Gruczka v. McConville

Jason Gruczka v. Caitrin McConville

No. HHDFA166065209S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Hartford, Hartford

March 3, 2017

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR CONTEMPT POSTJUDGMENT (#157) AND DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO SAID MOTION (#158)

Gerard I. Adelman, Justice Trial Referee.

The court heard this postjudgment matter on March 1, 2017. Both parties were represented by competent counsel and each offered several items into evidence including many photographs and video clips of the former marital home and its contents. This conflict is over the condition of the home when it was turned over to the plaintiff by the defendant and what, if any, personal property might have been removed from said home without permission.

This extremely brief marriage was dissolved by this court in a Memorandum of Decision filed November 7, 2016 (#154). In accordance with that Decision, the defendant was to surrender possession of the former marital home to the plaintiff no later than noon on December 19, 2016. The court's order was specific and directed the defendant to " leave the marital home broom clean and . . . only remove the items to be detailed below" (IV. B of the Decision). The items enumerated for the defendant to take with her were listed in VIII. A-E of the Decision.^[1]

The plaintiff filed his motion for contempt, postjudgment (#157) on January 5, 2017, alleging that the property was left in deplorable condition and that the defendant removed more personal property than was specified in the Decision. There was also an allegation as to the defendant's failure to pay certain utility bills, but that claim was not pressed during the hearing and it was acknowledged that the bills had been paid although there was some disagreement over the timeliness of the payment. Likewise, the plaintiff admitted on the stand that the property was left in a good and clean condition generally, but continued to claim that there were hidden issues, including all the sink drains being clogged and the Jacuzzi jets and the bathroom grout badly stained.

As was the case in the dissolution of marriage trial, the court was required to judge the credibility of the two parties as their renditions of the facts were extremely different from one another. Part of the problem stems from the fact that each had at least de facto exclusive use of the premises at different times. The defendant voluntarily vacated the marital home on December 13, 2015, after a domestic dispute. From that date until February 4, 2016, the plaintiff was the only occupant of the marital home, although, according to the defendant's testimony, she did return to the house on a regular basis to get clothing and other needed items. One of the video exhibits offered into evidence by the plaintiff is footage from the surveillance cameras in the house taken on the late evening of February 3, 2016. (Plaintiff's exhibit #3.) That video shows the defendant, her father and two Glastonbury police officers in the house while the defendant is removing clothing and other items that appear to be small personal possessions.

The parties were in criminal court on February 4, 2016, and a full protective order was entered protecting the defendant from the plaintiff. According to that new order, the plaintiff had to vacate the home and he was permitted to return to the house to get personal possessions with a police escort. He testified that he spent between an hour and an hour and a half removing items from the home. He did not return to the marital home again until December 19, 2016.

A review of the photographic and video evidence clearly shows that the condo was left by the defendant in broom clean condition. The house is spotless and the vacuum marks are still obvious in the carpeting during the inspection tour by the plaintiff. What is also clear is that the house was, to a great extent, empty of furnishings. There are no curtains on the windows, no pictures on the walls, very little furniture and a complete absence of accessories such as soap dishes in the kitchen or bathrooms and shower curtains.

In her testimony, the defendant candidly admitted removing more items than those specified in the Decision. It was her explanation that she also removed all items which she identified as having been purchased or given to her premaritally or purchased by her during the marriage. Much if not all, of those items were removed by her after the trial, but before the Decision was filed and it was done in anticipation of the court awarding the home to the plaintiff. The items she removed not on the Court's list included a bathroom mirror, the shower curtain, two lace curtains, the television in the living room, the gas grill and the bedding on the master bedroom bed. It is her claim that the great majority of items the plaintiff alleges were missing were items that he removed between December 2015 and early February 2016. It was her testimony that when she returned to the house on February 4, 2016, there were no dishes, no silverware, no towels and many other items were missing. She testified that when she would return to the home periodically to get clothing, she would notice that things were missing.

Despite the alleged condition of the home on February 4, 2016, the defendant took no action to seek to remedy this lack of necessary personal property in the marital home. She is asking the court to believe that she simply decided to live with the lack of such necessities as plates, silverware and towels and coped with the hardship by borrowing some items from her parents. That explanation lacks credibility especially since the dissolution of marriage case had just begun and a court-ordered remedy would have been readily available to her. The Automatic Orders^[2] were in effect on February 4, 2016, as the writ, summons and complaint had been signed by the plaintiff on January 5, 2016, and the defendant had been served in hand with the action on January 6, 2016 (#100.30).

The plaintiff, in his testimony, admitted to removing certain items from the home when he returned to the house with a police escort on February 4, 2016. According to that testimony, he took clothing, some business-related materials several items of boxing equipment, a television, and a piece of furniture described as an Amish table or booth. He also testified that he wanted to take additional items, but was told that he could not do so due to the Automatic Orders being in effect. The plaintiff's testimony was undisputed on that point. That objection was raised, according to the plaintiff, by the defendant's father who was present during the plaintiff's court-authorized visit to the marital home. If an issue was raised regarding the Automatic Orders at that time, why wouldn't the defendant raise the same claim regarding the items allegedly removed from the home in violation of that same Practice Book provision?

Judging the credibility of witnesses is a primary task of the trial court and " [i]t is well established that the evaluation of a witness' testimony and credibility are wholly within the province of the trier of fact . . . Credibility must be assessed . . . not by reading the cold printed record, but by observing firsthand the witness' conduct, demeanor and attitude . . . An appellate court must defer to the trier of fact's assessment of credibility because [i]t is the [factfinder] . . . [who has] an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and the parties; thus [the factfinder] is best able to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to draw necessary inferences therefrom." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Schoenborn v. Schoenborn, 144 Conn.App. 846, 851, 74 A.3d 482 (2013); Emerick v. Emerick, 170 Conn.App 368, 377 (2017).

In this case, however, it is not necessary for the court to have to delve into the contradictory recitations of the parties. This matter can be resolved based on the credible testimony of the parties. The defendant admitted to removing items not authorized by the court. Her rationale is not persuasive especially because she had requested all of her premarital property in her proposed orders (#147), but the court granted only specific items. It was also her claim that the items were removed before the court has issued its orders allocating the property, and, therefore, she...