Graziano v. Brater

342 Mich.App. 358

994 N.W.2d 521

Mamie GRAZIANO, George Louis Corsetti, Jim West, and Steve Babson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Jonathan BRATER, in his official capacity as Director of Elections and Secretary of the Board of State Canvassers, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 358913

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted July 13, 2022, at Lansing

Decided July 21, 2022, 9:10 a.m.

Law Office of Matthew S. Erard, PLLC (by Matthew S. Erard) and John A. La Pietra for plaintiffs.

Dana Nessel, Attorney General, Fadwa A. Hammoud, Solicitor General, and Erik A. Grill and Heather S. Meingast, Assistant Attorneys General, for defendant.

Before: Markey, P.J., and Boonstra and Riordan, JJ.

Boonstra, J. Plaintiffs appeal by right the order of the Court of Claims granting summary disposition in favor of defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(4) and (C)(8). Because we agree that the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, we affirm.

I. PERTINENT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This is the fourth time the subject matter of this appeal has reached this Court. Plaintiffs represent that they are registered electors who each signed an initiative petition promulgated by the Committee to Ban Fracking in Michigan (the Committee). On May 22, 2015, the Committee began circulating a petition and collecting signatures to ban horizontal, hydraulic fracturing—commonly known as "fracking"—in Michigan. See Comm. to Ban Fracking in Mich. v. Bd. of State Canvassers , 335 Mich.App. 384, 388, 966 N.W.2d 742 (2021). By November 18, 2015, which was the 180th day after the petition circulation began, plaintiffs had collected fewer than the 252,523 signatures required for an initiative petition. ¹ Id . By June 1, 2016, the Committee still had not collected enough signatures. Id.

The Committee filed suit in the Court of Claims, challenging the constitutionality of MCL 168.472a, which provides that an initiative-petition signature shall not be counted if it was made more than 180 days before the filing of the initiative-petition. The Court of Claims granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants ² on the basis that the Committee had not asserted an actual controversy because it had not collected enough signatures or submitted its initiative petition. Comm to Ban Fracking , 335 Mich App at 389, 966 N.W.2d 742. This Court affirmed, holding that the Court of Claims had properly dismissed the complaint because no actual controversy ripe for declaratory relief existed. Id.

By November 5, 2018 (the day before the 2018 general election), the Committee represented that it had amassed about 270,962 signatures. Id. at 389. The Committee submitted the petition to the Secretary of State, seeking to place its proposal on the ballot for the 2020 general election. Id. The Director of Elections refused to accept the petition because the petition stated that it would be voted on in 2016, and that date had already passed. Id. The Committee again filed suit in the Court of Claims, and the Court of Claims again granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants. ³ On appeal, this Court ordered the Secretary of State to accept the petition and forward it to the Board of Canvassers (the Board) for review. Id. at 390.

On June 8, 2020, the Board certified that the Committee's petition was insufficient because approximately 89% of the signatures were collected more than 180 days before the petition was submitted. Id. The Committee then filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the Michigan Supreme Court, asking the Supreme Court to "declare the 180-day rule in MCL 168.472a unconstitutional." Id. at 390-391. The Michigan Supreme Court denied the requested mandamus relief.

Comm. to Ban Fracking in Mich. v. Bd. of State Canvassers , 505 Mich. 1137, 1137, 944 N.W.2d 723 (2020) ("[T]he Court is not persuaded that it should grant the requested relief.").

On July 6, 2020, the Committee filed another action in the Court of Claims. Naming the Board as the defendant, the Committee sought a declaration that the 180-day rule in MCL 168.472a was unconstitutional as applied to statutory-initiative petitions. The Committee argued that the 180-day rule unconstitutionally infringes on Const. 1963, art. 2, § 9, which reserves to the people the right to propose laws through initiative petitions. Comm. to Ban Fracking , 335 Mich.App. at 391, 966 N.W.2d 742. The Court of Claims concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the Committee's claims because MCL 168.479(2) required that any challenge to the Board's decision on an initiative petition be filed in the Michigan Supreme Court; accordingly, it granted summary disposition in favor of the Board. Comm to Ban Fracking , 335 Mich App at 392, 966 N.W.2d 742.

