Grillo v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi.

DANN GRILLO, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN WATER RECLAMATION DISTRICT OF GREATER CHICAGO,JAMES MCNAMARA, and JIM DOUGLAS, Defendants.

No. 18 CV 5607

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

September 22, 2020

Judge Manish S. Shah

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Dann Grillo, a truck driver for the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, experienced many physical injuries over his career, most recently to his right shoulder. Grillo sued the District for failure to accommodate, discrimination, retaliation, and harassment under the Americans with Disabilities Act and age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. He also sued his supervisors James McNamara and Jim Douglas for violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But Grillo's factual and legal approach—to throw everything against a wall and see if something sticks—fails to establish any material dispute. The District's motion for summary judgment is granted.

I. Legal Standard

A party moving for summary judgment must show there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). All facts and reasonable inferences are drawn in the nonmoving party's favor. Hackett v. City of South Bend, 956 F.3d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 2020). The movant must show that a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the nonmovant, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), or that the nonmovant has failed to establish an essential element of his claim and could not carry his burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

II. Background

A. Local Rules

The purpose of Local Rule 56.1 is to identify a party's key facts and supporting evidence. See N.D. Ill. Local R. 56.1; Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir. 1994). "The rule aims to make summary-judgment decisionmaking manageable for courts." Kreg Therapeutics, Inc. v. VitalGo, Inc., 919 F.3d 405, 414-15 (7th Cir. 2019). Consequently, district courts can require strict compliance with the rule, id., and do not have to "wade through improper denials and legal argument in search of a genuinely disputed fact." Curtis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 807 F.3d 215, 219 (7th Cir. 2015). Grillo's 56.1 responses, [73], and statement of facts, [80], contain too many Local Rule 56.1 violations. His approach would exceed the number of facts allowed, without the court's approval, by including additional facts in his responses and headers. See N.D. Ill. Local R. 56.1. Many of his assertions and denials lack specific references to the record. See id. His technique of citing to other facts "for a better understanding" or "further context" also fails to specifically controvert the defendants' asserted fact. See id. He relies on conclusory statements and includesimproper legal argument. Id. Any fact not properly asserted is ignored, and any fact not properly controverted is deemed admitted.

B. Facts

Dann Grillo, born in 1955, started working as a truck driver for the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago in 1990. [73] ¶ 2; [80] ¶ 1.¹ The District is a unit of local government, responsible for sewage treatment and storm water management for most of Cook County. [73] ¶ 3. As a truck driver, Grillo's responsibilities included driving different vehicles, hauling materials, operating heavy equipment, and responding to emergency situations, like malfunctioning equipment. [73] ¶ 53.²

Over the course of his career, Grillo experienced many injuries that led to disputes with his employer. In 1996, Grillo suffered a left shoulder injury and took disability leave. [73] ¶ 23; [80] ¶ 2. When the District disputed his request to return to work with accommodations, Grillo filed an EEOC charge, followed by a federal lawsuit in 2001. [73] ¶ 7; [80] ¶¶ 2-3. The EEOC concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe the District violated the ADA. [80] ¶ 4. The lawsuit settled, and Grillo returned to work. [80] ¶ 4. A few years later, Grillo filed another EEOC charge based on disability discrimination and retaliation, which led to a second federal lawsuit in2006. [73] ¶ 7; [80] ¶ 5. The District's motion for summary judgment was denied, and the case settled. [80] ¶¶ 5-6; Minute Entry, [84], Grillo v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, No. 06-CV-01511 (N.D. Ill. 2007).³

In 2010, Grillo experienced a right knee and hip injury. [73] ¶ 23; [80] ¶ 6. In 2012, he injured his right shoulder. [73] ¶ 23; [80] ¶ 6. In 2014, Grillo reinjured his back, right knee, and right hip and also suffered another, unidentified injury. [73] ¶ 23; [80] ¶ 6; [72-25].⁴ Grillo said he was reinjured after attaching a trailer to a large truck and hauling a machine from one plant to another while still on "light duty" restrictions that limited his lifting, pushing, and pulling movements due to a previous injury. [73] ¶ 24. He also said that when his lower back injury flared up, he could not bend, squat, run, or lift, and had a hard time walking. [73] ¶ 25. The District eventually settled Grillo's requests for workers' compensation for all of these injuries (much later, in 2019) but did not concede they were work-related, i.e. "on-the-job" injuries. [72-25]; [73] ¶ 64; [80] ¶ 6.⁵

