Griffin v. Alamo

VANESSA GRIFFIN, et al. PLAINTIFFS v. TONY ALAMO, et al. DEFENDANTS

Civil No. 4:14-cv-4065

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS TEXARKANA DIVISION

December 21, 2016

ORDER

Before the Court is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Federal Claims filed by Separate Defendants Advantage Food Group; Advantage Sales, LLC; Ron Decker; Donn Wolf; Steve Lovellette; and Jeanne Estates Apartments, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Defendants"). (ECF No. 192). Plaintiffs have filed a response. (ECF No. 203). Defendants have replied. (ECF No. 211). The Court finds this matter ripe for consideration.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from a Complaint filed by Plaintiffs, who were all children born into families that were members of Tony Alamo Christian Ministries ("TACM"). TACM is an organization of churches and businesses that were operated by individual members of TACM and Separate Defendant Tony Alamo. Defendants are all individuals and business entities alleged to be affiliated with Tony Alamo and TACM.

Plaintiffs allege that, while they were members of TACM, they were subjected to constant beatings, threats of physical harm, and "brainwashed" to follow the tenets of TACM by Tony Alamo and members of his organization. Plaintiffs further allege that Tony Alamo and others forced each of them to perform labor for Defendants without compensation through "force, threats of force, physical restraint, and/or threats of physical restraint." (ECF No. 135, p. 9). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants knowingly obtained financial benefits from Plaintiffs' forced labor and should have known that such actions were in violation of the law. Plaintiffs allege that they were subjected to the aforementioned conditions by Defendants until Plaintiffs were removed from the TACM compound.¹

Pursuant to these allegations, Plaintiffs assert federal claims against Defendants under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act ("TVPRA") for violations of the TVPRA's forced labor provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1589, and its documentary servitude provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1592. Plaintiffs seek damages for Defendants' alleged violations under the TVPRA's civil remedy provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1595. In addition, Plaintiffs allege and seek damages for a variety of state law claims including battery, false imprisonment, outrage/intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring, training, retention and supervision, and negligence.

Defendants filed the instant motion for partial summary judgment, which seeks to dismiss all of Plaintiffs' federal claims. In the motion, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs are barred from seeking civil relief against Defendants for the forced labor alleged in the Third Amended Complaint. In short, Defendants argue that the TVPRA's civil remedy provision was amended in December 2008 to allow victims to bring a private right of action against individuals who knowingly benefit, either financially or otherwise, from forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589. Defendants note that, prior to the December 2008 amendment, § 1595 only allowed victims of forced labor to bring a cause of action against the perpetrator of a proscribed violation. Defendants argue that the December 2008 amendment to § 1595 does not apply retroactively and that Plaintiffs' claim must be dismissed because it is based solely upon the allegation that Defendants "knowingly benefited financially" from Plaintiffs' forced labor. Similarly, Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' claim fordocumentary servitude because the version of 18 U.S.C. § 1595 enacted prior to the December 2008 amendment did not permit a civil remedy for documentary servitude.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a party moves for summary judgment, "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Krenik v. County of LeSueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). This is a "threshold inquiry of . . . whether there is a need for trial—whether, in other words, there are genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); see also Agristor Leasing v. Farrow, 826 F.2d 732, 734 (8th Cir. 1987). A fact is material only when its resolution affects the outcome of the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party. Id. at 252.

The Court must view the evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enterprise Bank v. Magna Bank, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. The nonmoving party must then demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik, 47 F.3d at 957. A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256.

III. DISCUSSION

Congress enacted the Trafficking Victims Protection Act ("TVPA") in 2000 in order to "combat trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims." See Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000). Although the original Act did not contain a private right of action, Congress later established a civil remedy for victims of various forms of trafficking violations when it amended the Trafficking Victims Protection Act with the enactment of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act on December 19, 2003. See Pub. L. No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (2003). The 2003 Act provided, in relevant part, that "[a]n individual who is a victim of a violation of section 1589, 1590, or 1591 of this chapter may bring a civil action against the perpetrator in an appropriate district court of the United States and may recover damages and reasonable attorneys' fees." Id. On December 23, 2008, Congress expanded the TVPRA's civil remedy provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1595, to allow trafficking victims to recover damages and reasonable attorneys' fees from perpetrators and established a "financial beneficiary prong" which allows victims to recover similar relief from those who knowingly benefit, financially or otherwise, from a violation of the TVPRA. The retroactive application of the December 23, 2008, amendment to the TVPRA is primarily at issue in this matter.

A. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a)'s Financial Beneficiary Prong

In light of the TVPRA's legislative history, Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' claim for civil relief brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1595. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs assert their claim for civil remedy solely on the basis that Defendants "knowingly financially benefited" from Plaintiffs' forced labor. Defendants furtherassert that all of the individual Plaintiffs either left or were removed from TACM by November 8, 2008, and that Plaintiffs' causes of action as to Defendants accrued no later than that date.

Defendants contend that the December 23, 2008, amendment to the TVPRA does not apply retroactively to conduct that occurred prior to its effective date. Thus, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are bound by the language of the civil remedy provision as it was enacted on December 19, 2003. Accordingly, Defendants take the position that Plaintiffs may only seek a civil recovery against the alleged "perpetrator," whom the Defendants identify as Separate Defendant Tony Alamo, and are barred from recovering damages from Defendants on the basis that they knowingly benefited, financially or otherwise, from Plaintiffs' forced labor. Plaintiffs counter that the "financial beneficiary prong" applies retroactively.

Because the events in question occurred prior to the enactment of the 2008 amendment to the TVPRA that included the financial beneficiary prong of § 1595(a), the Court must determine whether the amendment applies retroactively. In Landgraf, the Supreme Court established that there is a "presumption against retroactive legislation [that] is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence." Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994). As a result of this presumption against retroactive legislation, "the Supreme Court has provided a framework for determining when a federal statute applies to conduct predating the statute's enactment." Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n v. New Prime, Inc., 339 F.3d 1001, 1007 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). First, the Court must determine if Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's temporal reach. Id. If so, the Court's inquiry ends. Molina Jerez v. Holder, 625 F.3d 1058, 1069 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280). If not, the Court must then determine whether the statute would have a retroactive effect. In other words, the Court must examine:

whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would do any of these things, the presumption is that the statute does not govern, absent clear congressional intent otherwise.

Molina Jerez, 625 F.3d at 1058 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting In re ADC Telecomm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 409 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 2005)).

Plaintiffs contend that Congress has expressly demonstrated its intent to apply § 1595 retroactively because it enacted a ten-year...