Green v. Joy Cone Co.

278 F.Supp.2d 526

Brenda GREEN, Plaintiff, v. JOY CONE COMPANY, Defendant.

No. C.A. 01-2471.

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania.

August 21, 2003.

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Samuel J. Cordes, Colleen Ramage Johnston, Ogg, Cordes, Murphy & Ignelzi, Pittsburgh, PA, Gary F. Lynch, New Castle, PA, for plaintiff.

Patrick W. Ritchey, Darren P. O'Neill, Reed Smith, Pittsburgh, PA, for defendant.

OPINION

COHILL, Senior District Judge.

This case is before us via a "Notice of Right to Sue" issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on or about September 24, 2001 in response to Plaintiff's allegation of a per se violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. The Defendant has submitted a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment (Doc. 4) based on both a lack of standing and the absence of a cause of action under the ADA. Plaintiff responded with both a Response Brief as well as a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 9) on the issue of the ADA claim. For the reasons stated below, we will grant Defendant's Motion in its entirety and deny Plaintiff's Motion.

I. GENERAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's claim followed the usual path to judicial review of a claim under the ADA. Plaintiff applied for a position with Joy Cone Company ("Joy Cone") on February 12, 2001. Green Compl. ¶ 17. Included in the application materials was a form explaining Joy Cone's physical examination policy and requiring authorization to allow Joy Cone access to the applicant's medical records ("Release Form"). Green Compl. ¶ 18. Plaintiff received no further communication from Defendant regarding the status of her application, and on March 6, 2001, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against Joy Cone Company with the EEOC alleging a per se violation of the ADA's prohibition against "pre-offer" medical inquiries. Aff. of Tracey Billings, Ex. B, attached to Def's Mot. to Dismiss the Compl. or in the Alternative for Summ. J. On September 24, 2001, the EEOC dismissed Plaintiff's claim and gave notice of Plaintiff's right to sue under the ADA. Aff. of Tracey Billings, Ex. B. Thereafter, Plaintiff retained an attorney and filed a class action suit in this court against Joy Cone pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d).

Plaintiff's complaint alleges that the employment policy of Joy Cone, which requires applicants to execute an authorization to release their medical records as part of the initial paperwork necessary for consideration for employment, is a per se violation of the ADA's policy against pre-offer medical inquiries. Green Compl. ¶ 14, 16, 34. Thus, Plaintiff claims that because she signed the Release Form allowing Joy Cone to obtain access to her medical records at the pre-offer stage, she is entitled to recover damages and seeks an injunction on behalf of herself and other similarly-situated applicants to prevent Joy Cone from continuing this practice. Green Compl. ¶¶ 32, 35.

Defendant does not dispute the facts as related by Plaintiff, but argues that they do not establish a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 12112. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss the Compl. or in the Alternative for Summ. J., at 2. According to Joy Cone, the explanation in the first sentence of the Release Form makes clear that a medical inquiry will take place only after an offer of employment. Id. The ADA expressly authorizes employers to conduct medical examinations or inquiries after an offer of employment has been extended to the individual as long as all applicants are subjected to the same procedures and medical records are kept confidential. Id. at 4 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)). Furthermore, Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks standing since Ms. Green has suffered no injury-in-fact due to Joy Cone's conduct and she does not claim to have a disability for which she is being discriminated against. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss Compl. or in the Alternative for Summ. J., ¶ 2; Mem. of Law in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss the Compl. or in the Alternative for Summ. J., at 7.

Plaintiff argues that because Joy Cone does not dispute its business practice of including the Release Form in pre-offer application materials and the Form is per se illegal under the ADA, she should be granted summary judgment on this issue. Br. in Supp. of Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J., 1. In relation to standing, Plaintiff argues that she need not prove that she is disabled in order to pursue claims for injunctive relief, and requests more time to conduct discovery in accordance with Federal Rule 56(f) to establish her standing for pecuniary relief. Pl.'s Br. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss the Compl. or in the Alternative for Summ. J., at 3 and 6; Aff. of Gary F. Lynch, Esq. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). Plaintiff and Defendant both point to similar evidence derived from a plain reading of the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and legislative history of the adoption of the ADA in order to lend credence to their positions.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Motion To Dismiss

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). A court must determine whether the party making the claim would be entitled to relief under any set of facts that could be established in support of the claim. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984) (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99); see also Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271, 273 (3d Cir. 1985). "A motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6) may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and viewing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff is not entitled to relief." In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir.1997). While a court will accept well-pleaded allegations as true for the purposes of the motion, it will not accept legal or unsupported conclusions, unwarranted inferences, or sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. See Miree v. DeKalb County, Ga., 433 U.S. 25, 27 n. 2, 97 S.Ct. 2490, 53 L.Ed.2d 557 (1977).

As an initial matter, we must determine the extent of our consideration of the materials submitted by the parties. "When deciding a motion to dismiss, it is the usual practice for a court to consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record." City of Pittsburgh v. West Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 259 (3d Cir.1998) (citing 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (2d ed.1990)); see also Rogan v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 113 F.Supp.2d 777, 782 (W.D.Pa.2000). "`Documents that the defendant attaches to the motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to the claim; as such, they may be considered by the court.'" Pryor v. NCAA, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.2002) (quoting 62 Fed. Proc., L.Ed. § 62:508).

Here, we may consider the medical consent form submitted by Joy Cone that is the central basis of Ms. Green's claim. The form is alleged in the Complaint and neither party questions its authenticity. Pryor, 288 F.3d at 560. Joy Cone also submitted an affidavit from Tracy Billings, Joy Cone's Personnel Manager. Joy Cone describes the affidavit as merely authenticating the medical form and setting forth facts not inconsistent with the Complaint. Reply Br. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summ. J., at 14 n. 15. Joy Cone apparently concedes that Ms. Billings' affidavit cannot be considered unless we convert this motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Id. ("The Court can decide this case without reference to her affidavit.")

The information submitted in Ms. Billings' affidavit offers material factual evidence not contained in the Complaint that both parties rely on in arguing that summary judgment is appropriate. We will not exclude consideration of Ms. Billings' affidavit and thus we will treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). We further conclude that the parties have provided all material pertinent to our disposition of this motion. Significantly, the parties agree that the Court can, and should, decide as a matter of law the central issue of whether Joy Cone has committed a per se violation of the ADA as evidenced by their cross motions for partial summary judgment.

Ms. Green objects to our deciding the issue of standing at this stage of the proceedings contending that she needs to conduct discovery. Pl.'s Br. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss the Compl. or in the Alternative for Summ. J., at 6 (referring to Plaintiff's counsel's affidavit). Specifically, and solely, she requests that we defer a determination until she has had the opportunity to conduct discovery "regarding whether the defendant obtained and/or intended to consider information pursuant to the Authorization to Release Medical Records executed by plaintiff." Affidavit of Gary F. Lynch, Esq. Pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(f), at ¶ 3. As discussed below, there is no merit to Ms. Green's contention that deferral of this issue is necessary while she pursues the above question.

B. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is a mechanism used to end litigation where there are no disputed factual issues to be determined at trial and one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). The procedure is regarded as "an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, and is designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1.)...