Griffin v. Breed

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JANIS GRIFFIN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS DAUGHTER OF CHARLES W. GRIFFIN, DECEASED; Plaintiff, v. CHARLES G. BREED, CHARLES R. BREED, WHITNEY V. BREED, JANIS R. BREED, LESLIE KOBATA, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AS HAWAII STATE OFFICIAL; Defendants.

Civ. No. 22-00503 LEK-RT

United States District Court, D. Hawaii

August 25, 2023

ORDER: GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT LESLIE KOBATA'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL DISMISSAL OF PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED MARCH 17, 2023 WITH PREJUDICE; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS C.G. BREED, C.R. BREED, WHITNEY BREED, AND JANIS BREED'S MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; SUA SPONTE DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE

LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On March 29, 2023, Defendant Leslie Kobata, in his individual capacity as a Hawai'i state official (“Kobata”), filed his Motion for Partial Dismissal of Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint Filed March 17, 2023, with Prejudice (“Kobata Motion”). [Dkt. no. 18.] On March 31, 2023, Defendants Charles G. Breed (“C.G. Breed”), Charles R. Breed (“C.R Breed”), Whitney V. Breed (“Whitney Breed”), and Janis R. Breed (“Janis Breed” and collectively “Breed Defendants”) filed their Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint (“Breed Motion”).

[Dkt. no. 19.] On April 17, 2023, pro se Plaintiff Janis Griffin, individually and as daughter of Charles W. Griffin deceased (“Plaintiff”), filed her memoranda in opposition to the Breed Motion (“Breed Opposition”) and the Kobata Motion (“Kobata Opposition”). [Dkt. nos. 22, 23.] Kobata and the Breed Defendants filed their respective replies on June 23, 2023 (“Kobata Reply” and “Breed Reply”). [Dkt. nos. 24, 25.]

The Court finds these matters suitable for disposition without a hearing pursuant to Rule LR7.1(c) of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii (“Local Rules”). On June 30, 2023, the Court issued an entering order informing the parties of the Court's rulings on the respective motions (“6/30 EO”). [Dkt. no. 26.] This Order supersedes the 6/30 EO. The Kobata Motion and the Breed Motion are hereby granted in part and denied in part for the reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND

The operative pleading for the Breed Motion and the Kobata Motion is Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, which was filed on March 17, 2023. [Dkt. no. 14.] Plaintiff alleges she is the sole child of Charles W. Griffin (“C.W. Griffin”), who lived in a condominium in Honolulu, Hawai'i. See First Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 1-3. In 2013, C.W. Griffin purchased the condominium (“the Property”) as trustee of a trust created in 2001 (“the Trust”). The Property's deed and transfer certificate of title (“TCT”) was subsequently recorded in the State of Hawai'i Bureau of Conveyances (“BOC”) Land Court registry. But, according to Plaintiff the TCT is now missing from the registry. See id. at ¶¶ 50-51.

Plaintiff states C.G. Breed, C.W. Griffin's grandson, sought an issuance of a Quitclaim Deed for the conveyance of the Property. See id. at ¶¶ 3, 60. A Quitclaim Deed was prepared even though C.G. Breed allegedly lacked a power of attorney to act on behalf of C.W. Griffin. See id. at ¶ 61. Plaintiff alleges the Quitclaim Deed accomplished three things: (1) granted C.G. Breed legal capacity as the successor trustee of the Trust; (2) granted C.G. Breed authority to sell the Property; and (3) conveyed the Property into the Trust. See Id. at ¶ 64. Plaintiff states Kobata, the registrar of the BOC/Land Court, removed the certificate of title of the Property from the BOC/Land Court registry, which allowed the Quitclaim Deed to be registered. See id. at ¶¶ 6, 79-81.

In addition, the Breed Defendants, who are all Arizona residents, see id. at ¶¶ 15-18, allegedly lured and/or abducted C.W. Griffin from his Hawai'i home and transported him by air to Arizona against his will and held him at the residence of C.R. Breed and Janis Breed, see id. at ¶¶ 35-36. This occurred prior to September 2016. See id. at ¶ 37. On December 7, 2020, C.W. Griffin died in Arizona and his death certificate states his place of residence before his death was at C.R. Breed and Janis Breed's residence. See id. at ¶¶ 44, 49.

