Guardianship J.M. v. A.M.

967 N.W.2d 217 (Table)

In the MATTER OF the GUARDIANSHIP OF J.M., Minor Child,

R.P., Petitioner-Appellee,

v.A.M., Respondent-Appellant.

No. 20-1638

Court of Appeals of Iowa.

Filed September 22, 2021

Amy K. Davis of Babich Goldman, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Andrea M. Flanagan of Flanagan Law Group, PLLC, Des Moines, for appellee.

Heard by Mullins, P.J., and May and Ahlers, JJ.

AHLERS, Judge.

The child in these guardianship proceedings was born in 2005. After the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) became involved with the child's family due to domestic violence and drug abuse in the home, the child was placed with her maternal grandmother (A.M.). In 2008, the parental rights of the child's parents were terminated, and A.M. adopted the child.

R.P. is the biological mother of the child.¹ Despite the termination of her parental rights, R.P. continued to have a relationship with the child. This continuation of the relationship was with A.M.’s knowledge and blessing. In fact, for significant periods after the adoption, R.P. lived in the same home with the child and A.M. The child knows R.P. as her biological mother, and, even after the termination of parental rights and adoption, the child continues to call R.P. "mom" and call A.M. "gaga" or "grandma."

R.P. continued to struggle getting her life in order until 2012. In 2012, R.P. successfully completed drug treatment. She also moved out of A.M.’s house permanently after meeting and marrying her current husband. R.P. has continued to maintain a relationship with the child since moving out permanently. R.P. and her husband are productive adults. They are gainfully employed and have shown a long period of stability.

In April 2020, when the child was fifteen years old, an altercation occurred between the child and A.M. After being told she could not leave the home due to COVID precautions, the child became angry and an argument ensued during which A.M. slapped the child in the face and threatened to throw her down the stairs. A.M. called R.P. to take the child to R.P.’s home so there could be a separation period to cool down. R.P. came and got the child.

The next day, R.P. and the child retrieved the child's belongings from A.M.’s home without notice to A.M. That night, R.P. caught the child drinking alcohol in R.P.’s home with the child's adult cousin, who was also residing in the home. R.P. called the police to have the child taken to a youth emergency-services shelter. The shelter would not take the child without a parent or guardian's permission. As R.P. was not legally the child's parent or guardian, the police turned to A.M. to give such permission. A.M. gave permission, and the child was placed at the shelter.

R.P. and A.M. then worked together to start the process to have the child civilly committed. Before they could obtain a commitment order, however, the child ran away from the shelter. An order to pick up the child was issued. Once she was found, she was taken to a hospital and held for seventy-two hours. Testing revealed marijuana in her system. A.M. picked the child up following her hospital stay. The child was adamant that she wanted to live with R.P., so A.M. allowed her to live at R.P.’s house. Soon after, R.P. began sending text messages suggesting she was now ready to parent the child and A.M. should essentially step aside. When A.M. did not immediately respond, R.P. expressed an intention to hire an attorney. Less than a month later, R.P. filed her petition to start this involuntary guardianship proceeding.

After the guardianship proceeding was filed, A.M., through counsel, demanded the child's return. R.P. acquiesced, and the child returned to A.M.’s house in mid-June. After returning to A.M.’s, the child ran away again. She was gone for nearly a week. Contact was eventually made with the child, and she agreed to return so long as she could live with R.P. R.P. and A.M., through counsel, agreed the child could live with R.P. temporarily until things could be sorted out. Once the agreement was made, the child came out of hiding and began living with R.P., where she remained through the final hearing in this case. Following that hearing, the juvenile court granted the application for an involuntary guardianship and named R.P. as the child's guardian. A.M. appeals that ruling.

I. Legislative Amendments and Standard of Review

In 2019, our legislature amended the statutory scheme governing guardianships for minors. The amendments removed all provisions for such guardianships from the Iowa Probate Code (Iowa Code chapter 633) and replaced them with different provisions in newly created Iowa Code chapter 232D. See 2019 Iowa Acts ch. 56, 57. The changes apply to all guardianships of minors established or pending on or after January 1, 2020, see id. ch. 56, § 45; ch. 57, § 44, so they apply here.

