Greear v. Warden, FCI Beckley

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DANIEL JAY DONALD GREEAR, II, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, FCI Beckley, Respondent.

No. 5:22-cv-00390

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, Beckley Division

February 17, 2023

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Cheryl A. Eifert Judge

Pending before the Court are Petitioner Daniel Jay Donald Greear II's pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, (ECF No. 1), and a motion to dismiss contained in the Warden's Response. (ECF No 8). This case is assigned to the Honorable Frank W. Volk United States District Judge, and by standing order was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for submission of proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the following reasons, the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 be DENIED, Respondent's request for dismissal be GRANTED, and this action be DISMISSED and removed from the docket of the Court.

I. Relevant History

Greear is an inmate currently incarcerated at FCI Beckley. See Federal Bureau of Prisons Inmate Locator www.bop.gov/inmateloc/. In July 2016, he was sentenced to two consecutive 60-month terms of imprisonment after being convicted of conspiracy to distribute alpha-PVP and possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. (ECF No. 8 at 1). Greear was granted CARES Act home confinement in June 2021, expected to begin in August 2021; however, his release to home confinement was cancelled when a NCIC check revealed that Greear had an outstanding warrant issued by the Sullivan County Circuit Court in Tennessee for an alleged probation violation. (ECF No. 1 at 5). The alleged violation stemmed from Greear's federal arrest in 2015. (Id. at 9). Greear states that he only learned of the probation violation and warrant at the time of the NCIC check. (Id. at 6). Greear then requested that the Sullivan County Circuit Court hear his probation violation in absentia. (Id. at 9). The Tennessee court denied Greear's motion, stating that a probation revocation hearing was not covered by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act; therefore, the court would hold a hearing on the probation violation when Greear was released from federal custody. (Id. at 14). Greear submitted another motion to the Tennessee court, invoking his right to a speedy trial and again requesting that his probation violation be heard. (Id. at 6). At the time Greear filed the instant habeas petition, he had not received a response from the Tennessee court on his second motion. (Id.)

In his § 2241 petition, Greear asserts that the Tennessee court's refusal to hear the probation violation contravenes his right to a speedy trial. (Id.). He also complains that he was not given notice of the probation violation. (Id.). His primary complaint is that the warrant for the probation violation is preventing him from being released to home confinement. (Id.) Greear asks that the warrant be dismissed and that he be given time served on the probation violation. (Id. at 7).

II. Standard of Review

In the response to the petition, Respondent moved the Court to dismiss this action.

(ECF No. 8 at 1). Therefore, the motion will be construed as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Walker v. Kelly, 589 F.3d 127, 139 (4th Cir. 2009). A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is reviewed under the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Conner v. Cleveland Cnty., N. Carolina, 22 F.4th 412, 416 (4th Cir. 2022); see also Martin v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, No. cv PWG-17-3335, 2018 WL 2135009, at *1 (D. Md., May 9, 2018).

When deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the petition as true and “draw all reasonable factual inferences” in favor of the petitioner. See Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 353 (4th Cir. 2014); Wolfe v. Johnson, 565 F.3d 140, 169 (4th Cir. 2009). Nonetheless, the court is “not obliged to accept allegations that ‘represent unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments,' or that ‘contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit.'” Massey, 759 F.3d at 353 (quoting Blankenship v. Manchin, 471 F.3d 523, 529 (4th Cir. 2006)). A court presented with a motion for judgment on the pleadings in a federal habeas case must consider “the face of the petition and any attached exhibits.” Walker, 589 F.3d at 139 (quoting Wolfe, 565 F.3d at 169) (internal markings omitted). In addition, a court may consider “matters of public record” including documents from prior or pending court proceedings, id., and “documents attached to the complaint ... as well as those attached to the motion to dismiss, so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Blankenship, 471 F.3d at 526 n.1).

Courts are required to liberally construe pro se petitions. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, the petition still must contain sufficient factual allegations to support a valid legal cause of action. Bass v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003). The Court may not rewrite the pleading to include claims that were never presented, Parker v. Champion, 148 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 1998), construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

III. Discussion

Greear's principal complaint is that the warrant for the probation violation has prevented him from being released to home confinement, and he would like this Court to dismiss the warrant so he can be released. (ECF No. 1). Respondent argues that Greear's petition must be dismissed for failure to exhaust available state remedies and for failure to state a cognizable claim under § 2241. (ECF No. 8).

A. Exhaustion

Although the text of § 2241 does not mention exhaustion of state remedies, federal courts generally require that a prisoner who might secure relief through state courts must attempt to do so before filing a habeas petition in federal court. Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973). Exhaustion requires the prisoner invoke “one complete round” of the state's appeal process. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). Greear states in his petition that he has not appealed the Tennessee trial court ruling because he cannot afford an attorney. (ECF No. 1 at 3). Failure to exhaust remedies will typically be excused only if the petitioner can show cause and prejudice; federal courts will also not require exhaustion if doing so would be futile or cause irreparable harm to the petitioner. Rodriguez v. Knight, No. U21-459-DCN-SVH, 2022 WL 796815, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2022). Greear has provided no evidence of special circumstances that warrant deviation from the general rule requiring exhaustion of state court remedies. Galloway v. Stephens, 510 F.Supp. 840, 846 (M.D. N.C. Mar. 25, 1981) (“When state court remedies have not been exhausted, absent special circumstances, a federal habeas court may not retain the case on its docket, pending exhaustion, but should dismiss the petition.”). Unfortunately for Greear, his inability to afford an attorney is not a sufficient legal excuse for his failure to exhaust his state remedies, as he has the right to appeal and there are no external forces preventing him from doing so. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 280 (2012) (defining “cause” in the cause and prejudice standard as “something external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to him”); Hellman v. Rohling, No. 09-3223-SAC, 2009 WL 4016081, at *2 (D. Kan., Nov. 18, 2009) (“Moreover, not being an attorney or knowledgeable of the law is not a sufficient excuse for failure to exhaust state remedies prior to filing a federal habeas corpus petition.”). In order to properly raise this challenge in federal court, Greear must first appeal the Sullivan County Circuit Court's ruling to Tennessee's Court of Appeals and Supreme Court-even if he must make those appeals without the assistance of an attorney. Tunanidas v. Folino, No. 4:10 CV 1263, 2010 WL 3271737, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 18, 2010) (“In order to challenge the validity of an interstate detainer, a state prisoner must first exhaust all available state remedies before filing a federal habeas petition.”).

B. No Grounds for Relief

Even if Greear had exhausted his state remedies, this Court would still have to deny his petition, because there is no federal statutory or constitutional basis to dismiss the detainer. Though Greear's petition does not explicitly argue that he is entitled to relief under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (“IADA”), both the Tennessee court order and Respondent address the statute, so this Court will discuss its applicability to Greear's case. (ECF Nos. 1, 8). The IADA would be the most relevant federal statute under which Greear could plausibly seek relief, as it facilitates the prompt resolution of state charges for prisoners in custody of another state or the federal government. A prisoner with charges pending in another state has the right to demand a trial be held within 180 days; if he is not tried in that time, the charges may be dismissed. See 18 U.S.C. App.2 § 2; United States v. Starks, No. 3:18-00249-02, 2021 WL 1342532, at *1 (S.D. W.Va., Apr. 9, 2021). But the IADA only applies to state charges-the Supreme Court explicitly held in Carchman v. Nash...