Gray v. Tunica County, Mississippi, 202CV020-PA.

279 F.Supp.2d 789

Christina Bell GRAY, Milton Bell, Charles C. Bell, Garmillia Ann Bell, Individually and as the Wrongful Death Heirs of Clarence Leon Bell, Deceased, and the Estate of Clarence Leon Bell, by and Through Its Administratrix, Christina Bell Gray, Plaintiffs, v. TUNICA COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI and Lemuel Glenn Wellington, Individually and in His Official Capacity as a Jailor of Tunica County, Mississippi, Defendants.

No. 202CV020-PA.

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Eastern Division.

July 2, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Edward Peacock Connell, Jr., Merkel & Cocke, Nathan J. McMullen, N.J. McMullen, Attorney, Clarksdale, MS, for Plaintiffs.

Daniel J. Griffith, Griffith & Griffith, Cleveland, MS, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PEPPER, District Judge.

This cause is before the Court upon Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The Court, having considered the motion, the responses thereto, and the briefs and authorities cited, is prepared to rule.

This case involves the suicide of Mr. Clarence Leon Bell on April 12, 2001 while a pretrial detainee at the Tunica County Jail.

The plaintiffs, Christina Bell Gray, Milton Bell, Charles C. Bell, Garmillia Ann Bell, all both individually and as the heirs of Clarence Leon Bell, and the estate of Mr. Bell through his administratrix, Christina Bell Gray, filed the instant suit against the defendants Lemuel Glenn Wellington, in his official and individual capacity as a jailor for the Tunica County Sheriff's Department ("TCSD"), and Tunica County, Mississippi under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Mississippi law for damages arising from Mr. Bell's suicide. Essentially, the plaintiffs argue that Tunica County, for their allegedly constitutionally inadequate jail policies, and Jailor Wellington, for his alleged acts and/or omissions, are liable under Section 1983 for violating Mr. Bell's constitutional right to be protected from harm while a pretrial detainee. In addition, the plaintiffs argue that Tunica County is liable under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act for wrongful cremation of Mr. Bell's remains.

The defendants filed a summary judgment motion praying the Court to rule on three issues: (1) Jailor Wellington's immunity from suit in his individual capacity under the doctrine of qualified immunity; (2) Tunica County's immunity from suit under the doctrine of official capacity liability; and (3) Tunica County's immunity from the Mississippi state-law claim regarding wrongful cremation under the law enforcement or inmate exceptions, or both, to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Miss, Code Ann. § 11-46-1 (1993) et seq.

Because this suit involves federal questions, the Court has proper jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Section 1331. Furthermore, under usual summary judgment standards the facts are viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs.

After so viewing, the Court rules in favor of the defendants on the first and second issues mentioned above. With respect to the third issue, because the Court dismisses the claims upon which its original jurisdiction was based, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(c)(3). As such, the Court dismisses the same without prejudice and gives leave for the plaintiffs to refile this claim in a State court of competent jurisdiction and venue, without penalty or waiver of any applicable statutes of limitation within ninety (90) days of the date of this opinion and the order therewith.

The Court recognizes the facts material to its summary judgment rulings as follows:

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On or about April 12, 2001, officers of the TCSD arrested Mr. Bell at a casino for disturbing the peace at around 5:00 a.m. The officers proceeded to book Mr. Bell into the recently-built Tunica County Jail, at around 6:00 a.m. During the jail's screening and classification process, Mr. Bell confirmed he was neither suicidal nor did he require any medical attention. Mr. Bell appeared to be well-acquainted with jail routine, evincing he was not a novice regarding jail procedures.

After the booking process, during which he was outfitted with a standard orange jail jumpsuit, the jailors placed Mr. Bell in a holding cell. While in the holding cell, Mr. Bell was especially disruptive. The disruptive behavior included: disobeying instructions, ringing the electronic call button repeatedly, banging on the door and walls, hitting his head on the cell, and striking a jailor. As such, the jailors decided to move Mr. Bell to an isolated padded cell, referred to by the jailors as the lunacy cell, which is an eight-by-eight-foot padded cell with no fixtures and a French toilet. Jailor Wellington escorted Mr. Bell to the lunacy cell at around 10:35 a.m. that same day. After placed in the lunacy cell, the jailors instituted a suicide watch upon Mr. Bell.

Around 11:45 a.m., a little over an hour after he placed Mr. Bell in the lunacy cell, Jailor Wellington passed by Mr. Bell's cell and looked through the window. The jailor allegedly observed Mr. Bell in the back corner of the cell in a position resembling a "frog like" posture, most likely hunched over on his knees, nude, and with his back toward the window, but in any event, apparently in no distress. Thereupon Jailor Wellington allegedly called for the jail nurse, Dockreletta Smith, LPN, to take a look. They both state that they believed Mr. Bell was merely sleeping. As such, Jailor Wellington stated he then decided to feed the other inmates first and return to feed Mr. Bell thereafter.

About thirty minutes later, at around 12:15, Jailor Wellington returned to Mr. Bell's cell to feed him. When he opened the cell he discovered Mr. Bell was lying on the ground in a kneeling position, nude, and not breathing. According to the plaintiffs, no one attempted CPR on Mr. Bell at that moment, nor did anyone summon the on-duty doctor and the only action taken by Jailor Wellington was to cover Mr. Bell with his jumpsuit and await the arrival of the paramedics. When the paramedics arrived, all attempts to revive Mr. Bell failed and he was soon thereafter pronounced dead.

In their Second Amendment Complaint, the plaintiffs assert: (1) wrongful death against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Mississippi Wrongful Death Statute; (2) claims arising from Mr. Bell's estate under section 1983; and (3) negligence under the Mississippi Wrongful Death Statute for claims involving the cremation of Mr. Bell's remains without their permission and for failing to provide Mr. Bell with proper medical attention. With the exception of the state negligence claims involving the wrongful cremation, on September 12, 2002 this Court dismissed the plaintiffs' state claims under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, Miss. Code Ann. §§ 11-46-9(1)(m) and (c) (1997) and § 11-46-7(2) (1993), using the inmate exemption, the law enforcement exemption, and individual immunity provisions contained therein.

Thus, the federal claims of violation of constitutional rights under Section 1983 and the state claim involving wrongful cremation remain.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment should be entered only if "[t]here is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of demonstrating through the evidentiary materials that there is no actual dispute as to any material fact in the case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). On motion for summary judgment, "[t]he inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is a need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In determining whether this burden has been met, the court should view the evidence introduced and all factual inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. Furthermore, "the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra, at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

The summary judgment procedure does not authorize trial by affidavit. Rather, "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Accordingly, a court may not decide any factual issues found in the record on motion for summary judgment, but if such material issues are present, the court must deny the motion and proceed to trial. Impossible Elec. Tech. v. Wackenhut Protective Systems, 669 F.2d 1026, 1031 (5 Cir.1982); Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 991 (5 Cir. 1981); Lighting Fixture & Electric Supply Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 1211, 1213 (5 Cir.1969).

Under the provisions of Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party against whom a motion for summary judgment is made may not merely rest upon his pleadings, but must, by affidavit, or other materials as provided in Rule 56, inform the court of specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra, at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The facts stated in uncontradicted affidavits or other evidentiary materials must be accepted as true. However, the moving party...