Griffin v. Cook Cty.

240 N.E.3d 1

2023 IL App (1st) 221376

Montell GRIFFIN, Hernan Mosquera, and Jacqueline Meyer, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.COOK COUNTY; Thomas J. Dart, Sheriff of Cook County; and The Cook County Sheriff's Merit Board, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1-22-1376

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

Filed September 13, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 19 CH 9988, Honorable Alison C. Conlon, Judge, presiding.

Cass T. Casper, of Disparti Law Group, P.A., of Chicago, for appellants.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Cathy McNeil Stein, Jonathon D. Byrer, and Kathleen C. Ori, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellee Thomas J. Dart.

No brief filed for other appellees.

OPINION

JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiffs argue that they made a timely challenge to the illegal composition of the Cook County Sheriff's Merit Board (Merit Board), and, thus, their complaint in the circuit court of Cook County raising the same allegation was not barred by the de facto officer doctrine. In the alternative, they claim that the trial court erred by denying them leave to file an amended complaint.

¶ 2 For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.¹

¶ I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 On February 3, 2016, the Cook County Sheriff's Office (Sheriff) filed a complaint against plaintiffs Hernan Mosquera and Jacqueline Myers, correctional officers, with the Merit Board. The complaint alleged that, on May 27, 2014, Mosquera and Myers witnessed the use of excessive force against a detainee, failed to intervene, failed to notify a supervisor, failed to file the proper written reports, and provided false statements regarding the incident.

¶ 5 On August 29, 2016, the Sheriff filed a complaint with the Merit Board against plaintiff Montell Griffin, a correctional officer, alleging that on April 24, 2015, Griffin used excessive force against a detainee and provided false reports and false statements regarding the incident.

¶ 6 The administrative hearings for Mosquera and Myers began on May 22, 2017; continued on May 23, 2017, and on July 6, 2017; and concluded on September 14, 2017. The hearing for Griffin took place on September 22, 2017.

¶ 7 On November 27, 2017, after their hearings had concluded and all the evidence against them was presented, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County against the Sheriff in Griffin v. Dart, No. 2017-CH-15622 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Nov. 27, 2017). This complaint does not appear to be contained in the record on appeal. On May 9, 2018, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed that complaint and never refiled it.

¶ 8 On May 30, 2018, plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking equitable relief and alleging that the illegal composition of the Merit Board violated plaintiffs’ due process rights. The complaint was later dismissed with prejudice on September 2, 2020.

¶ 9 In addition to filing lawsuits, plaintiffs all raised the issue of the illegally constituted Merit Board in documents filed with the Merit Board itself. On February 14, 2019, Mosquera filed a document titled, "Respondent’s Opposition to the Motion," which contained allegations such as, "Respondents’ [sic] prior hearing was conveyed by a usurper. It is null and void," and "Respondent has been deprived of property and due process rights in excess of the authority permitted to the Sheriff and the Merit Board." On April 10, 2019, Mosquera filed a document with the Merit Board, titled "Respondent’s Proposed Findings of Fact." In it, she alleged that the hearing was "convened during the Merit Board’s Period of Impotence." Myers filed documents identical to those filed by Mosquera on February 14, 2019, and April 10, 2019. On September 19, 2018, Griffin filed with the Merit Board a motion to dismiss, which claimed, among other things, that the Merit Board was illegally constituted.

¶ 10 On July 8, 2019, the Merit Board ordered the firing of Griffin, effective August 29, 2016. Two days later, on July 10, 2019, the Merit Board ordered the firing of Mosquera and Myers, effective February 3, 2016.

¶ 11 On August 28, 2019, plaintiffs filed a "Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Administrative Review," in the circuit court of Cook County. Count I of the pleading sought declaratory judgment that the Sheriff's suspension of their employment beyond 30 days was illegal, null, and void and that plaintiffs were entitled to reinstatement and back pay. Count II sought review of the Merit Board’s decisions, claiming that the decisions to terminate plaintiffs’ employment were against the manifest weight of the evidence and that the findings did not warrant termination.

¶ 12 Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on November 4, 2019. That motion asserted that the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 2018)) barred plaintiffs’ claims and that, alternatively, plaintiffs’ claims were untimely.

