Gray v. Wittman

EDDIE RAY GRAY, Plaintiff v. PA STATE TROOPER TIMOTHY WITTMAN in his official and individual capacities,ALAN M. CONN, Warren County Public Defender, in his official and individual capacities

Case No. 1:19-cv-000125 (Erie)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

May 1, 2020

RICHARD A. LANZILLO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

[ECF NO. 19]

Presently before the Court is Defendant Timothy Wittman's Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 19. For the reasons explained below, all federal law claims against Wittman will be dismissed with prejudice. Furthermore, the Court will exercise its screening authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and dismiss as frivolous Count III of the Complaint, which purports to assert a §1983 supervisory liability claim against an unnamed defendant. Finally, given the dismissal of all claims asserted under federal law, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim against Wittman and the state law claims against Co-Defendant Alan Conn.¹

I. Introduction and Background

Plaintiff Eddie Ray Gray ("Gray"), proceeding pro se, commenced this action against Timothy Wittman, a Pennsylvania state trooper, asserting claims against him pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest and malicious prosecution as well as a state law claim of false swearing by agovernment official in violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4904.² Wittman has moved to dismiss all claims of Gray's Complaint against him pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.³

Gray's habeas corpus proceedings in this Court preceded the present Complaint, and provide pertinent background.⁴ As recounted in Gray v. Tice, No. 17-71, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27413, **1-2 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2019) ("February 21 Order"), Gray and Jeremy Hoden, a non-party to this action, were imprisoned at the same correctional facility in 2012. During January and February of 2012, Gray and Hoden each mailed threatening letters to participants in Hoden's 2007 criminal cases. Id. at *2. As a result of the letters, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania charged Gray and Hoden with Conspiracy, Terroristic Threats, Retaliation Against a Prosecutor or Judicial Official pursuant to 18 Pa. C. S. A. § 4953.1 ("§ 4953.1 Retaliation"), and Retaliation against a Witness or Victim in violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4953 ("§ 4953 Retaliation"). Id. at *3.

Following a jury trial in the Warren County Court of Common Pleas, Gray was convicted on multiple counts, including three counts of § 4953 Retaliation. Id. On September 7, 2012, he was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment, representing a total aggregate sentence of 35-71 years. Id. at *4. Specifically, Gray was convicted and sentenced as follows: three to seven years at each count of three counts of § 4953 Retaliation; five to ten years at each of four counts of § 4953.1 Retaliation; five to ten years at one count of Conspiracy; and a fine at each of eight counts ofTerroristic Threats. The sentencing court ordered that the sentence run consecutively with the term of incarceration that Gray was already serving. Id.

Following post-conviction proceedings in the state court, Gray filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. The petition was based on claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id. at **4-5. By Opinion and Order dated February 21, 2019, this Court granted the petition, and issued a conditional writ of habeas corpus. Id. at **46-47. In so doing, this Court allowed the Commonwealth to either retry Gray or opt to have his convictions for § 4953 Retaliation vacated, and have him resentenced. Id. at *47. The present Complaint followed.

II. Standards of Review

A. Motion to Dismiss

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), it is clear that "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice" to preclude dismissal. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ethypharm S.A. France v. Abbott Labs., 707 F.3d 223, 231 n.14 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, n. 27 (3d Cir. 2010)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the Gray pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.

The applicable standards require a complaint to do more than allege a Gray's entitlement to relief; it must "show" such entitlement through factual allegations. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2008)). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.' Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The "plausibility" determination is a "context-specific taskthat requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. "In short, a Motion to Dismiss should be granted if a party fails to allege facts which could, if established at trial, entitle him/her to relief." Hill v. Cosby, 2016 WL 247009, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2016) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n. 8)).Pro Se Parties

B. Pro Se Pleadings

Pro se pleadings, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969).

III. Gray's Complaint

Pertinent here, the Complaint alleges that in January and February of 2012, while incarcerated at SCI Forest, he sent three threatening letters to individuals associated with a prior criminal prosecution. ECF No. 5, ¶¶ 3, 6-8. Gray admitted writing the letters during an interview with Wittman, who oversaw a probe concerning the letters. Id. at ¶ 10-11. Ultimately, Wittman submitted both an affidavit of probable cause and a criminal complaint charging Gray with three counts of § 4953 Retaliation. Id. at ¶¶ 9-13. Gray alleges that Wittman initiated charges even though he knew that the recipients of Gray's letters did not sustain harm, as required for a violation of § 4953 Retaliation. Id. at ¶¶ 19-22.

Following this Court's February 21 Order granting habeas relief, the Commonwealth elected not to re-try Gray on the § 4953 Retaliation charges. Id. at ¶ 40. Gray served approximately four years of the now-vacated sentence. Id. at ¶42. Moreover, the Complaint alleges that a favorableresolution of his Complaint would not disrupt the remaining convictions resulting from the Warren County proceeding. Id. at p. 13. Id. at ¶ 3.

A. Analysis

Gray's claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"). In order to state a claim under Section 1983, Gray must allege that the subject misconduct was committed by a person acting under color of state law and that, as a result, he was deprived of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).

1. False Arrest - Claim I

Wittman moves to dismiss Gray's false arrest claim on grounds that Gray was already incarcerated at the time of the alleged constitutional violation. In opposition, Gray contends that Wittman's conduct caused him to suffer deprivations of liberty, aside from his pre-existing incarceration, that are sufficient to support his claim.

A prima facie claim for false arrest requires proof of the constraint of a person against his will, without legal justification. Fennell v. Camden Cnty. Facility, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88204, at *13 (D.N.J. June 8, 2017); see also Pittman v. McDuffy, 240 Fed. Appx. 524, 526 (3d Cir. 2007). In recent years, courts within this Circuit have repeatedly confirmed that a prisoner cannot state a claim for false arrest that occurred while he was already in custody.⁵ See, e.g., Rosario v. Lynch, No. 13-01945, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 149825, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 15, 2017); Curry v. Yachera, No. 14-5253, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31744, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2015); Regelman v. Weber, No. 10 - 675, 2012 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 140398, at *29 (W.D. Pa. Sep. 28, 2012); Hall v. Berdanier, No. 09-1016, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40010, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2012). Moreover, Gray asserts that he served four years imprisonment on the baseless charges before this Court vacated his sentence. Nonetheless, his Complaint avers that he was incarcerated when the charges were initiated, and remains so at this time. He has not alleged that period of incarceration was lengthened as a result of Defendant Wittman's conduct; in other words, no new deprivation resulted therefrom. Gray's claim fails for this reason.

Although he does not dispute his incarceration at the pertinent times, Gray insists that he nevertheless suffered a constitutional deprivation. Specifically, he contends that he was deprived of liberty when Wittman's conduct caused Gray's removal from state custody at SCI Forest, transfer to Warren County Prison, and compelled participation in attendant court proceedings. However, "[o]nce an individual has been lawfully taken into custody he has been seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment; merely transferring custody of that individual from one law enforcement agency to another...