Grier v. State

RICHARD GRIER v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 1083

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2019

February 8, 2021

Circuit Court for Baltimore City

Case No. 118257005

UNREPORTED

Berger, Gould, Wells, JJ.

Opinion by Wells, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

Vuai Green was shot and killed on the afternoon of August 18, 2018 while standing in the 2300 block of Harford Road in Baltimore City. With the aid of surveillance cameras from near-by stores, the police quickly arrested appellant, Richard Grier, and charged him with Mr. Green's murder. The case was tried before a jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.

The State's witnesses were comprised entirely of police officers and an assistant medical examiner from the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner for the State of Maryland. The latter opined that the manner of Mr. Green's death was homicide by multiple gunshots, most grievously, one delivered to the back of his head. The police officers testified about evidence collection, including collecting the surveillance videos and about the circumstances in which Mr. Grier gave a statement to the police.

In his video-taped statement, which the circuit court concluded Mr. Grier gave voluntarily, Mr. Grier admitted that he was in the 2300 block of Harford Road at the time of the shooting. He also identified himself in a surveillance video wearing a green shirt immediately before the shooting. However, he denied brandishing a handgun and killing Mr. Green.

A second surveillance video from a different location, however, seemed to show that he did. In that video, a man in a green shirt is seen pulling what appears to be a handgun from his pants pocket and firing multiple shots at Mr. Green. Mr. Green falls to the ground and a group of people nearby scatter. After Mr. Grier's recorded statement wasentered into evidence and the surveillance video was played for the jury, Mr. Grier testified that he killed Mr. Green in self-defense.

The jury convicted Mr. Grier of first-degree murder and the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. The trial judge sentenced Mr. Grier to life imprisonment for Mr. Green's murder and 20 years, to be served concurrently, for use of a handgun in the commission of the murder.

Mr. Grier filed this timely appeal and poses three questions for us:

1. Did the circuit court err in not suppressing appellant's statement?

2. Is reversal required because appellant was not present during a critical stage of the proceedings?

3. Did the circuit court exercise discretion in sentencing appellant?

For the reasons we discuss, we perceive no error and affirm.

DISCUSSION

I. The Circuit Court Properly Admitted Appellant's Statement to the Police.

A. Parties' Contentions

Mr. Grier's first allegation is that the circuit court erred in not suppressing his statement to the police. He argues that his statement was not voluntary under Maryland's common law of voluntariness. Specifically, Mr. Grier claims that the circumstances of his interrogation, such as being 18 years of age, his level of educational attainment and being placed in "a tiny interrogation room with two homicide detectives," led to his will being overborne. The State responds, arguing that after the police advised him of his Mirandarights,¹ Mr. Grier voluntarily gave a statement. The State contends that neither Mr. Grier's age, educational attainment, nor the location of the questioning, contributed to Mr. Grier's will being "overborne." In the State's view, Mr. Grier fully understood that the police wanted information about Mr. Green's death and Mr. Grier voluntarily answered their questions.

B. Standard of Review

Recently, in Madrid v. State, 247 Md. App. 693, 714 (2020), we reiterated the standard of review for a circuit court's denial of a motion to suppress a criminal defendant's statement to the police. There, we explained:

When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, "we confine ourselves to what occurred at the suppression hearing. We view the evidence and inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the prevailing party on the motion, here, the State." Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 148 (2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "We defer to the motions court's factual findings and uphold them unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous." Id. (quoting State v. Luckett, 413 Md. 360, 375, n.3 (2010)). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the evidence, and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence come within the province of the suppression court.Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 499 (2007) ("Making factual determinations, i.e.[,] resolving conflicts in the evidence, and weighing the credibility of witnesses, is properly reserved for the fact finder. In performing this role, the fact finder has the discretion to decide which evidence to credit and which to reject." (internal citations omitted)). "We, however, make our own independent constitutional appraisal, by reviewing the relevant law and applying it to the facts and circumstances of this case." Lee, 418 Md. at 148-49 (quoting Luckett, 413 Md. at 375, n.3).