The legislative amendments have put us in uncharted water in determining the standard of review of cases addressing the establishment of guardianships for minors. Before the amendments, while acknowledging the case law "continues to be muddy," our cases generally held the appropriate standard of review was for errors at law, not de novo. In re Guardianship of C.R. , No. 14-1039, 2015 WL 576385, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2015) ; see also In re Guardianship of Evans , No. 16-2192, 2017 WL 4570438, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 11, 2017). However, the foundation for these holdings was Iowa Code sections 633.33 and 633.555, which stated actions for the involuntary appointment of guardians are triable as law actions. Iowa Code §§ 633.33 (2019) (stating actions for "the involuntary appointment of guardians" shall be "triable as law actions"), 633.555 (stating the action for establishment of a guardianship "shall be tried as a law action"); Evans , 2017 WL 4570438, at *2 (citing Iowa Code section 633.33 (before the 2019 amendments) in concluding actions for the involuntary appointment of a guardian are at law and thus the standard of review is for correction of errors at law); C.R. , 2015 WL 576385, at *1 (citing Iowa Code sections 633.33 and 633.555 (before the 2019 amendments) in concluding actions for the establishment of a guardianship are law actions and thus the standard of review is for errors at law, not de novo). Since the 2019 amendments, guardianships of minors are no longer governed by chapter 633, so sections 633.33 and 633.555² no longer control such actions.

With this removal of the statutory underpinnings of our prior cases establishing the standard of review, such cases are no longer controlling. Instead, we look to the new statutory home for guardianships of minors—Iowa Code chapter 232D. Unfortunately, chapter 232D is silent on the topic of the nature of the proceedings or the standard of review. As a result, we are on our own to determine whether proceedings for establishment of a guardianship for a minor are legal or equitable. To do that, "we look to the pleadings, relief sought, and nature of the case." Dix v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc. , 961 N.W.2d 671, 680 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Hedlund v. State , 930 N.W.2d 707, 718 (Iowa 2019) ).

Looking at those factors, we start with the pleadings. In her petition, R.P. alleges she has been serving as de facto guardian and A.M. has shown a lack of consistent participation in the child's life. As for relief sought, the only relief sought in the pleadings or at trial was to establish a guardianship and name R.P. as guardian for the child. As for the nature of the case, the only issue raised in the case was to ask the court to determine whether a guardianship should be established and name R.P. as guardian. Resolution of that issue involves making a determination whether R.P. should be given authority to do such things as take custody of the child, establish the child's permanent residence, consent to medical treatment for the child, arrange for the provision of the child's education, consent to professional services for the child, apply for benefits for the child, consent to the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from the child, establish the residence of the child outside the state, consent to the marriage of the child, and consent to the emancipation of the child. See Iowa Code § 232D.401(3), (4) (listing the powers of an appointed guardian).

Given the equitable nature of the relief sought and the circumstances at issue in this proceeding coupled with the legislative amendments that removed the directive that such an action is one at law, we find this to be an equitable action. See Suit in Equity , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("A civil suit stating an equitable claim and asking for an exclusively equitable remedy."); Equitable Remedy , Black's Law Dictionary ("A remedy, usu[ally] a nonmonetary one such as an injunction or specific performance, obtained when available legal remedies, usu[ally] monetary damages, cannot adequately redress the injury.").³ As a result, our review is de novo. Woods v. Charles Gabus Ford, Inc. , 962 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2021). With de novo review, we are deferential to the district court's factual findings but are not bound by them, and we make our own legal conclusions with no deference to the district court's conclusions of law. Id.⁴

II. Issues Presented and Discussion

A.M. asserts three claims: (A) reversal is required because the juvenile court failed to make required factual findings under Iowa Code section 232D.204(3) that a child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA) proceeding is not appropriate; (B) R.P. was required to prove all elements of both section 232D.204(1) and (2) to prevail; and (C) the juvenile court erred in concluding R.P. proved the elements for establishment of a guardianship under section 232D.204(1).

The relevant portions of the statute at issue read:

1. The court may appoint a guardian for a minor without the consent of the parent or parents having legal custody of the minor if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence all of the

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