Grimm v. State

BRIAN GRIMM v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 37

COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND

Argued: February 1, 2018

September Term, 2017

April 20, 2018

FOURTH AMENDMENT - PROBABLE CAUSE - DETERMINATION OF DRUG DETECTION DOG'S RELIABILITY - STANDARD OF REVIEW - Court of Appeals held that ultimate question of probable cause to conduct warrantless search of vehicle based on drug detection dog's alert is reviewed de novo; i.e., standard of review as to issue of probable cause to search based on drug detection dog's alert is de novo. Determination of probable cause involves two-step process. First, court must identify all relevant historical facts that were known to officer at time of search and, if necessary, any relevant or disputed background facts. Second, court must determine whether those facts give rise to probable cause to search. Issue of drug detection dog's reliability is factual question; accordingly, appellate court reviews for clear error trial court's determination as to whether drug detection dog is, or is not, reliable. Upon determination of reliability, court must determine whether drug detection dog's reliability and any other relevant circumstances, viewed from standpoint of objectively reasonable officer, give rise to probable cause. Court held that trial court did not clearly err in determining that drug detection dog was reliable, as abundance of evidence supported trial court's determination as to reliability, and, under totality of circumstances, probable cause existed.

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County

Case No. 02-K-14-001188

Barbera, C.J. Greene Adkins McDonald Watts Hotten Getty, JJ.

Opinion by Watts, J.

Adkins, J., concurs.

It is undisputed that the ultimate question of probable cause to conduct a warrantless search is reviewed by an appellate court de novo; i.e., the standard of review for the issue of probable cause is de novo, or without deference. "In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court reviews for clear error the trial court's findings of fact, and reviews without deference the trial court's application of the law to its findings of fact." Varriale v. State, 444 Md. 400, 410, 119 A.3d 824, 830 (2015) (citation omitted). It may be less clear, however, whether a particular determination by a trial court is a finding of fact, and thus subject to deference, or a conclusion of law, and thus subject to no deference. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985) ("[T]he appropriate methodology for distinguishing questions of fact from questions of law has been, to say the least, elusive." (Citations omitted)).

This case requires us to determine whether, in the context of a probable cause determination, the issue of a drug detection dog's reliability is a factual question to be reviewed for clear error, or a legal one to be reviewed de novo. This is a matter of first impression, and our resolution of the issue will govern the standard of review of a trial court's determination as to whether a drug detection dog is, or is not, reliable.

We set the stage. In this case, Sergeant Christopher Lamb of the Maryland Transportation Authority Police initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle that Brian Grimm, Petitioner, had been driving. Officer Carl Keightley of the Maryland Transportation Authority Police, a K-9 handler, and Ace, his Belgian Malinois K-9 partner, arrived at thescene of the traffic stop.¹ Ace scanned the vehicle and alerted to it. Sergeant Lamb searched the vehicle and found drugs inside.

In the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, the State, Respondent, charged Grimm with various drug-related crimes. Grimm moved to suppress the drugs, alleging that Sergeant Lamb lacked probable cause to search his vehicle. At a hearing on the motion to suppress, the circuit court admitted into evidence several documents, including Ace's training records, Ace's field reports,² and Officer Keightley's and Ace's certifications. The State called two expert witnesses: Officer Keightley and Sergeant Mary Davis, the Montgomery County Police Department's K-9 Unit's head trainer. Grimm also called two expert witnesses: Ted Cox, the former head trainer of the Baltimore Police Department's K-9 Unit and the Maryland Transportation Authority Police's K-9 Unit,³ and Officer Michael McNerney, a trainer of the Maryland Transportation Authority Police's K-9 Unit. Sergeant Davis essentially testified that Ace was reliable, while Cox and Officer McNerney opined that Ace was unreliable. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that Sergeant Lamb had probable cause to search the vehicle. The circuit court found that Sergeant Davis was "the most credible witness[,]" and "accept[ed]" her opinion as to Ace's reliability.

