Gray v. Hamilton

DAVID GRAY, Plaintiff, v. RICHARD HAMILTON, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:20-CV-00953

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

August 31, 2020

JUDGE PAMELA A. BARKER

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER

Currently pending is the Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) filed by Defendants Richard Hamilton, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Kelly M. Motta, and Tracy Motta-Hamilton. (Doc. No. 3.) Plaintiff David Gray filed a Memorandum in Opposition on June 22, 2020. (Doc. No. 4.) Plaintiff thereafter filed a Motion for Default Judgment against Defendants Hamilton, in his capacity as Administrator, and Motta-Hamilton. (Doc. No. 9.) Hamilton as Administrator and Motta-Hamilton filed a response opposing Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment. (Doc. No. 10.)

For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 3) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. No. 9) is DENIED.

I. Procedural History

On May 1, 2020, Plaintiff David Gray (hereinafter "Plaintiff" or Gray) filed a Complaint against the following Defendants: (1) Richard Hamilton, in his individual capacity ("Hamilton"), (2) Richard Hamilton, in his capacity as Administrator of the Estate of Kelly M. Motta ("the Estate"), and (3) Tracy Motta-Hamilton ("Motta-Hamilton"). Therein, Gray asserts three state law claims: malicious prosecution, conversion, and conspiracy for conversion. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 29-48.) He asserts his malicious prosecution claim against Hamilton and the Estate ("Malicious Prosecution Defendants"). He asserts his conversion and conspiracy for conversion claims against Hamilton and Motta-Hamilton ("Conversion Defendants"). Gray's claims arise out of a dispute over the handling of the Estate of his ex-wife, Kelly M. Motta ("the Decedent" or Motta). (Id. at ¶¶ 5-28.) The Complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, attorneys' fees, and costs. (Id. at PageID# 6.)

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 28, 2020. (Doc. No. 3.) Gray filed a Memorandum in Opposition on June 22, 2020. (Doc. No. 4.) Defendants did not file a Reply in Support of their Motion to Dismiss.

On July 21, 2020, Gray filed a Motion for Default Judgment against Motta-Hamilton and the Estate. (Doc. No. 8.) On July 22, 2020, Motta-Hamilton and the Estate filed a Response to Gray's Motion for Default Judgment. (Doc. No. 9.) Plaintiff did not file a Reply.

Thus, the parties' Motions are now ripe and ready for resolution.

II. Factual Allegations

The Complaint contains the following factual allegations. Gray lives in Massachusetts, where he works as a "financial services executive." (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 1.) Gray was previously married to Decedent; on January 29, 2015, the Medina County Domestic Relations Court entered a Judgment Entry of Divorce, which included a Marital Separation Agreement, ending Gray's and Decedent's marriage. (Id. at ¶ 5.) Under the Marital Separation Agreement, Gray paid Decedent $6,000 per month in spousal support; the Agreement would terminate upon Decedent's death. (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 8-9.)

Decedent passed away in Mansfield, Ohio on February 5, 2018, sometime around 1:45 p.m. (Id. at ¶ 7). Approximately 90 minutes after her death, the February 2018 spousal support check "wasdeposited at a KeyBank branch by one or both of the Conversion Defendants." (Id. at ¶ 12.) The check bears an endorsement that purports to be Decedent's signature, although Hamilton admitted in a November 14, 2019 deposition that either he or Motta-Hamilton "deposited the check after Decedent's death" into Decedent's account. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Gray alleges that the Conversion Defendants had direct access to Decedent's account and one or both stood to benefit from these funds as beneficiaries of Decedent's estate. (Id. at ¶14.) At the time the check was deposited, neither Conversion Defendant had power of attorney for Decedent, nor was the Estate yet established, nor was Hamilton yet appointed as administrator of the Estate. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 17.) The Conversion Defendants refused to return the balance of the spousal support check to Gray following Decedent's death. (Id. at ¶ 19.) Gray alleges the portion of the check intended to cover February 6 through February 28, 2018, had Decedent lived, comprises the "Converted Funds." (Id.)

On March 12, 2018, Decedent's estate opened in Richland County Probate Court. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Hamilton was appointed administrator of the Estate. (Id.) On January 18, 2019, the Malicious Prosecution Defendants filed a Complaint for Concealment or Embezzlement of Assets against Gray in Richland County Probate Court. (Id. at ¶ 21.) This Embezzlement Action arose under § 2109.50. (Id.) Gray alleges that "[s]aid Embezzlement Action was criminal in nature." (Id. at ¶ 22.) In the Embezzlement Action, the Malicious Prosecution Defendants alleged that Gray "embezzled and concealed certain assets" from Decedent, including "non-qualified stock options, restricted stock units, [a] Charles Schwab 401k account, [a] Charles Schwab rollover IRA[,] and a condominium property in Hawaii, among other items." (Id. at ¶ 23.)

On April 15, 2019, the Malicious Prosecution Defendants also filed a "Motion to Show Cause/Contempt," as well as a Motion for Attorney Fees "in the Divorce case." (Id. at ¶ 24.)According to Gray, the Malicious Prosecution Defendants made the same allegations against him as they did in the Embezzlement Action. (Id.)

On July 3, 2019, the Malicious Prosecution Defendants "voluntarily dismissed" the Show Cause action in the divorce case. (Id. at ¶ 25.) On July 8, 2019, the Malicious Prosecution Defendants also "voluntarily dismissed" the Embezzlement Action. (Id. at ¶ 26.)

III. Standard of Review

Defendants move for dismissal on the basis of both failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court accepts the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and construes the Complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Gunasekara v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009). In order to survive a motion to dismiss under this Rule, "a complaint must contain (1) 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible,' (2) more than 'formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements,' and (3) allegations that suggest a 'right to relief above a speculative level.'" Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting in part Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

The measure of a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge—whether the Complaint raises a right to relief above the speculative level—"does not 'require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting in part Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the courtto draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Deciding whether a complaint states a claim for relief that is plausible is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

Consequently, examination of a complaint for a plausible claim for relief is undertaken in conjunction with the "well-established principle that 'Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.' Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Gunasekera, 551 F.3d at 466 (quoting in part Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007)) (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964). Nonetheless, while "Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era ... it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

The standard of review of a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction depends on whether the defendant makes a facial or factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. Wayside Church v. Van Buren County, 847 F.3d 812, 816-17 (6th Cir. 2017). A facial attack "questions merely the sufficiency of the pleading" and requires the district court to "take[ ] the allegations in the complaint as true." Gentek Bldg Prods., Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co, 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007). To survive a facial attack, the complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the grounds for jurisdiction. See Rote v. Zel Custom Mfg. LLC, 816 F.3d 383, 387 (6thCir. 2016); Ogle v. Ohio Civil Service Employees Ass'n, AFSCME, Local 11, 397 F.Supp.3d 1076, 1081-1082 (S.D. Ohio 2019).

A factual attack, on the other hand, "raises a factual controversy requiring the district court 'to weigh the conflicting evidence to arrive at the factual predicate that subject-matter does or does not exist.'" Wayside Church, 847 F.3d at 817 (quoting Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc., 491 F.3d at 330). The plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction when subject matter jurisdiction is challenged. Rogers v. Stratton Indus., 798 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1986). The court may allow "affidavits, documents and even a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts." Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990).

IV. Analysis

A. Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment

As an...