Grimes v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga.

LAKETIA GRIMES, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEMOF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, et al., Defendants.

6:13-cv-75

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA STATESBORO DIVISION

Dated: March 23, 2014

ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

The Board of Regents of the University System of the State of Georgia, Georgia Southern University, Dr. Brooks A. Keel, Charles Patterson, John R. Diebolt, and Samuel Todd bring this motion to dismiss Laketia Grimes's claims, contending that she brought her case outside the statute of limitations. ECF No. 13. Some of Ms. Grimes's claims are time-barred, but some remain within their window of viability. Therefore, the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

II. BACKGROUND¹

Plaintiff's claims arise from her time at Georgia Southern University ("GSU") as an undergraduate and from GSU's rejection of her application to remain there as a graduate student. She alleges that while at GSU, her instructors demeaned her because of her status as an African-American and a woman, and that they gave advantages to white students that she did not receive. ECF No. 17-2 at 8-10. She further alleges that GSU denied her application to its graduate sports management program because of her race, and that GSU employees retaliated against her by tarnishing her reputation in filings to the Office of Civil Rights. Id. at 11-13. She has raised claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988; 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88; 42 U.S.C. § 2000d to 2000d-7; and state tort law. Id. at 13-26.

Plaintiff filed this case in the Northern District of Georgia. She has since amended her complaint several times.² ECF Nos. 17; 19. The Defendants moved to dismiss on a variety of grounds. ECF No. 13. The Plaintiff timely filed her response to the motion to dismiss, and the parties subsequently transferred the case to this Court. ECF No. 23. Per the agreement of the parties and the previously-granted permission of the Northern District, Plaintiff responded only to the threshold issue of the statute of limitations. ECF No. 16. Both parties have jointly requested that another pending motion—the motion for leave to file a third amended complaint—be held in abeyance until after this Court rules on Defendants' statute of limitations defense. ECF No. 26 at 2.

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants moved to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims as barred by the statute of limitations. ECF No. 13. However, Plaintiff's responsive motion focused exclusively on her § 1981 claims, ECF No.16, and Defendants pointed out that her briefing appeared to concede that her other claims were time-barred, ECF No. 20. The Court therefore briefly addresses the relevant legal standard, followed by the statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiff's § 1981 claims, and finally the limitations periods for all other claims.

A. Motion to Dismiss Standard

A claim survives a motion to dismiss if it alleges sufficient facts to render that claim plausible. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Id. at 555. Well-pleaded facts, however, are taken as true for deciding this motion. E.g. Watts v. Fla. Intern. Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007). "Dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on statute of limitations grounds is appropriate only if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the claim is time-barred." Tello v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 410 F.3d 1275, 1288 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted).

B. Plaintiff's § 1981 Claims

Plaintiff's various complaints allege that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by intentionally discriminating against her, or in the alternative by failing to implement measures preventing discrimination against her. ECF No. 17-2 at 18-19. Defendants argue that Georgia state statutes of limitation control the § 1981 claims, and that those statutes are either one or two years. ECF No. 13-1 at 6-7. Defendants further contend that this action may not travel as a renewal action under Georgia law. Id. at 8-14.

Though Plaintiff's brief is at times difficult to follow, her primary rebuttal is that a federal statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 1658, controls her § 1981 claims. ECF No. 16 at 1. She appears to concede that her claim is not a valid renewal action under Georgia law. Id. at 15 ("If the claims remaining were diversity claims, and if we were proceeding under a limitations period based on a renewal of a prior, validly filed and served complaint, then Georgia rules of diligent service . . . would apply."). Her argument, therefore, solely rests on whether Georgia's statute of limitations or § 1658 governs her § 1981 claims.

1. § 1658 Application

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1658 to alter the statute of limitation analysis that the Supreme Court had previously announced for several categories of claims, including those arising under § 1981. Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 371 (2004). The plain language of § 1658 sets a four-year statute of limitations for claims "arising under federal statutes enacted after December 1, 1990." Id. Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, interpreted that language and held that § 1658 governed a claim if the "claim against the defendant was made possible by a post-1990 enactment." Id. at 382.

