Gresh v. Huntingdon Cnty., CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-CV-1466

DENNIS GRESH, Plaintiff v. HUNTINGDON COUNTY, et al., Defendants

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-CV-1466

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

March 24, 2016

(Chief Judge Conner)

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Dennis Gresh ("Gresh") filed the above-captioned action alleging Fourth Amendment and procedural due process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims for assault, battery, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"), tortious interference with contract, and civil conspiracy. Before the court are three motions (Docs. 14, 23, 33) to dismiss for failure to state a claim, filed by (1) Huntingdon County (the "County"), the Huntingdon County Sheriff's Office (the "Sheriff's Office"), Sheriff William G. Walters ("Sheriff Walters"), Chief Deputy Mark Foor ("Chief Deputy Foor"), Sergeant Jeff Leonard ("Sergeant Leonard"), Deputy Dan McCartney ("Deputy McCartney"), Deputy Tammy S. Foor ("Deputy Foor"), and Deputy Larry Cressman ("Deputy Cressman") (collectively, "the Huntingdon County defendants"); (2) the Huntingdon County Agricultural Association, Inc. (the "Agricultural Association"); and (3) Bartlebaugh Amusements, Inc. ("Bartlebaugh Amusements"). The motions will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. Factual Background & Procedural History

Gresh is the sole proprietor of D&L Concessions, a food concession vending company. (Doc. 1 ¶ 13). Sheriff Walters is the elected sheriff of Huntingdon County, Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 7). At all times relevant to the complaint, Chief Deputy Foor, Sergeant Leonard, and Deputies McCartney, Foor, and Cressman were employees of the Sheriff's Office. (Id.) The Agricultural Association is a corporation registered in Pennsylvania that plans and operates the annual Huntingdon County Fair ("the fair"). (Id. ¶ 8). Bartlebaugh Amusements is a Pennsylvania corporation and competitor to D&L Concessions in the concession vending business. (Id. ¶ 9).

In April 2014, Gresh contracted with the Agricultural Association for concession stand space at the August 2014 fair. (Id. ¶¶ 14-16). Thereafter, he engaged three young adults, Matt, Cassidy, and Zach, to staff his fair stands from August 3 to August 9, 2014. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 17). Gresh orally agreed to pay each employee by check at the conclusion of the fair on August 9. (Id. ¶ 18).

Soon after the fair commenced, relations between Gresh and his employees deteriorated. Gresh believed that Matt was shirking his concession stand duties and consequently fired him on August 5, 2014. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21). Gresh requested that Matt return to the D&L Concessions stands only to collect his pay on August 9. (Id. ¶ 21). On August 6, Matt twice appeared at the concession stands and unsuccessfully demanded payment. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23). Gresh asserts that Matt then publicly "bad-mouth[ed]" D&L Concessions and claimed he was "going to have [Gresh] kicked out of the fair." (Id.) In what Gresh avers is a related incident on the same day, heobserved Cassidy conversing in "a secluded area" with the wife of the owner of Bartlebaugh Amusements. (Id. ¶ 25).

On August 7, 2014, the concession stand employment dispute culminated in a confrontation involving the Sheriff's Office. Initially, Gresh sought the assistance of the Sheriff's Office in dealing with potential further disruption by Matt. (Id. ¶ 26). Gresh alleges that when he arrived at the Sheriff's Office located on the fairgrounds, four to five deputies were present as Sheriff Walters "scream[ed]" at him to "get back to [his] stand" and stated, "[W]e'll deal with you later." (Id. ¶ 27). About an hour afterward, Sheriff Walters and three to four uniformed deputies approached Gresh's stand. (Id. ¶ 28). Gresh claims that Sheriff Walters "began yelling" at him and ordered the deputies to handcuff him. (Id.) The deputies "grabbed [Gresh] by his arm," led him to a second stand, and handcuffed him for approximately four to five minutes. (Id. ¶¶ 28, 30). During this time, the deputies allegedly commanded Gresh to pay Matt, Cassidy, and Zach in cash immediately and threatened to jail him for "theft by deception" if he refused. (Id. ¶ 28). Gresh complied, and Sheriff Walters directed him to vacate the fairgrounds. (Id. ¶ 29). When Gresh subsequently visited the Huntingdon County Fair office, an employee of the Agricultural Association "made a phone call" and then advised Gresh to leave the fairgrounds. (Id. ¶ 31).

On July 29, 2015, Gresh filed the complaint (Doc. 1) against the Huntingdon County defendants, the Agricultural Association, and Bartlebaugh Amusements. Gresh asserts against the Huntingdon County defendants Fourth Amendment and procedural due process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims forassault, battery, false imprisonment, IIED, tortious interference with contract, and civil conspiracy. Gresh also brings claims for conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights against the Agricultural Association and Bartlebaugh Amusements. In three separate motions (Docs. 14, 23, 33), defendants seek dismissal of Gresh's claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

II. Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008).

Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide "the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint, the court must conduct a three-step inquiry. See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2010). In the first step, "the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' " Id. at 130 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Next, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated; well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true, while mere legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at131; see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the court isolates the well-pleaded factual allegations, it must determine whether they are sufficient to show a "plausible claim for relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (requiring plaintiffs to allege facts sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level"). A claim "has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Courts should grant leave to amend before dismissing a curable pleading in civil rights actions. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Courts need not grant leave to amend sua sponte in dismissing non-civil rights claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fletcher-Harlee Corp., 482 F.3d at 251, but leave is broadly encouraged "when justice so requires." FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2).

III. Discussion

Defendants contend that Gresh's factual averments, even accepted as true, are insufficient to establish his entitlement to relief under Section 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and state law governing assault, battery, falseimprisonment, IIED, tortious interference with contract, and civil conspiracy.¹ The court will address these issues seriatim.

A. Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides a cause of action to redress violations of federal law committed by state officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights, but merely a method for vindicating those rights otherwise protected by federal law. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). To establish a claim under Section 1983, plaintiff must show a deprivation of a "right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States . . . by a person acting under color of state law." Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1204 (quoting Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995)). The Huntingdon County defendants do not dispute Gresh's contention that Sheriff Walters and employees of the Sheriff's Office involved in the August 7 confrontation acted under color of state law. (See Doc. 1 ¶ 11).

In the case sub judice, Gresh alleges that defendants violated or conspired to violate his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court will address in turn Gresh's claims against the various Huntingdon County defendants, the Agricultural Association, and Bartlebaugh Amusements.

1. Fourth Amendment and Procedural Due Process Claims Against Huntingdon County

The Huntingdon County defendants argue that Gresh's Section 1983 claims against the County should be dismissed because he "has not identified any policy, practice, or custom of Huntingdon County" that caused his alleged injury. (Doc. 16 at 17). In response, Gresh posits that the role and conduct of Sheriff Walters adequately demonstrates the existence of a policy or custom. (Doc. 25 at 9-12).

Municipalities and other local government entities may not be held liable in a Section 1983 suit for conduct of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (citing Monell v. Dep't of...