Gray v. PennyMac Corp.

202 A.3d 712

Patricia GRAY, Appellant

v.PENNYMAC CORP. and Gwendolyn L. Jackson, Appellees

No. 1272 EDA 2018

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted October 29, 2018

Filed January 7, 2019

Patricia Gray, appellant, pro se.

Michael P. Trainor, Philadelphia, for appellee.

BEFORE: OTT, J., NICHOLS, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.^*

OPINION BY STRASSBURGER, J.:

Patricia Gray appeals pro se from the order entered on April 5, 2018, which dismissed her complaint against PennyMac Corporation and Gwendolyn L. Jackson¹ pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 233.1.² Upon review, we affirm.

We begin with a summary of the facts and procedure that led to this case. On January 30, 1981, Gray and her sister, Jackson, jointly purchased and mortgaged a property in Philadelphia.³ The last mortgage payment for this property was made on May 1, 1996. On May 7, 2015, PennyMac instituted a mortgage foreclosure action against Gray and Jackson (2015 Foreclosure Action).⁴ "In defense, Gray attacked the validity of the [m]ortgage and filed a cross-claim against Jackson, alleging Jackson was solely liable on the [m]ortgage because Jackson agreed with [ ] Gray that [Jackson] would live in the property and collect the rents, pay the mortgage and keep the property in good condition." Trial Court Opinion, 7/10/2018, at 1-2 (internal quotation marks omitted).

At trial, [PennyMac] proved ownership of the note and mortgage[,] and the balance due. [Gray] herself admitted to making no payments since 1996. [Following a non-jury trial, t]he [trial court] found in favor of [PennyMac] and against [Gray and Jackson] ... in mortgage foreclosure in the amount of $151,419.54. The [trial c]ourt calculated this amount not from 1996, as urged by [PennyMac], but from 2006, a period [ ] beginning with the conclusion of [PennyMac's] predecessor's previous unsuccessful attempt to foreclose.

PennyMac Corp. v. Jackson , 193 A.3d 1079 (Pa. Super. 2018) (unpublished memorandum at 1-2) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Jackson filed a post-trial motion, which was denied. She filed an appeal to this Court, and on June 15, 2018, this Court affirmed the judgment entered in favor of PennyMac and against Gray and Jackson. See id.

Meanwhile, in 2000, "Gray attempted to obtain a money judgment against PennyMac, in its role as garnishee" (Garnishment Action).⁵ Trial Court Opinion, 7/10/2018, at 2. This action was an attempt by Gray to execute on a judgment she had obtained against Jackson. In an attempt to setoff what she owed to PennyMac after the 2015 Foreclosure Action, on January 18, 2017, Gray filed a writ of execution and interrogatories in attachment against PennyMac and sent PennyMac a 10-day notice of intent to take a default judgment. PennyMac responded and objected to the interrogatories; nevertheless, Gray filed a praecipe for entry of a default judgment against PennyMac for failure to answer its interrogatories. PennyMac filed a petition to strike the default judgment, which was granted by the trial court on January 19, 2018.

In addition, during the pendency of the 2015 Foreclosure Action, on January 10, 2018, Gray initiated the action subject to this appeal. In her complaint, Gray asserted claims for

intentional interference, trespass, violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Law, negligence, and loss of rental income against PennyMac, and loss of rental income against Jackson. According to the complaint, PennyMac illegally barred access to the property by changing the locks, thereby impeding her ability to collect rent from Jackson.

On February 20, 2018, PennyMac filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 233.1. PennyMac pointed to paragraph 7 of the mortgage which expressly permits assignees access to the property in the case of default: "If borrower fails to perform covenants and agreements contained in th[e] mortgage, ... lender at lender's option, upon notice to borrower, may ... take such action as is necessary to protect lender[ ] including ... entry upon the property to make repairs." PennyMac attached photographs of the property and referenced [a] $49,000 judgment in favor of the city of Philadelphia for unpaid water and sewer payments to prove disrepair. PennyMac admitted to changing the locks but provided new keys to Gray.

On April 4, 2018, [the trial court] granted PennyMac's motion, dismissing the complaint and barring [Gray] from filing any action involving the property or the mortgage without leave of court.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/10/2018, at 3-4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Gray timely filed a notice of appeal, and both Gray and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On appeal, Gray argues the trial court erred in concluding that this action filed by her satisfied the requirements of Pa.R.C.P. 233.1. See Gray's Brief at 4. We review this issue mindful of the following.