The Jones Court further confronted the specific statutory interplay this Court faces today—when § 1658's time bar applies to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In so doing, it noted that its own prior rulings had interpreted § 1981 as a narrow remedy, applicable only to a racially-motivated refusal to contract or to racially-motivatedretaliation designed to prevent a party from exercising her explicit contractual rights. Jones, 541 U.S. at 372-73 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)). The Jones Court noted that Congress did not agree with the Patterson Court's earlier, limited reading of § 1981. In 1991, in response to Patterson, Congress incorporated "termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship" into the bundle of rights that § 1981 guarantees. Jones, 541 U.S. at 383 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981).

The Jones Court therefore examined when and how 28 U.S.C. § 1658's limitations period applied to actions brought under the post-amendment § 1981. Applying the "made possible by a post-1990 enactment" test, the Jones Court held that if a § 1981 claim arose under one of the new, ancillary contract rights, § 1658's four-year period was the governing one. Id. at 382. Contrarily, "[a]ctions which were available prior to the amendments are still subject to a 'borrowed' statute of limitations, which in Georgia is two years." Palmer v. Stewart Cnty. Sch. Dist., 215 F. App'x 822, 824 (11thCir. 2007).

2. Plaintiff's § 1981 Claims

As Jones shows, the Court must examine Plaintiff's specific § 1981 claims and determine whether they arise under the pre-amendment or post-amendment interpretation of § 1981. The Court notes that the inquiry would be easier were Plaintiff's § 1981 count more than a shotgun pleading that sprawlingly reincorporates the Complaint's prior seventy-three paragraphs. ECF No. 1 at 18-20. Her amended complaint makes no further movements towards specificity. ECF No. 17-2 at 18-20. The Court must therefore comb the complaint and attempt to discern the exact nature of Plaintiff's § 1981 claim.

a. GSU's Racial Harassment

Plaintiff alleges that four individual Defendants "alone or in concert with one or more of the others intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff on account of her race" or "failed to implement measures to prevent discrimination . . . ." Id. at 18. She claims that individual Defendant Todd gave white students advantages that he did not afford Plaintiff, id. at 9, and that he made disparaging comments about African-Americans, id. at 10.

Defendants urge that any racial harassment was actionable under the pre-amendment rubric. ECF No. 13 at 6-7. Plaintiff's brief focuses almost exclusively on retaliation, but points the Court generally towards Jones and its articulation of the divide between pre- and post-amendment claims. ECF No. 16 at 3.

For these specific claims, Jones is the starting point. There, the plaintiffs were black manufacturing workers—already under contract with the defendant—who alleged that their work environment was hostile and racially charged. 541 U.S. at 371-72. The Jones Court held that "hostile work environment, wrongful termination, and failure to transfer claims" were violations only of the post-amendment statute and thus fell under § 1658's limitations period. Id. at 383. The Eleventh Circuit has implemented the Jones holdingin largely predictable fashion. See, e.g., Baker v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ, 531 F.3d 1336, 1337-39 (11th Cir. 2008) (racial discrimination against already-employed teacher was post-amendment claim). And for § 1981 purposes, analysis of a contract for education is no different than analysis of a contract for employment or any other service. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 n.23 (2003) ("[W]e have explained that a contract for educational services is a 'contract' for purposes of § 1981.").

Given these starting points, it seems relatively clear that 28 U.S.C. § 1658's limitations period applies to Plaintiff's claims that GSU racially harassed her during the course of her 'contract' as a student. Her claims do not arise from the formation of a contract—rather, they allege that GSU instructors behaved improperly once she was already under that contract. It took the 1991 amendment, and Jones's interpretation of it, to render post-contract employer malfeasance cognizable under § 1981. Cf Patterson, 491 U.S. at 176-77 (holding that pre-amendment cause of action did not address "conduct by the employer after the contract relation has been established ...."). § 1658's four-year...