The Committee appealed the Court of Claims’ determination that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that "our Supreme Court's jurisdiction under MCL 168.479 is actually nonexclusive because MCL 600.6419 vests the Court of Claims with exclusive jurisdiction to hear claims for declaratory relief against the state...." Id. This Court rejected the Committee's argument and concluded that MCL 168.479 —as the more recent and specific statute—"creates an exception to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and controls in this case." Comm to Ban Fracking , 335 Mich App at 395, 966 N.W.2d 742.

The Committee also argued that because MCL 168.479(1) provided that a person "may" have a determination by the Board reviewed in the Michigan Supreme Court, it was entitled to file a later suit in the Court of Claims after the Michigan Supreme Court denied mandamus relief. Comm to Ban Fracking , 335 Mich App at 396, 966 N.W.2d 742. This Court rejected that argument, noting that "[t]he stated purpose of MCL 168.479 is to have our Supreme Court decide any legal challenge to the sufficiency or insufficiency of an initiative petition as promptly as possible." Id. at 397. This Court concluded that while MCL 168.479(1) reflected a permissive invitation to seek a review of the Board's determination, that subsection must be read together with MCL 168.479(2), which clearly requires that any such legal challenge be filed in the Michigan Supreme Court. Comm to Ban Fracking , 335 Mich App at 396-397, 966 N.W.2d 742. The Court accordingly held that the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the Committee's claims. Id. at 397-398.

In 2021, plaintiffs filed this action in the Court of Claims as "registered Michigan electors who signed a statutory initiative petition under Const. 1963, art. 2, § 9 but whose signatures were barred from being counted due to the 180-day restriction of MCL 168.472a." In Count I, plaintiffs asserted a violation of Const. 1963, art. 2, § 9 (concerning initiative petitions). In Count II, plaintiffs alternatively asserted violations of Const. 1963, art. 1, § 17 (concerning due process); Const 1963, art. 3, § 2 (concerning separation of powers); Const 1963 art. 6, §§ 4 and 5 (concerning authority of the Supreme Court); and Const 1963, art § 28 (concerning judicial review of agency decisions). Plaintiffs requested that the court declare MCL 168.472a unconstitutional as applied to petitions under Const. 1963, art. 2, § 9 ; issue an injunction requiring defendant to canvass plaintiffs’ petition signatures and the signatures of similarly situated electors; issue a report crediting the countability of the signatures; and award any other equitable and just relief.

Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) and (8), arguing that plaintiffs were challenging a determination by the Board regarding the sufficiency of an initiative petition and as a result their claims were controlled by MCL 168.479. According to defendant, MCL 168.479 did not permit plaintiffs to file their challenge in the Court of Claims; therefore, the Court of Claims lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear it. Additionally, defendant argued that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of MCL 168.479 and that, in any event, MCL 168.479 was constitutional.

The Court of Claims granted defendant's motion, concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ challenge to the Board's determination regarding the sufficiency of a petition. The court concluded that plaintiffs’ claim should have been filed in the Michigan Supreme Court. The Court of Claims further rejected defendant's standing argument and held that MCL 168.479 did not violate separation-of-powers principles, did not deprive plaintiffs of notice and an opportunity to be heard, and was not otherwise constitutionally deficient.

This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo a lower court's grant of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4). Weishuhn v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing , 279 Mich.App. 150, 155, 756 N.W.2d 483 (2008). When doing so, "this Court must determine whether the pleadings demonstrate that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, or whether the affidavits and other proofs show that there was no genuine issue of material fact." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

This Court reviews de novo questions involving the interpretation and application of statutes. Linden v. Citizens Ins. Co. of America , 308 Mich.App. 89, 91, 862 N.W.2d 438 (2014), lv den 498 Mich. 880, 869 N.W.2d 275 (2015). When interpreting a statute, this Court seeks to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Comm. to Ban Fracking , 335 Mich.App. at 393, 966 N.W.2d 742. "The language of the statute itself is the primary indication of the Legislature's intent." Id. This Court gives statutory language its fair and natural meaning, considers the subject matter of the law, and reads statutes as a whole rather than reading statutory provisions in isolation. Id. "The statutory language must be read and understood in its grammatical context, unless it is clear that something different was intended." Sun Valley Foods...