¶ 13 On August 14, 2020, the trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss as to count II, holding that plaintiffs’ complaint was not filed within 35 days of the Merit Board’s decisions, as required by section 3-103 of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-103 (West 2018)). The trial court did not rule on defendants’ motion as to count I, noting that the question of whether a Merit Board decision is void because the Merit Board was invalidly constituted was pending before the Illinois Supreme Court. On October 22, 2020, the supreme court decided Goral v. Dart, 2020 IL 125085, 450 Ill.Dec. 384, 181 N.E.3d 736.

¶ 14 Following the supreme court’s decision in Goral, plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion for leave to file a first amended complaint for declaratory, injunctive and equitable relief. That complaint reiterated the argument that the Merit Board was unlawfully constituted and that the orders terminating plaintiffs’ employment were void.

¶ 15 On December 15, 2021, the trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file the amended complaint, holding that plaintiffs’ claim regarding the composition of the Merit Board was barred because they did not make a timely challenge to that composition.

¶ 16 Plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for leave to file a first amended complaint on March 21, 2022, renewing the claim that the Merit Board was illegally constituted and, therefore, the decisions terminating plaintiffs’ employment were void.

¶ 17 The trial court denied the renewed motion for leave to file a first amended complaint on September 7, 2022, on the grounds that plaintiffs failed to state a claim and did not make timely challenges to the Merit Board’s appointments before it took substantive action. During arguments on this motion, defendants also asked the trial court to reconsider its August 14, 2020, order, which left count I of plaintiffs’ original petition intact. The trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss count I with prejudice for the same reasons. This appeal followed.

¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 19 Plaintiffs appeal the denial of their renewed motion for leave to file an amended complaint, as well as the trial court’s order dismissing count I of the original complaint. As explained below, the timeliness of plaintiffs’ challenges to the Merit Board’s authority govern both of these issues.

¶ 20 A. Statutory Overview

¶ 21 Although the Sheriff has the authority to suspend a Sheriff's officer for any reasonable amount of time not to exceed 30 days, the Merit Board has the exclusive authority to remove, demote, suspend in excess of 30 days, or terminate a Sheriff's officer for violating the Sheriff's rules, regulations, or code of conduct. Id. ¶¶ 31-32; 55 ILCS 5/3-7011, 3-7012 (West 2018).

[1, 2] ¶ 22 Administrative agencies are created solely by statute, and thus have no general or common law powers. Goral, 2020 IL 125085, ¶ 33, 450 Ill.Dec. 384, 181 N.E.3d 736. An administrative agency’s powers are limited to those granted by the legislature. Any action taken by an agency must be authorized by its enabling act. Id.

[3] ¶ 23 The Illinois Constitution grants circuit courts the jurisdiction to review administrative decisions as provided by law. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9. The Administrative Review Law "shall apply to and govern every action to review judicially a final decision of any administrative agency where the Act creating or conferring power on such agency, by express reference, adopts the provisions of *** the Administrative Review Act." 735 ILCS 5/3-102 (West 2018). Where it is adopted, the Administrative Review Law bars any other statutory, equitable, or common-law mode of review of decisions of administrative agencies. Goral, 2020 IL 125085, ¶ 34, 450 Ill.Dec. 384, 181 N.E.3d 736. The Administrative Review Law applies to and governs proceedings for review of the Merit Board. 55 ILCS 5/3-7012 (West 2018).

¶ 24 B. The Backdrop of Taylor v. Dart and Goral v. Dart

¶ 25 On September 23, 2016, this court issued its first opinion in Taylor v. Dart., 2016 IL App (1st) 143684, 407 Ill.Dec. 745, 64 N.E.3d 123 (vacated by Taylor v. Dart., No. 121507, 412 Ill.Dec. 918, 77 N.E.3d 86 (Ill. Jan. 25, 2017) (supervisory order)). On May 5, 2011, the Sheriff requested approval from the Cook County Board of Commissioners to appoint John R. Rosales to the Merit Board to fill a vacancy, the term of which was set to expire on March 19, 2012. Id. ¶ 7. Rosales’s appointment was approved on June 1, 2011. Id. After the expiration of that term on March 19, 2012, the Sheriff did not reappoint Rosales to the Merit Board, but he continued to serve. Id.

¶ 26 The Sheriff subsequently filed a complaint against Taylor, seeking to terminate his employment as a Sheriff's officer. Id. ¶ 7. Rosales presided over the hearing on February 27, 2013, and signed the order terminating Taylor’s employment on October 30, 2013. Id. Taylor subsequently...