Griffin v. Astro Moving & Storage Co., 11-CV-1844 (MKB)

TRATHONY GRIFFIN, MICHAEL GODWIN, and FRANK CALLACE Plaintiffs, v. ASTRO MOVING AND STORAGE CO. INC., Defendant.

11-CV-1844 (MKB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

March 31, 2015

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

MARGO K. BRODIE, United States District Judge:

Plaintiffs Trathony Griffin, Michael Godwin and Frank Callace commenced this action against Defendant Astro Moving and Storage Co. Inc. seeking minimum wage and overtime payments pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (the "FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201, and the New York Labor Law (the "NYLL").¹ After a jury trial, the jury found Defendant liable to Plaintiffs for overtime wages under both the FLSA and the NYLL and determined that Defendant's failure to pay Plaintiffs' overtime was willful.² (Docket Entry No. 70.) The jury awarded compensatory damages to Griffin, Godwin and Callace in the amounts of $750.00, $385.00 and $3350.00respectively. (Id.) Currently before the Court are (1) the parties conflicting submissions as to the amount of damages owed to Plaintiffs, and (2) Plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees. For the reasons discussed below, the Court awards damages as follows: $1687.50 to Griffin; $866.25 to Godwin; and $7537.50 to Callace. The Court also awards attorneys' fees in the amount of $52,022.50.

I. Background

On November 20, 2014, a jury found Defendant liable to Plaintiffs for overtime wages in violation of the FLSA and the NYLL, and awarded Plaintiffs compensatory damages. (Docket Entry No. 70.) The jury also found Defendant's conduct in failing to pay Plaintiffs their overtime wages to be willful. (Id.)

a. The parties' proposed damages calculation

The Court directed the parties to submit proposed calculations of the total damages owed to Plaintiffs, including liquidated damages. (Order dated Dec. 11, 2014.) Plaintiffs' damages calculations, including liquidated damages, are: $1687.50 for Griffin, $866.25 for Godwin, and $7537.50 for Callace. (Pl. Letter dated Dec. 15, 2014 ("Pl. Damages Ltr.") 1, Docket Entry No. 73.) Defendant argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to liquidated damages under the FLSA or NYLL because, although "not paying overtime was intentional, not inadvertent, it was based on a good faith belief that [it] was complying with the law." (Def. Ltr. dated Dec. 31, 2014 ("Def. Damages Ltr.") 1, Docket Entry No. 75.) Defendant further argues that if the Court does award liquidated damages to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs are not entitled to "cumulative" liquidated damages under both the FLSA and NYLL. (Id.)

b. Attorneys' fees

Plaintiffs seek attorneys' fees in the total amount of $52,022.50, comprising of$48,480.00 for counsel, $2497.50 for Plaintiffs' paralegal, and $1045 in costs. (Pl. Reply Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Att'y Fees 4, Docket Entry No. 77.) Plaintiffs assert that their attorney is a 1987 cum laude graduate of Harvard Law School, where he was General Editor of the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review. (Decl. of Stuart Lichten in Support of Mot. for Att'y Fees ("Lichten Decl.") ¶ 3, Docket Entry No. 71.) Since 1990 to the present, counsel has concentrated his litigation practice in labor and employment law. (Id.) Plaintiffs seek attorneys' fees for 121.2 hours of work, billed at a rate of $400.00 per hour for counsel, and paralegal fees for a total of 33.3 hours worked, billed at a rate of $75.00 per hour. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 10.)

Defendant asserts that the fee amount sought by Plaintiffs for their counsel should be reduced because Plaintiffs only prevailed on their unpaid overtime wages claim, "which comprised only a small portion of the damages claim . . . ." (Def. Mem. in Opp'n to Pl. Mot. for Att'y Fees ("Def. Fee Mem.") 3, Docket Entry No. 74.) Defendant also argues that the "request for fees for the paralegal's time should be denied." (Id. at 6.) Defendant asserts that the paralegal "sat quietly in the rear of the courtroom and provided no visible services." (Id.) Defendant further asserts that in addition to not being "present on the last day of trial, when the jury was deliberating . . . . [the paralegal] bills for her time." In addition to challenging the fee amount billed, Defendant also challenges the hourly rate requested for Plaintiffs' counsel as too high. (Id. at 4.) Defendant contends that the rate should be $300 per hour instead of $400. (Id.)

