Grier v. Griffin Moving & Storage, Inc.

452 F.Supp.3d 1325

Ken GRIER and Carmen Grier, Plaintiffs,

v.GRIFFIN MOVING & STORAGE, INC., Allied Van Lines, Inc., and Sirva, Inc., Defendants.

Case No. 17-CV-61485-MIDDLEBROOKS/HUNT

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

Signed September 26, 2017

Order denying reconsideration Nov. 9, 2017

Geoffrey S. Stahl, Jeffrey M. Liggio, Liggio Law, P.A., West Palm Beach, FL, for Plaintiffs.

Heidi M. Roth, Coral Gables, FL, for Defendants Allied Van Lines, Inc., SIRVA, Inc.

Kirstie Hayduk, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & SmithLLP, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Defendant Griffin Moving and Storage, Inc.

ORDER ON MOTION TO REMAND AND MOTIONS TO DISMISS

DONALD M. MIDDLEBROOKS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand and various Motions to Dismiss. (DE 3, 5, 12). For reasons stated below, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand (DE 12) is denied, Allied Van Lines, Inc. and Sirva, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (DE 3) is granted in part and denied in part, and Defendant Griffin Moving & Storage, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss (DE 5) is granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Ken and Carmen Grier ("Plaintiffs") allege that they contacted Defendant Griffin Moving & Storage, Inc. ("Griffin"), an agent of Defendant Allied Van Lines, Inc. ("Allied"), for assistance with their move from Florida to North Carolina. (Compl. ¶ 6). Plaintiffs specifically explained to Griffin that they were moving valuable antiques and artwork and were seeking experienced movers. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-8). They also explained that in addition to the items in their home, they needed to move items from a separate storage unit. (Id. at ¶ 10). After Griffin assured Plaintiffs that they had experience moving valuable goods, Plaintiffs contracted with Griffin and Allied for moving services on August 28, 2014. (Id. at ¶ 15). Plaintiffs inquired about insurance options with Griffin and Allied and were informed that "they were limited to only $200,000.00 of insurance coverage, but that they did not even need to purchase that because Griffin ... was entirely trustworthy and reliable." (Id. at ¶ 16). Plaintiffs purchased the $200,000.00 insurance policy with Defendant Sirva, Inc. ("Sirva"). (Id. at ¶ 17).

On September 29, 2014, Griffin began packing Plaintiffs’ belongings at their Florida home. (Id. at ¶ 18). The items from the storage unit were loaded onto an Allied truck but not safely packed at that location. (Id. at ¶ 20). However, Plaintiffs were informed that the items were safely packed at Griffin's facility. (Id. ). After a period of time in storage under Griffin's care (id. at ¶ 56), Plaintiffs’ belongings were delivered to their North Carolina home on August 17, 2015 (id. at ¶ 23). Ten to 15 of the boxes were not delivered and other items were significantly damaged. (Id. ). The floor of Plaintiffs’ North Carolina home was also damaged. (Id. at ¶ 24). Plaintiffs made a claim to Sirva in the amount of $1,500,746 based on the undelivered and damaged items but Sirva ultimately offered Plaintiffs $17,855 as a "full and final offer." (Id. at ¶ 46). Plaintiffs rejected the offer. (Id. at ¶ 47).

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in state court alleging the following claims: (1) Fraud in the Inducement against Griffin and Allied; (2) Breach of Contract against Griffin and Allied; (3) Negligent Supervision against Griffin and Allied; (4) Conversion against Griffin and Allied; (5) Breach of Contract against Sirva; and (6) Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing against Griffin, Allied, and Sirva. On July 25, 2017, Defendant Allied removed the complaint to federal court, with the consent of Griffin and Sirva. (DE 1). Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ claims against Griffin and Allied are preempted by the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 11706, et seq., and thus this case is removable as it is a civil action over which this Court has original jurisdiction. "In accordance with 28 U.S.C. [§] 1445(b), a civil action against a common carrier for loss or damage to shipments arising under Section 14706 or 11707 of Title 49 is deemed ‘nonremovable’ unless the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000." (DE 1 at 2). Because Plaintiffs seek damages in excess of $15,000, "the jurisdictional amount set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1445(b) has been satisfied." (Id. ).

On August 22, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Remand, arguing that the Carmack Amendment does not completely preempt their state law claims. (DE 12). Defendants filed a response (DE 20), to which Plaintiffs replied (DE 24). Defendants Allied and Sirva filed a Motion to Dismiss (DE 3), as did Defendant Griffin (DE 5). Both Motions to Dismiss are fully briefed.

STANDARD

Motion to Remand. "[T]he burden of proving jurisdiction lies with the removing defendant." Williams v. Best Buy Co., Inc. , 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). "Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and there is a presumption against the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such that all uncertainties as to removal jurisdiction are to be resolved in favor of remand." Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assur. Co. , 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir. 2001). "[R]emoval statutes are construed narrowly." Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co. , 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994).

Motion to Dismiss. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In assessing the legal sufficiency of a complaint's allegations, the Court is bound to apply the pleading standard articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). That is, the complaint "must ... contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Am. Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp. , 605 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). "Dismissal is therefore permitted when on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual allegations will support the cause of action." Glover v. Liggett Grp., Inc. , 459 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist. , 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993) ).

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court must construe plaintiff's complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff and take the factual allegations stated therein as true. See Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) ; Christopher v. Harbury , 536 U.S. 403, 406, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 153 L.Ed.2d 413 (2002) ; Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc. , 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997). However, pleadings that "are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; see also Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co. , 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating that an unwarranted deduction of fact is not considered true for purpose of determining whether a claim is legally sufficient).

DISCUSSION

Motion to Remand. Although Plaintiffs’ complaint only contains state law claims, Defendants removed on the basis that the Carmack Amendment completely preempts the state law claims alleged against Griffin and Allied. A case that could have originally been brought in federal court may be removed from state court. One type of case over which federal courts have original jurisdiction is a case presenting a federal question. "The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams , 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). However, there is an ‘independent corollary’ to the well-pleaded complaint rule ... known as the ‘complete pre-emption’ doctrine." Id. (internal citation omitted). In some cases, "the pre-emptive force of a statute is so ‘extraordinary’ that it ‘converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.’ " Id. (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor , 481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987) ). "Once an area of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law." Id. at 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425. See also Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson , 539 U.S. 1, 8, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003) ("When the federal statute completely pre-empts the state-law cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope of that cause of action, even if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law."); Franchise Tax Board of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal. , 463 U.S. 1, 24, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983) ("[I]f a federal cause of action completely pre-empts a state cause of action any complaint that comes within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily ‘arises under’ federal law.").

To determine whether the complete preemption doctrine applies, "the proper inquiry focuses on whether Congress intended the federal cause of action to be exclusive rather than on whether Congress intended that the cause of action be removable." Beneficial National Bank , 539 U.S. at 9 n.5, 123 S.Ct. 2058. The Eleventh Circuit has not analyzed the Carmack Amendment and complete preemption after Beneficial National Bank. However, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have.

In Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines , 343 F.3d 769 (5th Cir. 2003), the Fifth Circuit analyzed whether the Carmack Amendment completely preempted claims of negligence, breach of contract, and...