Gregory v. W. Clermont Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.

414 F.Supp.3d 1064

Holly GREGORY, Plaintiff,

v.WEST CLERMONT LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

Case No. 1:18-cv-824

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division.

Signed September 27, 2019

Richard Ganulin, Cincinnati, OH, for Plaintiff.

Bernard W. Wharton, McCaslin Imbus & McCaslin, Cincinnati, OH, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT

Timothy S. Black, United States District Judge

This civil case is before the Court on Defendant West Clermont Local School District Board of Education ("West Clermont")'s partial motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint (Doc. 5) and the parties' responsive memoranda (Docs. 7, 8).

Plaintiff, Holly Gregory, alleges on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor son, "G.G.," that West Clermont failed to timely evaluate G.G. and accommodate his educational needs. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff also alleges that on one occasion, West Clermont restrained G.G. in a mat, and that on another occasion, West Clermont videotaped G.G. at school without consent. (Id. ). Plaintiff's complaint sets forth several federal and state claims. However, Plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed her state-law claims (Counts IV, V, VIII, and IX). (See Doc. 7 at 1). Defendant's partial motion to dismiss challenges the following remaining federal claims: (1) Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process violation (Count III), (2) Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure and use of excessive force (Count VI), and (3) Fourth Amendment right to privacy violation (Count VII).¹ (Doc. 5 at 3).

I. BACKGROUND

For purposes of Defendant's motions to dismiss, the Court must: (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Bickerstaff v. Lucarelli , 830 F.3d 388, 396 (6th Cir. 2016).

Gregory had early indications that her now eight-year-old son, G.G., has special needs. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 4, 24). When G.G. was three-years old, Gregory was told that G.G. may need a speech and language therapist. (Id. at ¶ 27). G.G. also had panic attacks and aggressive tantrums as early as preschool. (Id. ). In 2015, Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center diagnosed G.G. with learning and behavioral challenges. (Id. at ¶ 28).

Beginning in October 2016, Gregory had a series of communications with G.G.'s teacher and West Clermont concerning Gregory's disruptive behavior at school, which included yelling out, smacking the table, kicking the garbage can, climbing on top of the file cabinet and windowsill, hitting his teacher, and biting and spitting on another student. (Id. at ¶¶ 29-32, 34-43). Due to these incidents, G.G. was removed from the classroom and had to be picked up early by his mother on several occasions. (Id. at ¶¶ 31, 34, 38, 42, 44). Gregory's communications with G.G.'s teacher and West Clermont by e-mail expressed that she did not want G.G. to "get behind because his behavior is an impairment," and requested an evaluation of G.G.'s eligibility for an individualized education plan ("IEP"). (Id. at ¶¶ 29, 30, 38, 42).

In May 2017, a private assessment diagnosed G.G. with ADHD-Combined Type and Oppositional Defiance Disorder-Moderate Severity. (Id. at ¶ 33). Later that year, in September 2017, Gregory wrote to G.G.'s teacher that "last year ... there was talk of seeing if he qualified for an IEP with a possible help of an aid[e] but it kept getting pushed back and nothing ever happened." (Id. at ¶ 35). In October 2017, the principal told Gregory that she had been unable to calm down G.G. for over an hour and a half, had contemplated calling the police and an ambulance to come pick him up, and suggested that Gregory take G.G. to the hospital for an evaluation. (Id. at ¶ 38). Gregory wrote to West Clermont on October 25, 2017 about this incident, telling the school district that "[i]f a meeting had been set up a month ago like I had requested we might have a better handle on the situation now." (Id. ). Then, on October 31, 2017, Gregory informed West Clermont that she was requesting an "emergency meeting," explaining that she had to pick up G.G. early five times and was concerned about him missing valuable educational time. (Id. at ¶ 42). On November 1, 2017, West Clermont indefinitely suspended G.G. due to his behavioral issues, stipulating that "G.G. may return to school when he has documentation from a physician or therapist that he is not a threat to himself or others." (Id. at ¶ 44).

Six days later, on November 7, 2017, Gregory submitted a written request for an independent education evaluation, which was denied. (Id. at ¶ 45). Gregory proceeded to file an administrative due process complaint against West Clermont. (Id. at ¶ 47). West Clermont ultimately declared G.G. eligible for special education. (Id. ). West Clermont also recommended language services and noted G.G.'s "dysfunction with sensory processing" and inability to "self-regulate in order to calm himself down." (Id. at ¶¶ 50, 53, 54). After G.G.'s evaluations, West Clermont concluded that, "[e]valuation data shows that [G.G.] shows significantly more hyperactivity/impulsivity than same age peers, shows significant concerns at home and at school related to showing inappropriate behavior to typical circumstances and a general mood of unhappiness, pragmatic language concerns, and sensory concerns." (Id. at ¶ 55).

Based on these facts, Plaintiff alleges that West Clermont violated G.G. and Gregory's Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights (Count III). (Id. at ¶¶ 72-75). Plaintiff more specifically alleges that Defendant "continuously deprived G.G. of an appropriate public school education without due process of law by unilaterally predetermining to withhold his eligibility for an IEP and the specially designed instruction, related services, accommodations, and modifications provided by an IEP." (Id. at ¶ 73).

Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that on January 24, 2018, "West Clermont restrained G.G. by wrapping him in a mat at school" "without authorization" constituting an unconstitutional seizure and excessive use of force under the Fourth Amendment (Count VI). (Id. at ¶¶ 48, 83).

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that West Clermont violated G.G.'s Fourth Amendment right to privacy by videotaping G.G. at school without consent (Count VII). (Id. at ¶ 86). Defendant has moved to dismiss each of these claims. (Doc 5).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) operates to test the sufficiency of the complaint and permits dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." To show grounds for relief, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that the complaint contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."

While Rule 8 "does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ ... it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Pleadings offering mere " ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ " Id. (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). In fact, in determining a motion to dismiss, "courts ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation[.]’ " Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citing Papasan v. Allain , 478 U.S. 265, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) ). Further, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]" Id.

Accordingly, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A claim is plausible where a "plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Plausibility "is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ " and the case shall be dismissed. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim

First, the Court will assess Defendant's motion to dismiss Count III of Plaintiff's complaint, which alleges that West Clermont violated G.G.'s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights by "continuously depriv[ing] G.G. of an appropriate public school education without due process of law by unilaterally predetermining to withhold his eligibility for an IEP and the specially designed instruction, related services, accommodations, and modifications provided by an IEP." (Doc. 1 at ¶ 73).

Defendant asserts that this claim, in substance, alleges a violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), and that it should be dismissed because Plaintiff released West Clermont from claims arising under the IDEA in the settlement agreement that resolved Gregory's administrative due process complaint. (Doc. 5 at 5-7). Defendant also argues Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing this claim. (Id. at 6).

In response, Plaintiff asserts that the same unlawful conduct may simultaneously violate the IDEA and the Constitution. (Doc. 7 at 3). Thus, Plaintiff asserts that her Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim falls outside the scope of the release-of-claims provision contained in the parties' settlement agreement. (Id. ). Plaintiff further argues that the compensatory damages Plaintiff now seeks for an alleged...