Griffin v. Mass. Dep't of Revenue

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KIMBERLY A. GRIFFIN, Plaintiff, v. MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 22-cv-11991-FDS

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

July 20, 2023

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

SAYLOR, C.J.

This case involves a Title VII challenge to the denial of an employee's request for religious exemption from a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy. Plaintiff Kimberly A Griffin was employed as a tax auditor by the Massachusetts Department of Revenue (“DOR”), and was terminated when she refused to be vaccinated. She contends that her dismissal was based on unlawful religious discrimination. She is proceeding pro se.

Griffin contends that she has a sincerely held religious belief that she should not be vaccinated against COVID-19; in her words “I have closely contemplated with God and have been shown that I should not receive the COVID-19 vaccine.” She has not alleged that she is a member of any specific church or faith, or other form of organized religion.

For present purposes, the Court will assume that plaintiff believes in God in her own individualized way, and that she holds that belief sincerely. She was not, however, terminated because she believes in God; she was terminated because she refused to be vaccinated.

Defendant DOR has moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The central question is whether a simple allegation that plaintiff prayed to God and was “shown” that she should not receive the vaccine-without more-is sufficient to support a claim of religious discrimination. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that it is not, and therefore the motion to dismiss will be granted.

I. Background

The Court relies on the complaint and certain documents provided by the parties, to the extent they were “sufficiently referred to in the complaint.” Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993).^[1]

Plaintiff used a form complaint, without any attached exhibits, and therefore the alleged facts are relatively minimal. Specifically, the complaint does not allege any facts related to her religious beliefs; it simply states that MDOR determined that her religious beliefs were not sincere and denied her request for exemption on that basis.

Nonetheless, the Court will consider certain exhibits attached by the parties to their briefs as documents incorporated by reference in the complaint. Those exhibits are (1) plaintiff's request for an exemption, (2) a follow-up e-mail explaining her responses, (3) MDOR's denial of her request, (4) plaintiff's follow-up e-mails requesting an opportunity for further discussion or reconsideration, and (5) plaintiff's e-mail stating her objection to her termination.

A. Factual Background

Kimberly A. Griffin was employed as a tax auditor for MDOR.

On August 19, 2021, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts adopted a mandatory COVID- 19 vaccination policy for executive department employees. The policy provided for exemption for medical or religious reasons. Mass. Exec. Order No. 595, Implementing a Requirement for COVID-19 Vaccination for the Commonwealth's Executive Department Employees.

In October 2021, Griffin submitted a request for a religious exemption from the vaccine requirement. (Def.'s Ex. A). In her exemption request form, Griffin stated, “I have a sincerely held religious belief that I should not receive the COVID-19 vaccine.” (Id. at 1). Her requested accommodations included “[t]elecommuting and mask wearing when in person visits are required.” (Id.).

When asked by e-mail to expand on how the COVID-19 vaccine conflicted with her religious beliefs, she replied, “My sincerely held religious belief is that I should not receive the COVID-19 vaccine. I have closely contemplated with God and have been shown that I should not receive the COVID-19 vaccine. Therefore, the COVID-19 vaccine specifically conflicts with my sincerely held religious belief.” (Id. at 3). She also wrote that she had held the religious beliefs “[a]s long as [she could] remember,” and that her beliefs “include objections to other vaccines and/or medicines.” (Id.). She declined to provide information on any vaccines she had received in the past. (Id.).

Griffin's request for exemption was denied on October 22, 2021. (Compl. Sec. III; Def's Ex. B). The MDOR exemption response stated that she had not explained “how a COVID-19 vaccine conflicts with her sincerely held religious beliefs,” and provided “no religious principles that guide her objection.” (Def.'s Ex. B). Noting her refusal to provide evidence of past objections to other vaccines or medicine, the form further stated: “Griffin refuses to provide information sufficient to enable [] DOR to find that her objection to the COVID-19 vaccination is based on a sincerely held religious belief as opposed to an isolated personal choice.” (Id.).

According to the complaint, Griffin “made multiple requests to discuss [her belief and accommodation request] but was denied.” (Compl. Sec. III). In an e-mail to the Director of the Office of Diversity and Equal Opportunity at MDOR, she expressed her disagreement with the decision and wrote: “I don't know how to demonstrate this belief other than through my word and the action of potentially sacrificing my employment with DOR which provides for my family and livelihood; Certainly this is not a personal choice.” (Pl.'s Ex. A). On November 12, 2021, she e-mailed Joshua Prada, counsel at the Office of Labor Relations at MDOR, seeking reconsideration of the decision. (Pl.'s Ex. B). Prada responded that the Commonwealth was not reconsidering any exemption decisions, and that he did not have the authority to independently review her request. (Id.).

On November 18, 2021, MDOR terminated her employment for “continued noncompliance” with the vaccine mandate. (Compl. sec. III; Pl. 's Ex. C).^[2]Griffin responded reiterating her disagreement with MDOR's reasoning and process, including the alleged failure to provide an interactive process or to consider the reasonableness of her accommodation request. (Pl.'s Ex. C).

Griffin filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and was issued a Right to Sue notice. (Compl. sec. III).

B. Procedural Background

On November 22, 2022, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint alleging that MDOR violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), and MDOR's internal policy when it improperly denied her COVID vaccine exemption request without cause and without engaging in an interactive process.^[3]She seeks damages for lost wages, a settlement on the loss of expected future pension receipts, and court costs.

MDOR has moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.^[4]

II. Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court “must assume the truth of all well-plead[ed] facts and give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom.” Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1999)). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must state a claim that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In other words, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 555 (citations omitted). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Dismissal is appropriate if the complaint fails to set forth “factual allegations, either direct or inferential, respecting each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable legal theory.” Gagliardi v. Sullivan, 513 F.3d 301, 305 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005)).

Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”); see also Instituto De Educacion Universal Corp. v. United States Dep't of Educ., 209 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000). Where the court cannot ascertain the nature and basis of any legitimate claims, however, it is under no obligation to rewrite the pleadings on her behalf. See Lampkin-Asam v. Volusia Cnty. Sch. Bd., 261 Fed. App'x 274, 276-277 (11th Cir. 2008) (“While a trial judge is to employ less stringent standards in assessing pro se pleadings than would be used to judge the final product of lawyers, this leniency does not permit the district court to act as counsel for a party or to rewrite deficient pleadings.” (alterations and citation omitted)).

III. Analysis

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Claims of religious discrimination under Title VII are analyzed under a two-part framework. Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 133 (1st Cir. 2004). First, a plaintiff must make a prima facie case “that a bona fide religious practice conflicts with an employment requirement and was the reason for the adverse employment action.” Id. Second, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, “the burden then shifts to the employer to show that it offered a reasonable...