To the extent that the question presented involves interpretation of rules of civil procedure, our standard of review is de novo . To the extent that this question involves an exercise of the trial court's discretion in granting [a] "motion to dismiss," our standard of review is abuse of discretion.

Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law on facts and circumstances before the trial court after hearing and consideration. Consequently, the court abuses its discretion if, in resolving the issue for decision, it misapplies the law or exercises its discretion in a manner lacking reason. Similarly, the trial court abuses its discretion if it does not follow legal procedure.

Coulter v. Ramsden , 94 A.3d 1080, 1086 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting Sigall v. Serrano , 17 A.3d 946, 949 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal citations omitted) ).

The text of Pa.R.C.P. 233.1 provides the following.

Rule 233.1. Frivolous Litigation. Pro Se Plaintiff. Motion to Dismiss

(a) Upon the commencement of any action filed by a pro se plaintiff in the court of common pleas, a defendant may file a motion to dismiss the action on the basis that

(1) the pro se plaintiff is alleging the same or related claims which the pro se plaintiff raised in a prior action against the same or related defendants, and

(2) these claims have already been resolved pursuant to a written settlement agreement or a court proceeding.

(b) The court may stay the action while the motion is pending.

(c) Upon granting the motion and dismissing the action, the court may bar the pro se plaintiff from pursuing additional pro se litigation against the same or related defendants raising the same or related claims without leave of court.

(d) The court may sua sponte dismiss an action that is filed in violation of a court order entered under subdivision (c).

Note: A pro se party is not barred from raising counterclaims or claims against other parties in litigation that the pro se plaintiff did not institute.

(e) The provisions of this rule do not apply to actions under the rules of civil procedure governing family law actions.

Pa.R.C.P. No. 233.1. In examining this Court has noted that it

was promulgated by our Supreme Court in 2010 to stem a noted increase in serial lawsuits of dubious merit filed by pro se litigants disaffected by prior failures to secure relief for injuries they perceived but could not substantiate. See Pa.R.C.P. 233.1 Comment. Accordingly, the drafting committee constructed the Rule with attention to potential manipulation of the legal process by those not learned in its proper use, seeking to establish accountability for pro se litigants commensurate with that imposed upon members of the Bar. Seeid. Thus, the Rule operates to spare potential defendants the need to defend spurious claims, first, by allowing the expeditious dismissal of duplicative pro se actions and, second, by empowering the trial court to ban the pro se litigant's commencement of further actions against such defendants. Seeid.

Following scrutiny of the Rule's text, we discern the extent of our Supreme Court's intent in the Rule's allowance of summary proceedings for dismissal substantially less exacting than those required by the Rules of Court for counseled actions, as well as the absence from the language of any of the elements encompassed under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The Rule's language is noteworthy, specifically, in its omission of any reference to existing procedures under the Rules for obtaining judgment prior to trial, see, e.g. , Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(4) (Preliminary Objections (Demurrer) ), 1034 (Judgment on the Pleadings), 1035.2 (Summary Judgment). Indeed, the very fact that Rule 233.1 was promulgated in the presence of this series of rules and procedures, that by design tests every aspect of the legal and factual merit of a plaintiff's claim, announces the Supreme Court's focus and intent with exceptional clarity. Quite simply, the Court saw no reason to expose already beleaguered defendants to the demands of extended litigation and the rigor of technical procedural rules for summary disposition when the claims at issue have already been addressed in a substantive manner and resolved.

As noted by the drafting committee, the Rule allows that

[u]pon the filing of an action by a pro se plaintiff, a defendant may file a motion to dismiss a pending action provided that (1) the pro se plaintiff is alleging the same or related claims against the same or related defendants, and (2) the claims have already been resolved pursuant to a settlement agreement or a court proceeding.

Pa.R.C.P. 233.1 Comment.

Gray v. Buonopane , 53 A.3d 829, 835-36 (Pa. Super. 2012).⁶

On appeal, Gray argues that the claims in the instant action are not "rationally related" to claims made in the 2015 Mortgage Foreclosure Action or Garnishment Action. Gray's Brief at 30. The trial court addressed this claim as follows.

PennyMac has met its burden under Rule 233.1. Gray, a pro se plaintiff, has alleged the "same or related claims" she had raised in prior action against "the same or related defendants," and those claims have "been

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