Grier v. United States Dep't of Hous.

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DAUNDRA GRIER, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, et al., Defendants.

No. PWG 21-cv-2165

United States District Court, D. Maryland, Southern Division

November 1, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Paul W. Grimm United States District Judge

Pro se Plaintiff Daundra Grier filed suit against the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), the Housing Authority of Elkton Maryland (“Elkton Housing Authority”), and the Housing Authority of Dallas, Texas^[1] (“Dallas Housing Authority”) for civil rights violations and violations of the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) allegedly committed in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Compl., ECF No 1. HUD filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and because Ms. Grier's claims are time barred under the applicable statute of limitations. Mot 1, ECF No. 16. Ms. Grier responded in opposition. Resp., ECF No. 18. Pursuant to the Court's Letter Order, ECF No. 25 Ms. Grier then filed an Amended Complaint, Am. Compl., ECF No. 28, and HUD replied in support of its Motion to Dismiss, Reply, ECF No. 43. I have reviewed the filings^[2] and find a hearing unnecessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For the reasons stated below, HUD's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

For the purposes of considering HUD's Motion to Dismiss, this Court takes the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint as true. See Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, Louisiana in August 2005. Am. Compl. 1. Along with many other New Orleans residents, Ms. Grier initially weathered the storm in the New Orleans Superdome, but was later bused to Dallas, Texas. Id. at 6. In Dallas, she resided in a shelter downtown. Id. Ms. Grier alleges that she was subject to discrimination while staying at this shelter. Id. Specifically, she claims that someone at the shelter told police officers that she did not belong there, and police then arrested and detained her as a trespasser. Id. Following this incident, Ms. Grier filled out an application for housing assistance with the Dallas Housing Authority, believing she would “become a matriculating program housing client.” Id. at 3. She waited for six months through the spring of 2006 but never received confirmation that she was a housing voucher recipient. Id. at 4. Ms. Grier left Dallas in the summer of 2006 and moved to Maryland. Id. She checked her status on the Dallas housing waitlist before leaving and then obtained a travel voucher and ticket to Maryland through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”). Id. In Maryland, Ms. Grier again applied for housing assistance. Id. While awaiting assistance, she resided in a shelter in Elkton. Id. at 8. Ms. Grier never received a housing voucher from either the Dallas Housing Authority or the Elkton Housing Authority. Id.

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, HUD, with funding from FEMA, administered the Katrina Disaster Housing Assistance Program (“KDHAP”) through local Public Housing Agencies (“PHAs”). KDHAP provided temporary rental assistance to families impacted by the storm. Mot. 2. The funding for KDHAP ended on January 31, 2006. Id. Separately, Congress appropriated funds to HUD to provide Section 8 housing vouchers to families displaced by Hurricane Katrina. Section 8 is a federal housing subsidy program funded by HUD and administered by PHAs. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f). PHAs must abide by HUD regulations in administering the Section 8 program, but otherwise have broad discretion in deciding who is eligible for assistance - PHAs may develop their own admissions policies and administer their own waiting lists. Mot. 2. Thus, while Congress appropriated funds to HUD for families displaced by the hurricane, it was the PHAs that ultimately administered the vouchers through the Disaster Voucher Program (“DVP”). Id. The DVP ended in 2009. Id. at 3.

Ms. Grier filed suit against HUD, Elkton Housing Authority, and Dallas Housing Authority, alleging that the negligence of these entities and their employees caused her to be homeless for the last 17 years. Am. Compl. 4. Ms. Grier appears to assert violations of the FTCA and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a “willful failure” of HUD and the PHAs to perform their duty and provide her with housing. Id. at 2. She also alleges violations of 17 different executive orders, state codes, and federal laws. Id. at 11-12. Ms. Grier requests a total of $1,017,760.00 in damages. Id. at 12.

HUD filed a Motion to Dismiss Ms. Grier's suit on three bases. First, HUD argues that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Ms. Grier fails to state a claim because she fails to sufficiently allege wrongdoing by HUD and the actions of the remaining defendants cannot be imputed to HUD. Mot. 3. Second, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), suits are subject to dismissal when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over claims against the federal government where, as here, the government has not consented to the suit and no waiver of sovereign immunity is present. Id. at 4. And third, Ms. Grier's claims are time barred by the statute of limitations - in every civil action against the United States, the complaint must be filed within six years after the right of action first accrues. Id. at 67. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2401.

To refute HUD's first argument that she fails to state a claim, Ms. Grier asserts that “[t]here is a sense of negligence in the handling of the housing application[.]” Resp. 2. She also argues that there is a relationship between HUD and the PHAs because HUD is the regulating body with the right to direct or control the conduct of the external housing authority officers. Id. at 5. As to the sovereign immunity issue, Ms. Grier at first agrees that she has not filed a claim with the relevant agency, id. at 2, but then contends in her Amended Complaint that she did file an administrative complaint, Am. Comp. 9. Additionally, Ms. Grier states that the United States has waived sovereign immunity through the FTCA and the Tucker Act. Id. at 4. Addressing HUD's last argument regarding the statute of limitations, Ms. Grier contends that her claims are not barred because HUD and PHAs also failed to comply with applicable time limits to award her housing, which is a “direct offense against the presidential order.” Id. at 2. Furthermore, Ms. Grier states she has had an active application for housing as evidenced by 2010 and 2017 letters from housing authorities. Id. at 2-3.

In its reply, HUD reiterates its three arguments regarding Ms. Grier's failure to state a claim, her failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the applicable statute of limitations. Reply 1.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, “asserting, in effect, that the plaintiff lacks any ‘right to be in the district court at all.'” Matter of Moore, 488 F.Supp.3d, 231, 235 (D. Md. 2020) (quoting Holloway v. Pagan River Dockside Seafood, Inc., 669 F.3d 448, 452 (4th Cir. 2012)). See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction, and the district court should only grant defendant's Rule 12(b)(1) motion “if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Matter of Moore, 488 F.Supp. at 235. “In a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court may look beyond the pleadings and ‘the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint and view whatever evidence has been submitted on the issue to determine whether in fact subject matter jurisdiction exists.'” Brooks v. United States, No. CV AW-10-122, 2010 WL 11692373, at *1 (D. Md. May 12, 2010) (quoting Khoury v. Meserve, 268 F.Supp.2d 600, 606 (D. Md. 2003)).

A defendant challenging subject matter jurisdiction may do so in one of two ways, by asserting either: “(1) the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to establish subject-matter jurisdiction (a ‘facial challenge'); or (2) the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint are false (a ‘factual challenge').” Wild v. Gaskins, 30 F.Supp.3d 458, 461 (E.D. Va. 2014). HUD does not state in its motion whether it brings a facial or factual challenge. I will construe the motion as a factual challenge because although Ms. Grier initially states in her response to HUD's motion that she did not file a claim with HUD, in her Amended Complaint, she appears to change her mind and assert she did, Am. Compl. 9, which HUD refutes. “A factual challenge requires that the court ‘go beyond the allegations of the complaint” and weigh evidence to determine jurisdiction.'” Id. (quoting Lufti v. United States, 527 Fed.Appx. 236, 241-42 (4th Cir. 2013)). If the jurisdictional allegations are “inextricably intertwined” with facts central to the merits of the case, then the Court should “afford the plaintiff the procedural safeguards-like discovery-that would apply were the plaintiff facing a direct attack on the merits.” Lufti, 527 Fed.Appx. at 241.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for “the dismissal of a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Velencia v Drezhlo, Civil Action No. RDB-12-237, 2012 WL 6562764, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 13, 2012). This rule's purpose “‘is to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.'” Id. (quoting Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006...