Before us, as to the standard of review, Grimm contends that we must review without deference, as opposed to for clear error, the circuit court's determination that Ace was reliable. As to the merits, Grimm argues that, no matter which standard of review applies, the circuit court erred in determining that probable cause existed. The State responds that the standard of review is for clear error, and asserts that the circuit court did not clearly err in determining that Ace was reliable. Alternatively, the State maintains that, even if probable cause did not exist, the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule applies.

In Part I below, we conclude that the ultimate question of probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle based on a drug detection dog's alert is reviewed de novo; i.e., the standard of review as to the issue of probable cause to search based on a drug detection dog's alert is de novo. A determination of probable cause involves a two-step process. First, a court must identify all of the relevant historical facts that were known to the officer at the time of the search and, if necessary, any relevant or disputed background facts. Second, the court must determine whether those facts give rise to probable cause to search. We conclude that the issue of a drug detection dog's reliability is a factual question. Accordingly, an appellate court reviews for clear error a trial court's determination as to whether a drug detection dog is, or is not, reliable. In Miller, 474 U.S. at 114, the Supreme Court concluded that, where an issue falls somewhere between a clear legal issue and a simple historical fact, the determination of the nature of the issue turns on an analysis of which judicial actor is better positioned to decide the question. As explained below, the issue of a drug detection dog's reliability is, in our view, a background fact that fallssomewhere between a clear legal issue and a simple fact. A trial court is better positioned than an appellate court to determine the issue. An issue as to a drug detection dog's reliability requires a trial court to assess the credibility of lay and expert witnesses; to watch, when available, a recording of a drug detection dog's scan; to weigh and determine the weight to be given documentary evidence, such as the drug detection dog's training records, field reports, and certifications; to consider the qualifications of any experts, and their opinions about the evidence; and to determine whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the drug detection dog is reliable; and whether the drug detection dog's alert indicated that drugs were present. As such, a trial court is better positioned than an appellate court to determine a drug detection dog's reliability.

In Part II below, we hold that the circuit court did not clearly err in determining that Ace was reliable, as an abundance of evidence supports the circuit court's finding that Ace was reliable. We conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances, Sergeant Lamb had probable cause for the search, and we do not address the State's argument as to good faith.

BACKGROUND

Charges and Motion to Suppress

On April 19, 2014, in the circuit court, the State charged Grimm with possession of heroin with intent to distribute and other drug-related crimes. On May 23, 2014, Grimm filed a motion to suppress drugs that had been found in a vehicle that he had been driving. On multiple days, December 17, 2014, January 5 and 13, 2015, and March 17, 2015, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion to suppress.

Sergeant Lamb's Testimony Regarding the Traffic Stop

At the hearing, as a witness for the State, Sergeant Lamb testified that, on April 18, 2014, a detective with the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area team provided him with a description of a man who was suspected to be driving north on Interstate 95 from Atlanta, Georgia to the Baltimore area with a large quantity of controlled dangerous substances. On April 19, 2014, Sergeant Lamb was informed that the man was driving a maroon Honda that was registered in Georgia, that there were multiple occupants in the Honda, and that the man was expected to drive from Maryland Route 100 onto the northbound side of Maryland Route 295. That same day, Sergeant Lamb saw the Honda travel from Maryland Route 100 onto Maryland Route 295, and saw that, including the driver, the Honda had three occupants who were not wearing seat belts. Sergeant Lamb initiated a traffic stop.

Sergeant Lamb testified that Grimm was in the Honda's driver's seat. According to Sergeant Lamb, Grimm's "clothing looked disheveled," and "[h]is hair looked unkempt[,]" which indicated to Sergeant Lamb that "he had been driving for a long time . . . and had[ not] been staying anywhere." Sergeant Lamb spoke with Grimm, who "was kind of mumbling" and "rambling a little bit." Grimm did not make eye contact when he was addressing Sergeant Lamb. Grimm, however, appeared to be "very calm."

Grimm provided Sergeant Lamb with his Maryland driver's license and the Honda's registration. Two days earlier, the Honda had been registered in Georgia to a man named Johnny Lee Oglesbee, Jr. Grimm told Sergeant Lamb that he had bought the Honda, but could...