Griffin v. Lamanna

1

GARY GRIFFIN, aka G-Money, Petitioner, v. JAMIE LAMANNA Respondent.

No. 9:19-CV-155 (GLS/DJS)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

October 3, 2023

Mills Law Group PLLC Attorney for Petitioner

Hon Letitia James Attorney General for the State of New York Attorney for Respondent

Jasper L. Mills, Esq.

Paul B. Lyons, Esq. Assistant Attorneys General

REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER ^[1]

Daniel J. Stewart, United States Magistrate Judge

Petitioner Gary Griffin^[2] was convicted after trial of the crimes of murder in the first degree, conspiracy in the second degree, intimidating a victim or witness in the first degree, tampering with a witness in the first degree criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree and criminal facilitation in the second degree. SR. at p. 257.^[3] He was then sentenced to a “controlling term of life in prison without the possibility of parole.” People v. Griffin, 128 A.D.3d 1218, 1219 (3d Dep't 2015). Petitioner presently seeks a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Dkt. No. 1, Pet. Respondent opposes the Petition. Dkt No. 17, Resp.'s Mem. of Law. Petitioner has also filed a Traverse. Dkt. No. 27. For the reasons that follow, this Court recommends that the Petition be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

The Appellate Division summarized the facts of this case as follows:

Defendant, an admitted member of the “Sex, Money, Murder” branch of the Bloods gang, was charged with murder in the first degree as well as other, lesser charges in connection with his involvement in an execution-style murder intended to prevent the victim from testifying in a pending criminal action against another member of the gang. Members of the gang and their associates had threatened the victim's family and had been looking for him when they received word of his nearby location. Defendant and codefendant Trevor Mattis, together with two female associates, then drove to the victim's location. When they arrived, defendant gave Mattis a gun and Mattis shot the victim in the back of the head. Defendant then directed the getaway and disposal of the gun. After a joint trial, at which the two female associates testified on behalf of the People, defendant and Mattis were convicted as charged. County Court then sentenced them each to a controlling term of life in prison without the possibility of parole.

People v. Griffin, 128 A.D.3d at 1218-19 (footnote omitted). The female associates referenced by the Appellate Division are Amanda Miller and Demetria Kelley. Each testified before the grand jury and at trial.

Following his conviction, Petitioner appealed to the Appellate Division, Third Department. SR. at pp. 648-729, 1806-1858, & 2249-2272. That court affirmed. People v. Griffin, 128 A.D.3d 1218. Petitioner sought leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, SR. at pp. 2307-2314 & 2324-2327, which was denied. People v. Griffin, 27 N.Y.3d 998 (2016). Following numerous unsuccessful state collateral attacks on the conviction, see Griffin v. Lamanna, 2019 WL 569075, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2019), this Petition followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Jones v. Vacco, 126 F.3d 408, 415 (2d Cir. 1997); Rivera v. New York, 2003 WL 22234697, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2003). A federal court may not grant habeas relief to a state prisoner on a claim unless the state court adjudicated the merits of the claim and such adjudication either:

1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Hawkins v. Costello, 460 F.3d 238, 242 (2d Cir. 2006).

The Second Circuit has summarized the application of the standard of review under AEDPA as follows:

[u]nder AEDPA, we ask three questions to determine whether a federal court may grant habeas relief: 1) Was the principle of Supreme Court case law relied upon in the habeas petition “clearly established” when the state court ruled? 2) If so, was the state court's decision “contrary to” that established Supreme Court precedent? 3) If not, did the state court's decision constitute an “unreasonable application” of that principle?

Williams v. Artuz, 237 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) and Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2000)). The standard of review under § 2254(d) is “highly deferential” and “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010). “[A] state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).

The phrase “clearly established Federal law” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of th[e] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A state court decision is “contrary to” established Supreme Court precedent “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by th[e] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than th[e] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 413. A state court decision is an “unreasonable application” of established Supreme Court precedent “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from th[e] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id. AEDPA also requires that “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct [and t]he applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also DeBerry v. Portuondo, 403 F.3d 57, 66 (2d Cir. 2005); Boyette v. LeFevre, 246 F.3d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 2001).

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises several grounds for relief: 1) defects in the grand jury proceedings; 2) prosecutorial misconduct; 3) violation of the Fourth Amendment; and 4) ineffective assistance from trial and appellate counsel. Pet. at pp. 6-46. Respondent seeks dismissal of the Petition on the merits. See generally Resp.'s Mem. of Law at pp. 23-72. For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends that the Petition be dismissed.

A. Certain Claims Are Not Cognizable

“In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). Certain categories of claims, however, simply do not present a basis for relief. For example, “question[s] of state law . . . [are] not subject to federal habeas review.” Freeman v. Kadien, 684 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2012).

“Claims of alleged deficiencies in state grand jury proceedings are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review.” Hirsh v. McArdle, 74 F.Supp.3d 525, 533 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Lopez v. Riley, 865 F.2d 30, 32-33 (2d Cir. 1989)). Petitioner contends that prosecutors presented perjured testimony to the grand jury, Pet. at pp. 6-9, but such irregularities are not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus petition. Merritt v. Chappius, 2015 WL 5711961, at *15 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2015) (finding claim of presentation of perjured testimony to grand jury not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus petition). The Second Circuit has held that claims arising from a grand jury proceeding are non-cognizable on habeas review because any alleged prejudice from deficiencies in the grand jury proceedings is cured by a subsequent conviction after trial. See Lopez v. Riley, 865 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that under United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986) “claims concerning a state grand jury proceeding are a fortiori foreclosed in a collateral attack brought in a federal court”); Merritt v. Chappius, 2015 WL 5711961, at *15 (collecting cases).

Petitioner's third ground for relief alleges that he was arrested without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Pet. at pp. 15-16. As Petitioner now concedes, Traverse at p. 12, this claim is also not cognizable on federal habeas review. Crawford v. New York, 2010 WL 2651654, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2010); Anderson v. Corcoran, 2007 WL 1288539, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2007).

Petitioner's Grand Jury ^[4] and Fourth Amendment claims, therefore, should be dismissed.

B. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner claims that the prosecuting attorney engaged in misconduct related to the testimony of the prosecution's gang expert, specifically that the prosecutor permitted that expert to testify falsely about his qualifications. Pet. at pp. 10-14.

Detective Robert Henry testified, among other things, that he was with the Kingston Police Department for approximately 18 years was assigned to the Ulster Regional Gang Enforcement Narcotics Team (“URGENT”) since 2007; had been involved in gathering local gang intelligence and “hundreds” of gang related investigations and arrests; had attended “several schools” in reference to gang identification and gang prevention given by federal and state agencies and private firms; gave a webinar referencing the ...