Madrid, 247 Md. App. at 714 (emphasis supplied).

In Maryland, it is well-settled that "only voluntary confessions are admissible as evidence against a criminal defendant." Lee, 418 Md. at 158 (citing Knight v. State, 381 Md. 517, 531 (2004)). Indeed, under Maryland's common law, "a confession is presumptively inadmissible...." Hof v. State, 7 Md. 581, 595 (1993). In assessing the voluntariness of a statement generally, we have traditionally examined "the totality of the circumstances affecting the interrogation and confession." Hill, 418 Md. at 75 (citation omitted).

"A non-exhaustive list of factors to consider in that analysis includes the length of interrogation, the manner in which it was conducted, the number of police officers present throughout the interrogation, and the age, education, and experience of the suspect." Williams v. State, 375 Md. 404, 429 (2003). These factors, however, do not share equal weight in our common law analysis. Some factors, such as promises, threats or physical mistreatment, may be "decisive," indicating that the confession was coercive as a matter of law. In such cases, "the State has a very heavy burden, indeed, of proving that they did not induce the confession." Id. On the other hand, factors such as the length of interrogation, team or sequential questioning, the age, education, experience, or physical or mental attributes of the defendant . . . may become decisive, only in the context of a particular case—based on the actual extent of their coercive effect." Id. As the second group of factors pertain here, we review those circumstances that might have affected the voluntariness of Mr. Grier's statement.

As an alternate basis for reversal, Mr. Grier invokes Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which proclaims "[t]hat no man ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself in a criminal case." Whether a statement is voluntary under Maryland's Declaration of Rights is analyzed similarly to the Fifth Amendment's² constitutional analysis. Rodriguez v. State, 191 Md. App. 196, 223 (2010). Under this analysis, a reviewing court will "look to all of the elements of the interrogation to determine whether the suspect's confession was given freely to the police through the exercise of free will or was coerced through improper means." Id. (quoting Harper v. State, 162 Md. App. 55, 72-73 (2005)). The same factors previously discussed should be examined by the reviewing court, such as the length of the interrogation, the manner in which the questioning was conducted, the age of the defendant, and education of the defendant, among other factors. Williams, 375 Md. at 429.

C. Suppression Hearing

At the suppression hearing, Detective Frank Miller of the City's Homicide Unit testified that Mr. Grier was arrested at approximately 2:00 p.m. at his home, "a few blocks away" from where Mr. Green was killed. Det. Miller said that he began the interview of Mr. Grier at 4:00 p.m. The interview took place in a "six by eight" foot room with a desk and three chairs, one of which was bolted to the floor. The interview was video and audio recorded by two cameras. Det. Miller's partner, Detective Niedermeier was also presentand took part in the interview. According to Det. Miller, Mr. Grier was not restrained during the interview and the detectives permitted Mr. Grier to use the lavatory before the interview began.

At this point in the suppression hearing, the prosecutor played the video recording of the police interview with Mr. Grier.³ In addition to stating his name, birthdate, home address and other personal information, Mr. Grier stated that he was in "the 10th or 11th grade, one of them. I think 10th." Afterwards, Det. Miller testified that he read to Mr. Grier "the Explanation and Advice of Rights form," a pre-printed form stating each of the Miranda warnings.⁴ Det. Miller said that as he read each of these rights, Mr. Grier, with another copy of the form, "follow[ed] along with his pen." According to Det. Miller, Mr. Grier initialed that he understood each of the rights and acknowledged that he voluntarily wished to give a statement to the detectives without an attorney being present by placing his signature at the bottom of the form. Dets. Miller and Niedermeier then signed the same form.

Because aspects of the recorded statement play a part in the suppression court's analysis of voluntariness, we summarize Mr. Grier's interview with the police. Det. Miller started by explaining that he was trying to figure out who was involved in the "incident that happened on Saturday around...