II. Discussion

a. Liquidated damages

i. The FLSA

The FLSA provides for the payment of "unpaid overtime compensation" as well as "an additional equal amount as liquidated damages," 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), unless "the employer showsto the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that [it] had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission . . . was not a violation of the [FLSA]." 29 U.S.C. § 260; see also Gortat v. Capala Bros., 949 F. Supp. 2d 374, 380 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) ("[T]he FLSA provides for 'the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages . . . .'" (citing to 29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 260)). The employer bears the burden of proving good faith. Herman v. RSR Sec. Servs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 142-43 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Reich v. S. New England Telecomm. Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 71 (2d Cir. 1997); Gortat, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 380 ("The employer bears the burden of proving good faith and reasonableness, but the burden is a difficult one, with double damages being the norm and single damages the exception." (citing Herman, 172 F.3d at 142)).

To establish good faith, "the employer must take active steps to ascertain the dictates of the FLSA and then act to comply with them." Herman, 172 F.3d at 142-43; Brock v. Wilamowsky, 833 F.2d 11, 19 (2d Cir. 1987) (To establish good faith, a defendant must produce "plain and substantial evidence of at least an honest intention to ascertain what the [FLSA] requires and to comply with it."). A court can elect not to award liquidated damages if the employer demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Court that it acted in "good faith and had reasonable grounds for believing that its actions were lawful." Gortat, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 380. "Employer ignorance of the law is insufficient to establish good faith," and "[a]dherence to industry practice, when such practice violates the FLSA, is likewise insufficient." Hellmers v. Town of Vestal, N.Y., 969 F. Supp. 837, 848 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding defendant did not establish good faith under the FLSA where "[d]efendant all but admits its adherence to customary practice and its failure to attempt to ascertain whether [p]laintiff's . . . activities were compensable under the FLSA"); Herman, 172 F.3d at 142-43 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding thatdefendant did not establish good faith under the FLSA where defendant "had extensive knowledge of the FLSA's requirements, but utterly failed to take the steps necessary to ensure [its] pay practices complied with the Act"); Brock, 833 F.2d at 19-20 (finding defendant did not establish good faith under the FLSA where defendant argued that its employee pay rates "adhere[d] to industry practice"); Vasquez v. Ranieri Cheese Corp., No. 07-CV-464, 2010 WL 1223606, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2010) (finding that defendant did not establish good faith under the FLSA where defendant argued that "although not able to comprehend the [FLSA] laws, [he] had obtained a poster of such wage and hour laws," and "he somehow had a good faith reason not to read and implement the laws his poster-hanging noticed".) Where a jury finds a defendant's conduct to be willful, courts "typically do not exercise their discretion to reduce an award of liquidated damages under the FLSA." Gortat, 949 F. Supp. 2d at 380; see also Pineda-Herrera v. Da-Ar-Da., Inc., No. 09-CV-5140, 2011 WL 2133825, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 26, 2011) (noting that the jury found a willful violation of both the FLSA and NYLL and therefore "the Court will not exercise its discretion to reduce the award of liquidated damages available under the FLSA").

ii. The NYLL

The NYLL allows for the award of liquidated damages upon a finding that the employer's violation was "willful." N.Y. Labor Law § 663(1). An employer acts willfully under the NYLL if it "knowingly, deliberately, or voluntarily disregards its obligation to pay wages." Moon v. Kwon, 248 F. Supp. 2d 201, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing to Ayres v. 127 Rest. Corp., 12 F. Supp. 2d 305, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (quoting P & L Group, Inc. v. Garfnkel, 541 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537 (App. Div. 1989))); see also Lanzetta v. Florio's Enters., Inc., No. 08-CV-6181, 2011 WL 253961, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2011) (addressing NYLL and FLSA, noting that a violationis willful "when an employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). It does not require a showing that the employer acted maliciously or in bad faith. Moon, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 235. At all relevant times, the NYLL allowed for damages equal to one-fourth of the unpaid wages due under the statute.³ Id.

iii. Recovery under both the FLSA and the NYLL

The issue of whether a plaintiff is entitled to recover liquidated damages under both the FLSA and the NYLL for the same conduct has not been decided by the Second Circuit. Some district courts in the Circuit have determined that because the purpose of the liquidated damages provisions of both statutes is to deter wage-and-hour violations, a plaintiff is not entitled to liquidated damages under both statutes. See Greathouse v. JHS Sec., Inc., No. 11-CV-7845, 2012 WL 3871523, at * 7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2012) ("[E]mployees are not entitled to recover liquidated damages under both the NYLL and the FLSA because [l]iquidated damages under both statutes compensate the exact same harm — namely, the harm caused by the defendant's culpable state of mind." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Chun Jie Yin v. Kim, No. 07-CV-1236, 2008 WL 906736, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2008) ("To be...