Grillo also had problems with two of his bosses. When James McNamara started as a Master Mechanic in 2012, he assigned Grillo to drive different trucks. [73] ¶¶ 3, 67. While this was within McNamara's authority, Grillo had expected to beassigned to a single truck because of his seniority, as a courtesy. [73] ¶¶ 67-68.⁶ Grillo also said McNamara or another Assistant Master Mechanic lied about processing a reimbursement request in January 2016, causing a six-month delay. [73] ¶ 77. Grillo filed a grievance about the delay and an internal complaint against McNamara for discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. [73] ¶ 77; see [80] ¶ 31. In a draft report, an HR investigator concluded that Grillo's claim was unsupported but that McNamara "should be reminded" to set an example as a supervisor and conduct employee matters in a timely and professional manner. [80] ¶ 31. A few weeks later, the conclusion was revised to state that while it appeared McNamara was withholding payment from Grillo, McNamara was following directions from HR. [80] ¶ 31. The investigator could not recall why the conclusion had been edited. [80] ¶ 31. Jim Douglas, an Assistant Master Mechanic, was Grillo's direct supervisor and reported to McNamara. [73] ¶ 3. Grillo said that Douglas and other supervisors made a few "snide remarks," like "don't get hurt," because of the number of injuries Grillo had. [73] ¶ 14. Even McNamara said that Grillo probably had more injuries than other employees. [80] ¶ 10. Douglas also mispronounced Grillo's last name for years, which other employees knew about. [80] ¶ 29; [56-6] at 10. The parties dispute whether Douglas intentionally mispronounced Grillo's name or called Grillo a "baby." [80] ¶ 29; [73] ¶ 14; [56-6] at 10.⁷

In February 2016, Grillo reported to Douglas that operating an overhead door was causing pain in his elbow and upper right arm. [73] ¶ 72. The next month, Grillo complained to Douglas about pain in his right arm and elbow from securing a load. [73] ¶ 23; [80] ¶¶ 6-7. According to Grillo, Douglas provided an accident report for this second incident but falsified the report by writing that Grillo had described two different versions of the event. [80] ¶ 7.⁸ Grillo said that Douglas said McNamara told him to add a second version to the report. [80] ¶ 7.⁹ Douglas said that he did not recall McNamara asking him to make an addition, but that McNamara could have. [80] ¶ 11; [56-6] at 17.¹⁰ McNamara believed he asked Douglas to add more information to the report but could not recall the specific content. [56-5] at 27-29; [80] ¶ 11.¹¹

In May 2016, Grillo injured his left knee and filed a workers' compensation claim. [73] ¶ 27. According to Grillo, as he was getting out of a truck using the handholds, he stepped on a chunk of salt, and his left knee "buckled with sharp pain and weakness." [73] ¶ 27. A few days later, a doctor selected by the District diagnosed Grillo with a left knee sprain. [73] ¶ 28; [80] ¶ 8. The doctor approved Grillo to drive vehicles with the following restrictions: no lifting, pushing, pulling, kneeling, squatting, or climbing, and alternate between standing and sitting. [73] ¶ 28; [80] ¶ 8. Grillo underwent an MRI and saw his own doctor for treatment the following month. [73] ¶ 29; [80] ¶ 9. His doctor recommended surgery. [73] ¶ 30; [80] ¶ 9. The District's independent medical evaluator reviewed the MRI, Grillo's doctor's notes, and concluded that Grillo's left knee injury was from a pre-existing health condition. [73] ¶ 30; [80] ¶ 9. The evaluator indicated any daily activity would put Grillo at risk, disagreed with the surgery recommendation, and stated that Grillo was capable of driving trucks with automatic transmissions. [73] ¶ 30; [80] ¶ 9. Based on the medical evaluator's assessment, the District's Claims Administrator—who advised supervisors on permissible work modifications and the appropriate coding for employees involved in workers' compensation claims—told McNamara that Grillo could return to work on full duty in August. [73] ¶ 31; [80] ¶¶ 9, 12, 19.

In early August, Grillo's doctor submitted a report that Grillo was able to drive a truck, but with significant restrictions, including no extended climbing, squatting, twisting, lunging, kneeling, pushing, pulling, or walking. [73] ¶ 32; [80] ¶¶ 9, 27.¹²Grillo's doctor disagreed with the District's medical evaluator, stating that Grillo's symptoms were related to the incident in May 2016, regardless of a pre-existing condition, and asked the District to approve surgery. [73] ¶ 32; [80] ¶ 9. When Grillo returned to work the second week of August, the Claims Administrator...