Plaintiff asserts the following claims: (1) a claim against Kobata alleging that his failures to comply with the rules and statutes applicable to the BOC/Land Court resulted in the illegal transfer of the Property (“Count I”); (2) a claim against Kobata asserting a facial and as-applied challenge to the BOC/Land Court's policy permitting the transfer of property prior to the registration of the deed of conveyance because it leads to the deprivation of citizens' property, in violation of the petition clause of the First Amendment (“Count II”); (3) a claim against Kobata asserting a facial and as-applied challenge to the BOC/Land Court's policy because it violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (“Count III”); (4) a claim for intentional infliction of emotional stress (“IIED”) against the Breed Defendants (“Count 4”); and (5) a wrongful death claim against the Breed Defendants (“Count V”). Plaintiff alleges the Court has jurisdiction over Kobata based on federal question jurisdiction and has jurisdiction over the Breed Defendants based on diversity jurisdiction. See id. at ¶¶ 1011.

In the 6/30 EO, the parties were informed that all claims in the First Amended Complaint were dismissed without prejudice, and the Court stated that “[a] written order will follow that will supersede these rulings” and “Plaintiff [was] not to file her second amended complaint until after the written order is filed.” [6/30 EO at PageID.263.] Despite the Court's instruction, Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (“Second Amended Complaint”) on August 2, 2023. [Dkt. no. 28.] Also on August 2, 2023, Plaintiff filed her Petition for Change of Venue (“Petition”). [Dkt. no. 29.]

DISCUSSION

I. Standing

“Because the Constitution limits [a federal court's] jurisdiction to cases and controversies, standing is an essential and unchanging requirement.” In re E. Coast Foods, Inc., 66 F.4th 1214, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] party must establish an Article III case or controversy before [a federal court] exert[s] subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 1218 (citing Cetacean Cmty. v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A suit brought by a plaintiff without Article III standing is not a ‘case or controversy,' and an Article III federal court therefore lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted))).

To have standing, i.e., “[t]o bring suit, a plaintiff must plead an injury in fact attributable to the defendant's conduct and redressable by the court.” Tyler v. Hennepin Cnty., 143 S.Ct. 1369, 1374 (2023) (citation omitted). “An ‘injury in fact' is ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.'” Van v. LLR, Inc., 61 F.4th 1053, 1063 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)).

Here, Counts I through III assert claims relating to the Property. The Court notes that those three claims are ambiguous for numerous reasons. Count I is a claim against Kobata, but Plaintiff does not allege what statute or law Kobata violated. Counts II and III are facial and as-applied challenges to a BOC policy but Plaintiff does not name the BOC as a defendant. More importantly, though, Plaintiff does not allege that she has a legal interest in the Property. Notably, she brings this action in her individual capacity and as the daughter of C.W. Griffin, but she does not allege that, for example, she was a trustee of C.W. Griffin's estate or his guardian ad litem. Thus, to the extent that she seeks recourse for the Property's conveyance to some of the Breed Defendants, she does not allege a legally-protected interest and, therefore, she lacks standing. See Tingley v. Ferguson, 47 F.4th 1055, 1069 (9th Cir. 2022) (“The ordinary rule of standing is that a party ‘must assert his [or her] own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his [or her] claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.'” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975))). The same reasoning applies insofar as Plaintiff implicitly invokes third-party standing. See Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A., 140 S.Ct. 1615, 1620 (2020) (“But in order to claim ‘the interests of others, the litigants themselves still must have suffered an injury in fact, thus giving' them ‘a sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of the issue in dispute.'” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Moreover, if Plaintiff is attempting to bring claims on behalf of C.W. Griffin's estate, she would need to be the personal representative of the estate, and she cannot represent the estate pro se. See Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[C]ourts have routinely adhered to the general rule prohibiting pro se plaintiffs from pursuing claims on behalf of others in a representative capacity.” (citations omitted)). Counts I, II, and III must therefore be dismissed.

II. Personal Jurisdiction

Counts IV and V are alleged against the Breed Defendants. The Breed Defendants argue this Court does not have personal jurisdiction over them. See Breed Motion, Mem. in Supp. of Motion at 4.

The Ninth Circuit has stated:

“A federal district court sitting in diversity has in personam jurisdiction over a defendant to the extent the forum state's law constitutionally

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