public company or a private company.” Dearth v. Collins, 441 F.3d 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, “[a] municipal officer may not be sued in his individual capacity under Title VII.” Wiant v. Mobile Cnty. Pers. Bd., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2833, at *8, 1992 WL 510313, at *3 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 5, 1992) (citing Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding that Title VII claims against a municipal officer must be made against that officer in his official capacity, and not in his individual capacity)); see Gomez v. City of Doral, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 85, at *6 n.2, 2022 WL 19201, at *3 n.2 (11th Cir. Jan. 3, 2022) (per curiam) (“To the extent Gomez seeks to hold Mayor Bermudez liable in his individual capacity under Title VII, this argument fails. Our court has held that relief under Title VII is available against only the employer and not against individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the Act.”) (quotations omitted); Perkins, 21 F.Supp.3d at 1260 (“Individual employees and board members are not subject to liability under Title VII.”). In his response to the present motion, Gray concedes “there is no individual liability under Title VII.” (Doc. 12 at 1). Accordingly, to the extent Gray's Title VII claims are asserted against Defendants Stallworth, Edwards, and Caylor in their individual capacities, they are due to be dismissed.

B. Official Capacity Claims

The Individual Defendants argue that Gray's claims against them in their official capacities are also due to be dismissed as unnecessary and duplicative because “a suit against Individual Defendants in their official capacity is essentially the same as a suit against the City of Evergreen.” (Doc. 3 at 2; Doc. 4 at 4-5). In his response, Gray states that “where the plaintiff alleges claims and causes of action relative to constitutional law violations in his Second, Third and Fourth Cause of Action, the defendants in their individual capacity may be sued and to that extent the defendants' motion to dismiss is due to be denied.” (Doc. 12 at 1). However, Gray does not contest the Individual Defendants' motion for dismissal of his official capacity claims. (See id.).

When a plaintiff sues a local government officer in his or her official capacity, “the suit is simply another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Busby, 931 F.2d at 776 (quotations omitted). “Because suits against a municipal officer sued in his official capacity and direct suits against municipalities are functionally equivalent, there no longer exists a need to bring official-capacity actions against local government officials, because local government units can be sued directly . . . .” Id. “In reliance on this notion, courts in this Circuit routinely and overwhelmingly deem suits against both a local government official in his official capacity and the entity of which the officer is an agent to be redundant, and dismiss the official-capacity claims against the individual defendant on that basis.” M.R. v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile Cty., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99535, at *9, 2012 WL 2931263, at *2 (S.D. Ala. July 18, 2012); see, e.g. Btesh v. City of Maitland, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19815, at *14, 2010 WL 883642, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2010) (“When identical Section 1983 claims are made against both a governmental entity and the entity's officers, employees, or agents in their official...